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ABSTRACT
This study investigates stock market anomalies in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
(KLSE), Malaysia, with some comparisons with three other Far-Eastern markets, namely
the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) and the
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). The main anomaly investigated is overreaction
in the KLSE. Seasonality and firm size effects, which are usually associated with the
overreaction effect, are also examined individually, and in the context of the overreaction
effect. The impact of time-varying risk on overreaction is also investigated. First, stock
market seasonality across four markets - KLSE, SES, SET and SEHK- is examined. The
evidence suggests the existence of December and January effects in Singapore and Hong
Kong respectively. A Chinese New Year effect is observed in all countries except
Thailand. Next, stock market overreaction in the KLSE is investigated. Two portfolios of
extreme stocks (based on their past 3-year excess returns) are formed, and their
performance is measured in the next three years for evidence of overreaction. The initial
results are consistent with overreaction; winner (loser) portfolios, which outperform
(underperform) the market in the prior period, underperform (outperform) the market in
the next period. The reversal in performance is more dramatic for losers. Further analyses
show that risk and size factors cannot explain fully the observed phenomenon. A
seasonal pattern is revealed in the excess returns of winners and losers; there is a
pronounced February effect in both. Moreover, the February effect is observed to be
greater for smaller firms. Lastly, a post-script chapter is included whereby the effect of
the recent Asian economic turmoil on the markets, and on KLSE overreaction, is looked
at. It is found that several months into the crisis, both winners and losers underperform
the market.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1: Preamble
Something is termed as an anomaly when it deviates from the rule. A finding is
anomalous, according to Thaler (1987), "if it is difficult to 'rationalize', or if implausible
assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm" (p. 169). In the stock market
literature, a very well known and widely accepted proposition - the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH) - has been unable to explain the existence of many anomalies. A great
deal of evidence has been discovered that future share prices are predictable, contrary to
the argument of the hypothesis which claims that the movement of a change in share price
is best characterised by a random walk.
For example, the hypothesis has been unable to explain why some variables could
determine future share returns. Evidence suggests that size, price-earning ratio, and
dividend yields of companies may determine returns. Many studies also find that returns
can be determined according to the days of the week or months of the year. In addition,
contrary to the hypothesis that past returns as an information set cannot determine future
returns, more recent studies discover that future prices can be determined by stocks' past
performance; stocks doing very well in a period are likely to underperform the market in
the next period, and vice versa for stocks doing very poorly. In other words, share price
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tends to mean-revert, i.e., there is an apparent overreaction in the market.
Such irregularities have been a popular subject with academics in the field of financial
economics and have been exploited to some extent by investors in the market place.
Research has blossomed in the past two or so decades documenting the predictability of
share prices, and it is likely that this line of research will continue. For investors, such
findings provide opportunities to devise better investment strategies to maximise returns.
The globalisation of world markets has also benefited investors by creating an opportunity
for diversification. However, an understanding of world markets is a prerequisite for such
a strategy to be successful. The need for market studies, therefore, is paramount. A lot of
studies have been done to better understand the markets. However, the majority of these
studies have concentrated on the US and UK markets. Until recently, the emerging
markets in the Far East have been relatively neglected areas of research, despite the
rapidly growing interests of major international investors in this region of the world. For
example, most fund management houses offer investment funds constructed from
securities of emerging markets like the Philippine, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong
Kong, Thailand and Malaysia. An understanding and knowledge of these markets,
therefore, is essential for international investors.
It is due to these reasons that this study is undertaken. Research using data from the
Malaysian and other Far Eastern markets is still comparatively small despite the huge
potential of the region. Moreover, especially true for Malaysia, the conclusion from
2
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previous studies may no longer be valid not only because the market has grown
tremendously in the last decade, but also because the KLSE itself has undergone many
structural changes in the late eighties and early nineties. The results of this study, thus,
reflect the current situation of the market.
1.2: Objectives of the Study
The general objective of this study is to investigate the presence of some anomalies in the
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, Malaysia (KLSE). Specifically, three anomalies will be
looked at, namely stock market seasonality, firm size effect and overreaction effect.
Related investigations will first be carried out to examine stock market seasonality in four
Far Eastern markets. The main work, however, will centre around the examination of the
overreaction effect in the KLSE; this includes how the other anomalies relate to the
overreaction effect. Therefore, as roughly outlined in the table of contents, the specific
objectives of this study are;
(i) to examine stock market seasonality in 4 Far-Eastern markets, namely Malaysia,
Singapore, Thailand and Hong Kong,
(ii) to detect the presence of overreaction in the KLSE,
(iii) to examine the influence of time-varying risk on overreaction,
(iv) to detect the presence of size effects, and explain the relationship between size effects
and overreaction in the KLSE, and
3
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(v) to investigate seasonal patterns in the mean-reversions of loser and winner portfolios
of the KLSE stocks.
1.3: Importance and Background of the Malaysian and Other Markets
Recently, there has been a rising interest by institutional investors in investing in the Far
Eastern markets, also referred to as Asian Emerging Markets (AEMs), due to the huge
growth potential of the region. International fund management houses launch various
investment funds that invest in the region. Apart from sharing economic growth, the
reason is also for diversifiing away risk inherent in the developed western markets.
Therefore, it is important that this study describes the background and characteristics of
these markets. The description of the KLSE will first be given in detail, followed by the
other markets.
1.3.1: Background of the KLSE
a. Introduction
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), as known today, was established in 1973.
Like other stock exchanges, this public company limited by guarantee offers a central
market-place for both local and foreign buyers and sellers to transact in such securities as
ordinary and preferred shares, bonds, loan stocks, loan notes, property trust units,
warrants, transferable subscription rights, and call warrants. Over the last several years,
the KLSE has developed rapidly. The number of companies grew from 262 in 1973 to
4
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565 at the end of June 1996, with a market capitalisation of RM705.8 billions'.
Comparatively, as of December 1995, it is the second biggest in Asia after Hong Kong
(excluding Japan) with a value of US$222 billion (IFC, 1996). Yearly trading volume was
0.5 billion units in 1973 and reached the all-time high of 107.7 billion units in 1993.
Trading pace slackened from then on, and stood at 36 billion shares for the first half of
1996, representing a daily average of 302.3 million shares. Background information on the
number of companies listed, average daily volume and value traded, and market valuation
of the KLSE is given in Tables 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 respectively.
Companies are listed on either of two boards, i.e., the Main Board and the Second Board.
The first comprises large companies, while the latter consists of smaller firms whose paid-
up capital do not exceed RM2O millions. There are several indices in the KLSE. The
most-followed ones are the KLSE Composite Price Index, comprising 100 blue-chip
companies, and the EMAS index, the all-share index for the main board. The others are
mostly sectoral indices, i.e., industrial products, consumer products, construction, trading
/services, finance, property, mining, plantation, and the second board indices. All of the
above are value-weighted indices. Another index is the New Straits Times industrials
index, which is just a simple average of daily closing prices of 30 KLSE stocks.
RM refers to Ringgit Malaysia, i.e., the Malaysian currency. On average, in 1996, the exchange rate is
about RM2.7 to a dollar.
5
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Table 1-1: Number of company listed on KLSE by countr y of incorporation
Year	 _______ Main	 Board	 _______ Second Grand	 New Listings ______
	
M'sian S'pore	 Others	 Total	 Board	 Total	 Main	 Secon Total
Board	 d
______ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _______ Board ____
1973	 155	 69	 38	 262	 -	 262	 -	 -	 -
1974	 163	 67	 34	 264	 -	 264	 8	 -	 8
1975	 167	 67	 34	 268	 -	 268	 4	 -	 4
1976	 173	 64	 27	 264	 -	 264	 6	 -	 6
1977	 177	 59	 20	 256	 -	 256	 4	 -	 4
1978	 180	 57	 16	 253	 -	 253	 3	 -	 3
1979	 185	 56	 12	 253	 -	 253	 5	 -	 5
1980	 182	 56	 12	 250	 -	 250	 -	 -	 -
1981	 187	 55	 11	 253	 -	 253	 5	 -	 5
1982	 194	 56	 11	 261	 -	 261	 8	 -	 8
1983	 204	 56	 11	 271	 -	 271	 10	 -	 10
1984	 218	 56	 8	 282	 -	 282	 14	 -	 14
1985	 222	 56	 6	 284	 -	 284	 4	 -	 4
1986	 227	 55	 6	 288	 -	 288	 5	 -	 5
1987	 232	 54	 5	 291	 -	 291	 5	 -	 5
1988	 238	 53	 4	 195	 -	 295	 6	 -	 6
1989	 249	 53	 3	 305	 2	 307	 11	 2	 13
1990	 268	 -	 3	 271	 14	 285	 19	 12	 31
1991	 289	 -	 3	 292	 32	 324	 21	 18	 39
1992	 314	 -	 3	 317	 52	 369	 25	 20	 45
1993	 326	 -	 3	 329	 84	 413	 12	 32	 44
1994	 344	 -	 3	 347	 131	 478	 19	 47	 66
1995	 366	 -	 3	 369	 160	 529	 18	 33	 51
Asat	 379	 -	 3	 382	 183	 565	 9	 27	 36
28/6/96 ________ ________ _______ _______ ________ ________ __________ ________ ______
Note:
M'sian = Malaysian
S'pore = Singaporean
Source: KLSE (1996) Investing in the Stock Market in Malaysia
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Table 1-2: Daily volume and value traded in the KLSE, 1973-1996
Year	 Daily Average Volume	 Daily Average Value
	
___________	 (million units)	 _________ ___________	 (RIvI million)	 __________
	
Main	 Second	 Call	 Total	 Main	 Second	 Call	 Total
	
_______ Board	 Board Warrants ______ Board Board Warrants _______
1973	 3.1	 -	 -	 3.1	 12.2	 -	 -	 12.2
1974	 1.6	 -	 -	 1.6	 2.9	 -	 -	 2.9
1975	 2.5	 -	 -	 2.5	 5.3	 -	 -	 5.3
1976	 1.7	 -	 -	 1.7	 4.0	 -	 -	 4.0
1977	 2.4	 -	 -	 2.4	 4.2	 -	 -	 4.2
1978	 4.6	 -	 -	 4.6	 10.4	 -	 -	 10.4
1979	 2.6	 -	 -	 2.6	 6.7	 -	 -	 6.7
1980	 6.0	 -	 -	 6.0	 22.6	 -	 -	 22.6
1981	 6.7	 -	 -	 6.7	 32.8	 -	 -	 32.8
1982	 4.4	 -	 -	 4.4	 13.3	 -	 -	 13.3
1983	 9.2	 -	 -	 9.2	 32.0	 -	 -	 32.0
1984	 7.6	 -	 -	 7.6	 23.3	 -	 -	 23.3
1985	 11.9	 -	 -	 11.9	 25.7	 -	 -	 25.7
1986	 9.2	 -	 -	 9.2	 13.6	 -	 -	 13.6
1987	 21.4	 -	 -	 21.4	 40.8	 -	 -	 40.8
1988	 16.3	 -	 -	 16.3	 27.6	 -	 -	 27.6
1989	 41.5	 0.1	 -	 41.6	 75.7	 0.3	 -	 76.0
1990	 53.3	 0.3	 -	 53.6	 119.6	 0.9	 -	 120.5
1991	 48.5	 1.1	 -	 49.6	 117.5	 3.4	 -	 120.9
1992	 74.8	 2.9	 -	 77.7	 198.3	 9.2	 -	 207.5
1993	 421.7	 11.0	 -	 432.7	 1,496.5	 58.8	 -	 1,555.3
1994	 236.9	 5.6	 -	 242.5	 1,283.3	 39.5	 -	 1,322.8
1995	 127.0	 12.7	 0.163	 139.8	 649.8	 85.9	 0.305	 736.0
Up to	 232.2	 69.8	 0.203	 302.3	 1,288.3	 606.4	 0.273	 1,894.9
28/6/96 _________ _________ __________ ________ ________ ________ _________ ________
Source: KLSE (1996) Investing in the Stock Market in Malaysia
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Table 1-3: KLSE nominal value and market valuation: 1973-1996
	Nominal value	 Market valuation
Asat _________	 (RM billion)	 ________ ________	 (RM billion)	 __________
year	 Main	 Second	 Call	 Total	 Main Second	 Call	 Total
	
________ Board
	
Board Warrants	 Board Board Warrants _________
1973	 3.8	 -	 -	 3.8	 13.3	 -	 -	 13.3
1974	 4.3	 -	 -	 4.3	 8.1	 -	 -	 8.1
1975	 4.8	 -	 -	 4.8	 11.7	 -	 -	 11.7
1976	 5.0	 -	 -	 5.0	 12.7	 -	 -	 12.7
1977	 5.2	 -	 -	 5.2	 13.7	 -	 -	 13.7
1978	 5.9	 -	 -	 5.9	 18.3	 -	 -	 18.3
1979	 6.5	 -	 -	 6.5	 24.6	 -	 -	 24.6
1980	 7.9	 -	 -	 7.9	 43.1	 -	 -	 43.1
1981	 10.7	 -	 -	 10.7	 55.4	 -	 -	 55.4
1982	 13.6	 -	 -	 13.6	 52.9	 -	 -	 52.9
1983	 16.3	 -	 -	 16.3	 80.3	 -	 -	 80.3
1984	 20.4	 -	 -	 20.4	 69.3	 -	 -	 69.3
1985	 22.6	 -	 -	 22.6	 58.3	 -	 -	 58.3
1986	 23.5	 -	 -	 23.5	 64.5	 -	 -	 64.5
1987	 26.6	 -	 -	 26.6	 73.9	 -	 -	 73.9
1988	 29.4	 -	 -	 29.4	 98.7	 -	 -	 98.7
1989	 34.3	 0.03	 -	 34.3	 156.0	 0.1	 -	 156.1
1990	 35.1	 0.2	 -	 35.3	 131.1	 0.6	 -	 131.7
1991	 41.2	 0.5	 -	 41.7	 159.9	 1.5	 -	 161.4
1992	 52.3	 0.9	 -	 53.2	 242.9	 2.9	 -	 245.8
1993	 60.0	 1.6	 -	 61.6	 606.1	 13.5	 -	 619.6
1994	 73.0	 2.9	 -	 75.9	 493.0	 15.9	 -	 508.9
1995	 88.4	 3.9	 0.07	 92.4	 542.8	 22.7	 0.12	 565.6
28/6/96	 97.4	 4.7	 0.07	 102.2	 665.7	 39.9	 0.11	 705.8
Source: KLSE (1996) Investing in the Stock Market in Malaysia
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Figure 1-1: KLSE nominal value and market valuation: 1973-1996
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b. History
The first formal organisation in the securities business in Malaysia started when the
Singapore Stockbrokers' Association was formed in 1930. It was re-registered as the
Malayan Stockbrokers' Association in 1937. However, public trading of shares in
Malaysia only began on 9 May, 1960 when the Malayan Stock Exchange was formed. In
1961, the board system was introduced with two trading rooms, in Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur, that were linked by direct telephone lines into a single market with the same
stocks listed at a single set of prices on both boards.
With the secession of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, the common stock exchange
continued to function but as the Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore (SEMS). In
1973, currency interchangeability between Malaysia and Singapore was terminated and
SEMS was separated into The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Berhad (KLSEB) and The
Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES). During this time, Malaysian companies continued to
be listed on SES and vice versa. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), as it is
known today, was established in 1973 and took over operations from KLSEB as the stock
exchange in Malaysia. In 1990, Singapore incorporated companies were delisted from
KLSE and vice-versa. In 1994, the Exchange became known simply as Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange, without 'The' as a prefix.
c. Equity distribution of listed companies
A survey by the KLSE in 1995 revealed that as at 31St December 1994, small shareholders
holding 500 - 5,000 shares represent the largest group of investors, accounting for 76.4
10
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percent of total investors in the KLSE. However, in terms of equity held, shareholders
holding more than 10,000 shares control the largest portion of total equity, i.e., 89.7
percent, even though they account for only 7.8 percent of total investors. Individuals are
the largest type of investors accounting for 95.3 percent, while the institutions only make
up 2.3 percent of the shareholders. These institution, however hold 42.9 percent of the
equity, compared with only 16.7 percent and 38.6 percent for individuals and nominees
respectively. Bumiputera investors 2
 represent 17.3 percent of the total investors, while the
non-Bumiputeras and foreigners make up 69.7 and 13.0 percent respectively. These non-
Bumiputera, who are predominantly Chinese, control 49.1 percent of the equity of the
listed companies, while the Bumiputeras only 31.8 percent.
Foreign ownership of companies is generally restricted to 30 percent. However, this does
not apply to specific projects approved by the government. In July 1988, however, this
limit was increased to 49 percent.
d. Regulatory structure
A specific law for the Malaysian securities industry was first promulgated by Parliament
in 1973 in the form of the Securities Industry Act (SIA), which came into force in 1976.
This ACT enables the present KLSE to be established as a stock exchange. SIA provides
the regulatory framework of the securities industry in Malaysia, and is responsible to the
Ministry of Finance. It also requires a stockbroker to hold a dealer's licence issued by the
Registrar of Companies (ROC). The ROC is the body responsible for the registration and
2 Bumiputera refers to the indigenous people of Malaysia, i.e., the Malays.
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incorporation of companies. It is the custodian of Companies Act 1965, and also the SIA
1973. In 1983, the Securities Industry Act 1983 totally replaced SIA 1973. The SIA 1983
gave formal recognition to the Capital Issues Committee (CIC) with the primary functions
of advising the Minister of Finance (MOF) on matters relating to the securities industry
and approving the listing and quotation of securities on the KLSE.
In 1991, the Securities Industries (Central Depository) Act (SICDA) which allows for the
establishment, maintenance and operation of a central depository system, was
promulgated. The ROC was again appointed as the custodian of this Act. An important
milestone in the KLSE was seen in 1993 when the Securities Commission Act (SCA) was
passed. Under this Act, the Securities Commission (SC) was established. It took over the
functions of CIC and Panel of Takeover and Mergers. The SCA, SICDA and SIA were
later amended in 1996, which saw more power shifted to the SC in regulating securities
industry in Malaysia. Figure 1-2 illustrates the regulatory structure of securities and
financial future industry in Malaysia.
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Figure 1-2: Regulatory structure of securities and financial futures industry in
Malaysia (supervisory and monitoring)
Securities Industry Act 1983
	 Securities Commission Act 1993
Registrar of Companies 	 Securities Conmiission
Securities Clearing	 Malaysian Central
	 Kuala Lumpur Options &
KLSE	 Automated Network Sdn
	 Depository Sdn Bhd
	 Financial Futures
Bhd (SCANS)	 (MCD)	 Exchange
Source: KLSE (1996) Investing in the Stock Market in Malaysia
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e. Investment advisory services
As of June 1996, there are 60 brokerage houses throughout the country, which provide
investment advisory services, in addition to their core business. The services are also
provided by corporations that have been specifically issued with the relevant license by
the Securities Commission (SC) under the SIA 1983. There are 28 such companies; most
of them are affiliated with established foreign investment advisory services companies,
such as Baring Research, Credit Lyonnaise, BZW, Nomura and SG Warburg. The services
are also provided to some extent by commercial banks, Islamic banks, insurance
companies/societies, trust companies, and also by local newspapers and business
magazines.
Another type of company is the Asset Management Company (AMC). This is a company
incorporated under Companies Act 1965 to provide portfolio management services for
institutional, trust, pension, insurance, employees' provident and private individual funds.
There are 42 AMCs as of June 1996 in the country. The approving authority to set up an
AMC is the Ministry of Finance, and the licence is issued by the SC.
f. Trading on KLSE
Trading normally takes place 5 days a week (Monday - Friday) with two trading sessions.
The morning session runs from 9.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m., while the afternoon session runs
from 2.30 p.m. to 5.00 p.m. Trading is done under the Exchange's trading system called
SCORE (System on Computerised Order Routing and Execution) which was launched in
1989 to replace the open outcry system. Initially, SCORE was on a semi-automated
14
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basis, whereby orders were computerised but matchings were not. Orders were keyed into
the SCORE terminal at the stockbroking company and relayed to KLSE. Once in the
system, they were routed to the Exchange's matching room and matched by KLSE staff
manually. By the end of November 1992, it was converted into a fully automated trading
system without any human intervention in the matching process. In February, 1995, a
broker front-end system called WinSCORE was implemented. It allows order entry, trade
routing, credit control management, confirmation of trades and price, and news
monitoring via a single terminal. Prior to this, the order-entry function and real-time stock
price information were under two separate systems.
Clearing services for stockbroking are provided by Securities Clearing Automated
Network Services Sdn. Bhd. (SCANS), a wholly subsidiary of KLSE established in 1983.
To facilitate clearing and settlement, the KLSE has established a Fixed Delivery and
Settlement System (FDSS) in February, 1990. The KLSE adopts the system based on a
T+5 rolling settlement, where 'T' is defined as the day of trade, and '5' represents five
working days. Sellers will get paid by brokers on T+6, and buyers shall pay brokers no
later than T+7. More recently, the Central Depository System (CDS) has done away with
delivery and collection of physical scrips beginning in 1993. Under the system, delivery of
shares is through book-entry. The FDSS will continue, except that delivery will now be
replaced by book-entry. Shares are normally traded in board lots of 1000 units. However,
in a move to enable highly priced and, as such, thinly traded securities to be more
affordable to a larger section of the investing public, the KLSE has now allowed trading
of board lots of 200 units of certain companies.
15
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The minimum bids for securities range from 0.5 sen for securities whose price is below
RM1.00, to 50 sen for those whose price is more than RMi00 3 . Transaction costs also
vary depending on the value of transaction. For transaction values of up to RM500,000, a
brokerage fee of 1.00% is charged. For transaction values of RM5 00,000 - RM2 million,
the fee is 0.75%, while a fee of 0.50% is charged for transactions exceeding RM2 million.
In addition, an investor also needs to pay a clearing fee and stamp duty of 0.05% and
0.10% of transaction value respectively.
Cash transactions and margin transactions are two types of transaction allowed in the
KLSE. Moreover, in order to facilitate trade and arbitrage activities in the market, the
KLSE recently allowed the practice of short-selling. Contra transaction facilities are also
accorded to certain clients by the brokerage companies. In Malaysia, there is no tax on
capital gains arising from securities transaction.
1.3.2: Background of the other markets
The growing market in the Far-Eastern economies are generally referred to as the Asian
Emerging Markets (AEM5). This includes South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand,
the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia 4 . As the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of these countries increases, so do their securities market variables, such as the
number of companies listed, market capitalisation and trading volume (Sedaghat, et al.
1994). Some backgrounds of these markets are described below. Though only four
3 i senisequaltoRMO.O1
An emerging market can be defined in different ways. For example, it can refers to a market which is
growing in size and sophistication, or to a market in a developing country (IFC, 1996). The IFC does not
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countries are investigated in this study, the other markets are also reviewed since many
international investors look at the Asian markets as a single market.
To start with, some statistics of the AEMs, together with those for the US and UK as
comparisons, are presented in Table 1-4. As can be seen, some of these markets are
among the top 15 in the world in terms of market value. Hong Kong, for example, is in
ninth place. With regard to the value traded, Taiwan and Korea are in sixth and ninth
positions respectively at the end of 1995. However, the rankings of AEMs by the number
of companies listed are not impressive, as only Korea is able to place itself in the top ten.
Table 1-4 also gives a general idea of how concentrated the markets are. Two measures of
market concentration, i.e., the percentage of market capitalisation held by the 10 largest
companies, and the percentage of value traded held by the 10 most active stocks are given
in columns 8 and 9 respectively. Though the percentages of both measures are quite high,
they have generally been decreasing as more and more companies are listed, and the
markets become bigger. For example, a study by Divecha et a!. (1992) finds that using the
percentage market capitalisation of top 10 companies as a measure of market
concentration, the Philippines has the highest percentage, i.e., 65.2%, followed by
Singapore (54.5), Indonesia (53.4) and Hong Kong (45.2), whilst market concentration in
some others like Malaysia (25.0), and Korea (28.9) are more or less like that of the UK
(25.5).
categorise Hong Kong and Singapore as emerging markets. However, they are included here mainly for the
purpose of comparison.
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Among the stock markets in the emerging Asian economies, it is well known that
Hong Kong is the least regulated , while Singapore is the most regulated. Together
with the non-existence of price stabilisation mechanisms, these are the two major
reasons contributing to the high volatility of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Ko, et
a!., 1991). Another market sharing the status of the most volatile market in the Pacific
Rim is Taiwan. According to a report5, this is also one of the most speculative
markets. It has one of the highest turnover rates in the world, with trading levels at
times reaching approximately $3.8 billion a day.
Taiwan is also known as one of the most closed markets in Asia. It was only opened to
foreigners, with some share purchase restrictions, in early 1991. Actual foreign
holdings amount to less than 3 percent of the market in the early 1 9946 The absence
of foreign investors may be one of the reasons for its low correlation with the other
world markets. Another country with many restrictions to foreign investors is Korea,
which only opened its stock market to foreigners in January 1992. Any one foreign
investor can own no more than 3 percent of a company, and the total foreign
ownership generally may not exceed 10 percent of a company 7 . Like Taiwan, the
Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) also has a very low correlation with the other world
stock markets probably due to the lack of internationalisation of the market. With its
huge potential for economic growth, Korea is expected to take second place (after
Japan) as a financial centre in the region. However, corruption charges and scandals
by politicians and Securities and Exchange Commission officials have reduced
East Asian Executive Report (1991), v. 13, no. 1, January 15, pp.22-25
6 See Institutional Investors (1994), v. 28, February, pp.23-24
See The Economist, v. 232, January 4, 1992, p. 72
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investors' confidence in late 1995 and 1996. Not surprisingly, since October 1995, the
KSE has been one of the worst performers in Asia8.
Stock markets in the ASEAN9 countries are comparatively more open. Singapore, for
example, generally allows 100 percent foreign investment ceilings for listed
companies, Indonesia sets the ceiling at 49 percent, the Philippines at 3 0-40 percent,
and Thailand at 10-49 percent (IFC, 1996). In Malaysia, the ceiling is 49 percent. In
terms of market regulation, Singapore is regarded as having the most regulated market
in Asia. According to Clark (1994), Singapore's market receives the region's highest
rating from investors for enforcement of investors protection, insider trading, and
share manipulation regulations. The country also has a higher standard of investment
analysis than many of the other Asian markets (Bauman, 1997). Thailand, on the other
hand, is voted to be among the most susceptible to insider trading and corruption'°.
Like Hong Kong, the Singapore Stock Exchange also does not have a price
stabilisation mechanism - there is no limit to the price change during a trading session.
In the other ASEAN stock exchanges, however, the authorities set up a price change
limit in order to control volatility and therefore stabilise the price. In Thailand, daily
price movements cannot decrease or increase by more than 10 percent from the
previous close. The Manila Stock Exchange specifies that a security shall be frozen if
its price moves 50 percent up or 40 percent down on a particular day from the last
closing price or the last posted bid price, whichever is higher. In Malaysia, the limit is
30 percent of the closing price of the previous trading session. Therefore, when
See The Banker, v. 146, July 1996, pp. 68-70
ASEAN stands for Association of South East Asian Nations, which includes Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Only Brunei does not have a stock market.
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trading is halted in Malaysia due to shares reaching the price change limit, trading in
those Malaysian shares listed in Singapore may switch to the CLOB, the Singapore's
over-the-counter market (Clark, 1994).
1.4: Organisation of the Study
This study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 will review related literature on market
efficiency and market anomalies, and summarises the evidence from both the US and
developed markets, and the Malaysian and other Far-Eastern markets. In Chapter 3, I
begin my empirical analysis. Stock market seasonalities are investigated in four
markets, namely Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Hong Kong. Specifically, two
analyses will be carried out - the analyses of the January effect, and the Chinese New
Year effect. The next four chapters will focus on the Malaysian market. Chapter 4 will
look at the initial evidence of mean reversions in returns which is claimed as a
manifestation of overreaction in stock markets. The influence of time-varying risk on
returns and the effect of firm size on mean reversions are investigated in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 examines the seasonal variations in the mean reversion of KLSE stocks.
The next chapter (Chapter 7) is a post-script chapter. It looks at the recent Asian
economic turmoil, and its impact on the main results in the previous chapters. A
summary of the main findings and the conclusion of the study are given in Chapter 8.
'° See Euromoney, December 1993, pp. 68-70
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1: Introduction
One of the major areas of research on stock markets focuses on testing for the validity
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), i.e., testing whether the price of a security
fully and rapidly reflects the available information about the security. Earlier works
relating to testing for the validity of the EMH start with studies examining the
behaviour of speculative assets prices, such as those of stocks and commodites. The
main objective is to determine whether price movements are predictable, so that they
exhibit any recognisable pattern. As surveyed in Fama (1970), the evidence of such
patterns is generally weak. The movements of these assets are best described by a
random walk. The EMH is therefore hailed as the most consistent proposition in
financial economics, and is often taken for granted in research as the working
paradigm.
However, more recent evidence casts doubt on the EMH. Benefiting from the
progress in research techniques, i.e., larger data bases which cover more securities and
longer time periods, improved statistical techniques, and lower computational costs,
researchers were able to detect recognisable patterns in assets prices and hence their
returns. Recent studies have done damage to the EMH in two ways. First, instead of
examining the predictability of daily, weekly and monthly returns typical of the earlier
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works, these studies also look at the predictability of returns for longer horizons, such
as yearly. Secondly, recent studies also consider the forecasting powers of variables
like price-earning ratios (P/E), dividend yields (DIP), and market value of firms, in
contrast to the pre-1970 works which only concentrate on forecasting returns from
past series of returns. In both ways, evidence of successful forecasting techniques is
found.
2.2: Efficient Market Hypothesis
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been a subject of interest for many years
now. However, the discussion and debate among the academics on the subject is still
intense, especially in the past decade or so. Moreover, even though the knowledge of
the EMH has become widespread, it still has not been generally accepted as a basis for
making investment decisions. Therefore, questions pertaining to the hypothesis are
still relevant today as they were many years ago. This section will not give an
extensive review of the hypothesis, but will only give a brief overview of it. For a
more detailed discussion and debate of the EMH, a reference to papers like Fama
(1970, 1991), Beaver (1981) and Ball (1989) would be more appropriate.
2.2.1: What is market efficiency?
In the context of securities markets, the term 'efficient market' is first used in Fama,
Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), who study the relationship between returns and stock
splits. They define an efficient market as "a market that adjusts rapidly to new
information" (p. 1). However, no explicit development of the efficient market theory
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is provided in the paper. It is a year later that the theory is formalised in Fama's (1970)
classic article. According to Fama, an efficient market is a market in which "prices
always 'fully reflect' available information" (p. 383). Plainly speaking, it means that
an investor caimot use information about a stock which is available in the market to
make above-normal profits since the price of the stock has already incorporated that
information. The hypothesis is that stock prices instantaneously and unbiasedly adjust
to new information, which is seen as an implication of rational, utility-maximising
investor behaviour in competitive markets. Some conditions, however, are in order.
Fama states that for a market to be efficient, "(1) there are no transaction costs in
trading securities, (2) all available information is costlessly available to all market
participants, and (3) all agree on the implications of current information for the current
price and distributions of future prices of each security" (p.3 87). Expectation of future
price is thus simplified by assuming that investors have homogeneous beliefs.
Furthermore, since the future price is unobservable, an equilibrium asset pricing
model is needed. Therefore, market efficiency must be tested jointly with an asset
pricing model, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Market Model, etc.
Fama (1970) further classifies market efficiency into three types, depending on the
information set that is fully reflected in security price - (i) weak-form, where the
information set is the historical prices of the security, (ii) semistrong-form, where the
information set is the publicly available information, and (iii) strong-form, where the
information set is all information, including inside information 1 . A weakly efficient
market is defined as a market where past prices provide no information that would
allow an investor to earn a return above what could be attained with a naive buy-and-
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hold strategy. The semi-strong efficient market hypothesis requires that all public
information be fully reflected in security prices. The strong-form efficient markets
hypothesis suggests that all information, public or not, is fully reflected in security
prices.
The evidence in most of the pre-1970 works on weak-form market efficiency seems
unexpectedly consistent with Fama's definition of an efficient market. Studies by
Working (1934), Kendall (1953), Roberts (1959), Osborne (1959), Alexander (1961),
Cootner (1962) and Fama (1965), among others, produce evidence which suggest that
successive price changes are independent of each other, and that the behaviour of
common stocks and other speculative prices could be well approximated by a random
walk. In other words, future share returns are not predictable.
2.2.2: Critiques and extensions of Fama's definition
Famas (1970) definition serves as a good or clean benchmark that allows him to lay
out the early evidence on the adjustment of prices to various kind of information.
However, as he himself admits (Fama, 1991, p. 1575), the strong version of EMH
definition is surely false in the real world. In reality, there are a lot of imperfections in
the market. First, a market is normally characterised by non-instantaneous availability
and incomplete dissemination of information to all participants. This may prevent the
price from impounding the information fully and instantaneously. Secondly, there are
positive information and trading costs and other institutional constraints in the market.
This has led Jensen (1978) to define an efficient market as follows;
'In his sequel paper on EMH, Fama (1991) changes the categories to (i) test for return predictability,
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"A market is efficient with respect to information set B if it is impossible to make
economic profits by trading on the basis of information set 0• By economic profit,
we mean the risk-adjusted returns net of all costs" (p.96).
The idea is that if some set of information, such as a corporate earnings
announcement, is widely known to participants in a stock market, competition drives
prices in that market to be such that on average, investors can only earn the market
risk-adjusted rate of return from trading on that information. Investors, thus, can only
earn a normal profit from their investments. Underlying the EMH is competition for
information.
Thirdly, the market is characterised by the existence of heterogeneous belief arising
partly from differential information interpretation across participants and the timing of
the information. With respect to this, Beaver (1981) makes a further refinement to the
definition of market efficiency. Defining efficiency based on the information
distribution, he states that a market is efficient with respect to a specific information
set if the price that exists is the same as the price that would exist if everyone had that
information set. He states that "market efficiency with respect to an information item
means that prices act as if everyone knows that information" (p.28). Beaver's
definition of market efficiency therefore implies that efficiency can exist in a market
with heterogeneous beliefs. Individual investors need not perceive the market as
efficient for efficiency to exist. Another implication is that market efficiency can be
defined with respect to separate information sets.
(ii) event studies, and (iii) test for private information, respectively.
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Another critique to the EMH claims that in a market with mixtures of agents, there are
some who behave less than fully rationally, dismissing the assumption of investors'
rationality in a competitive securities market. Though economists acknowledge that
many market participants, such as individual investors, brokers, chartists, and
portfolio managers sometimes are far from rational, this is not thought to matter to
market efficiency as rational arbitrageurs will eliminate them. However, recent works
investigating 'noise' traders (Black, 1986; De Long, Summers, Shleifer and Waldman,
1990), fashions and fads (Shiller, 1984), and excessive stock price volatility (Shiller,
1981, Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1989) provide evidence which defies rational
economic explanations. There is also evidence from studies on stock market
anomalies and mean reverting-behaviour of returns which questions the notion that
stock prices reflect news about fundamentals, since they are difficult to be attributable
to news about fundamentals. More importantly, this evidence suggests that future
share prices are predictable, challenging the earlier notion that prices follow a random
walk. Some popular tests for a random walk are reviewed below.
2.2.3: Random Walk Tests
There are several tests used to determine whether a time series of economic variables,
such as stock returns, follows a random walk. Traditionally, the two most popular and
widely used tests are the serial correlation test, and the runs test. Later studies have
also employed unit root tests. These tests are briefly described below.
a. Serial correlation test
Serial correlation measures the association between two elements in a time series
separated by a constant number of time periods. The number of time periods that
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separates the two elements is known as the order of the serial correlation. For
example, the jth-order serial correlation coefficient measures the extent to which V1
and Y,+1 move together. If a higher (lower) than average observation tends to be
followed by a higher (lower) than average observation j period later, then Y and Y,+
are said to be positively serially correlated. If a higher (lower) than average
observation tends to be followed by a lower (higher) than average observation, then V,
and Y,-- are negatively serially correlated. The jth-order serial correlation for a sample
of time series is defined as2;
r 
=	 —)(Y,+ -Y)	
(2-1)
where; r = sample serial correlation at lag j
= return of security at time t
Y'+j = return of security at time t +j
N = number of observations
The range of r is between -1 and +1. A theoretical property of the first-differenced
series3
 of a random walk model is r = 0 for all j = 1 to n, where n is the number of
serial correlation that can be computed with the series. Testing whether a series
behaves as a random walk involves estimating the ri 's for the actual series and
comparing them with the theoretical prediction of the random walk model. The
2 See Pindyck & Rubinleld (1991, p.447)
A first-differenced series refer to the changes in consecutive observations, for example, (X^ 1 - Xi),
(X^2
 - X^1)......(X+ - X+1).
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sample serial correlations are therefore used to test the hypothesis the population
correlation coefficient at lagj is zero. The sample standard error is computed in order
to determine the statistical significance of r, and is given by;
S(r) =(l/N—j)	 (2-2)
where; r , N and j are defined as above. The null hypothesis, HO : Pi = 0 is tested
using the formula;
tobserved - S(r)
- r1.	 (2-3)
H0 is accepted at the 0.05 level of significance if tQbseed is within -1.96 and +1.96.
To test the joint hypothesis that all the serial correlation coefficients are
simultaneously equal to zero, the Box-Pierce Q-statistics is used. Under the null
hypothesis that all serial correlations equal to zero (i.e., H0 : p1
 = P2 = ......= = 0);
Q=NYrj2
	(2-4)
where N is the number of observations, and is the serial correlation at lag j. Q-
statistics is approximately distributed as a chi-square distribution with k degrees of
2
freedom. The null hypothesis is rejected if Q is greater than X with k degrees of
freedom at the corresponding 0.05 level of significance.
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b. Runs test
Another popular test of Random Walk is the run test. A run is defined as unbroken
sequence of like elements. For example, +++---- -00 constitutes three runs. The
question is: Are the 3 runs observed in the example consisting of 9 observations too
many or too few as compared with the number of runs expected in a strictly random
sequence of 9 observations? If there are too many runs, it would mean that in the
example, the observations change frequently, thus indicating negative serial
correlation. Similarly, if there are too few runs, they may suggest positive serial
correlation. Therefore, testing whether a series behaves as a random walk involves
comparing the actual run for the series and the expected number of run for the series.
When H0, i.e., the null hypothesis of randomness, is true, the number of runs, R, has a
sampling distribution that is approximately normal with mean, UR4;
[N(N+l)_(n +n +n)]
UR=	 N
and sample standard deviation, sR;
SR 
1J(ni +n +n)(n +n +n —N(N+1)-2N(n +n +n)—IV
-	 N(N—l)	 (2-6)
where; n 1 = number of positive return
= number of negative return
n3 = number of zero return (i.e., no change in return)
N Total number of observations (i.e., n1 + + n3)
(2-5)
"See Wallis & Roberts, 1957, p. 571
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The null hypothesis is tested using the formula;
ZObsC
ed = R—uR
SR
	 (2-7)
The null hypothesis of randomness will be accepted if Zobse,ed falls within + or -1.96
at 0.05 significance level.
c. Unit Root Test
A relatively new test for the random walk is the unit root test, introduced by Dickey
and Fuller (1979, 1981). A distinct difference between this test and other traditional
tests is that it can incorporate drift (cyclicality) and time trend in the time series of the
variables in question. The easiest way to introduce this test is to consider the
following regression model:
= pYt-] + Ut	 (2-8)
2
where ut is the stochastic error term with zero mean, constant variance a, and is
nonautocorrelated. If p = 1 from the regression, the stochastic variable Yt above is said
to have a Unit root. A time series that has a unit root is known as a random walk.
As works based on time series data assume that the underlying series is stationary, the
series need to be differenced (in the order of 1) so that it becomes stationary.
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Therefore, AYt in the regression above will be looked at. For theoretical and practical
reasons, the unit root test applied to regressions runs in the following forms;5
zlYt = (p - 1)Y 1 + Ut	 (2-9)
ziYt = a+ (p- 1) Yt- 1 + Ut	 (2-10)
= a+ fit + (p- 1) Yt 1 + Ut	 (2-11)
The differences between (9), (10) and (11) are the inclusion of a, i.e., the positive drift
term and t, the trend term. In equations (10) and (11) we assume that Y has been
growing because it follows a random walk with a positive drift (i.e., a> 0, /3 = 0, and
p = 1). The standard F ratio is then calculated to test whether /3 = 0 and p = 1 hold. If
they do, then the hypothesis of random walk in the time series is concluded. However,
instead of using the standard F distribution, the distribution tabulated by Dickey and
Fuller (1981) to determine the significance of the F ratio is used6.
It should be noted that though the unit root test is widely used, its power is limited. It
only allows us to reject (or fail to reject) the hypothesis that a variable is not a random
walk. A failure to reject (especially at a high significance level) is only weak evidence
in favour of the random walk hypothesis.
See Gujarati (1995)
6 The critical values for Dickey and Fuller's distribution are larger than those for the standard F
distribution. For example, for a sample size of 250 observations, the critical value at 0.05 level is 6.34,
compared with that of the standard F distribution of 3.00
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2.3: Stock Market Anomalies - Size and Seasonal Effects
Numerous anomalies have already been detected in the capital markets, and the list
keeps growing7 . There are, for example, studies which suggest that prices under-react
to information, while others suggest otherwise, i.e., over-react to such information.
Other evidence suggests that price varies according to day-of-the-week, month-of-the-
year, market value of firms, dividend-yield, PIE ratios, and other variables which are
difficult to be rationalised economically. While not directly related to the manner in
which prices respond to information (and therefore on the implication of market
efficiency), most of this evidence has seemingly defied rational economic explanation.
A review of all these anomalies will not be done here. Instead, only those directly
related to this study will be looked at. These are the firm size effect and the seasonal
effects.
2.3.1: Size Effect: Explanation and evidence
Standard asset-pricing models such as CAPM, predict a positive relation between an
asset's risk and its expected returns. However, evidence supporting this relation is
inconclusive (see Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Fama and French, 1992, for examples). It
is this possible missepecification of CAPM that leads other researchers to search for
other factors which better explain returns, such as size. Consequently, there has been a
growth in papers documenting the size effect, offering some possible explanations,
such as the misassessment of risk due to infrequent trading, changing risk premium,
and transaction costs bias.
See Francis (1993, pp. 565-575) for a long list of anomalies.
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The size effect refers to the tendency for smaller capitalisation stocks to yield
abnormally higher returns than the larger capitalisation stocks. Among the first to
observe this phenomenon is Banz (1981). He reports that smaller firms on the NYSE
in the period 1926 - 75, on average, have higher returns than the larger firms. This size
effect, however, is more pronounced for the smallest firms; returns of large firms are
not much different from those of the average-size firms. Banz's paper actually relies
on earlier work by Reinganum (1981), who suggests that the CAPM is misspecified.
He observes that portfolios based on firm size and price-earnings ratio experience
average returns systematically different from those predicted by CAPM. Subsequent
studies by Givoly and Ovadia (1983) and Keim (1983) among others, confirm the
existence of a firm-size effect. Keim (1983), for example, claims that the size
premium was 30.3 percent annually.
One of the explanations for the size effect is that smaller firms are perceived to be
more risky, and hence have higher risk, as measured by beta (fl
.
 Since they have
higher risk, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) predicts that they should yield
higher returns. However, some studies reveal that even after adjusting for the firms'
betas, smaller firms still yield higher returns (Reinganum, 1983; Banz, 1981). Some
researchers argue that the apparent abnormal returns might be attributed to the
misspecification in the model to estimate the firms' betas (Roll, 1981; Brown and
Barry, 1984). According to Roll, the misassessment of betas is due to infrequent
trading of smaller firms. Especially true for short-term (such as daily) data, infrequent
trading induces positive serial correlation. This results in downward biased measures
of portfolio risk and corresponding overestimates of risk-adjusted returns. In response
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to Roll's (1981) conjecture, Reinganum (1982) estimates betas according to methods
designed to account for infrequent trading problems proposed by Williams and
Scholes (1977) and Dimson (1979). He finds that the magnitude of the size effect is
not very sensitive to the use of these estimates.
Another critique of the firm size effect based on risk mismeasurement comes from
Chan and Chen (1988). They argue that the size effect is observed in Banz (1981)
because the betas used in the study are measured imprecisely, which allow firm size to
serve as a proxy for the true beta. However, Jegadeesh (1992) shows that, using test
portfolios constructed so that the cross-sectional correlations between beta and the
size proxy are small, the betas explain virtually none of the cross-sectional differences
in portfolio returns. Fama and French (1992) also use test portfolios sorted on both
size and beta. They find that the size effect is not explained by beta.
Basu (1983) finds that the size effect virtually disappears when returns are controlled
for differences in price-earning (PIE) ratios. According to Basu, small firms have
higher returns because they have low P/E ratios. After controlling for differences in
P/E ratios, he discovers that the size effect disappears. This finding is inconsistent
with earlier evidence in Reinganum (1981). He maintains that even after controlling
for P/E effect, the size effect is still present. When holding size constant, no clear
relationship between P/E ratio and return is observed.
Stoll and Whaley (1983) suggest large transaction costs may be responsible for the
size effect. The excess returns on small stocks are the result of higher proportional
bid-ask spreads in low-priced stocks. Because of this higher proportional bid-ask
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spread, investors demand a higher rate of returns from these stocks. After adjustment
is made for transaction costs and market risk, they find that for holding periods from 3
months to one year, there is no significant positive excess return for smaller firms. In
fact, for holding periods of 2 months or less, small firms earn lower returns than large
firms. They therefore conclude that using after-transaction cost returns, CAPM cannot
be rejected. Shultz (1983), duplicating Stoll and Whaley's test by using portfolios of
smaller firms that were costlier to trade, finds that the portfolios do earn excess returns
after transaction costs for holding periods as short as one month, if the holding period
includes the month of January. He then points out that the transaction costs in January
should be higher than in the other months to explain the January seasonal in abnormal
returns (see next section), but finds no evidence of seasonally varying transaction
costs. He therefore concludes that transaction costs cannot explain the anomalous
behaviour of small firm returns.
Chan and Chen (1991) claim that small firms tend to be 'marginal firms', i.e., firms
which are not doing very well. They lost market value due to dividend cutting, cash
flow problems, and relying on external fundings. Heavy financial leverage, therefore,
affects the risk of these companies. Moreover, the authors also postulate that the
earning prospects of firms are associated with a risk factor in returns. Firms that the
market judges to have poor prospects, signalled by low stock prices , have higher
expected returns (i.e., they are penalised with higher cost of capital), than strong-
prospects firms. The characteristics of small firms put them under poor prospects
category.
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Besides the evidence in the US studies above, the firm size effect is also documented
in UK studies by Reinganum and Shapiro (1987), Levis (1989) and Corhay, Hawawini
and Michel (1988). A recent study by Baker and Limmack (1998), however, reveals
that the firm size effect is not persistent over time. Examining UK returns data from
1956 to 1991, they observed that there is a reversals in the size effect in the later
period of their study (i.e., 1980-1991). Specifically, they find that there is a decreasing
mean return over portfolios 1 - 5 (smaller companies) as expected in the presence of
firm size effect, but an increasing mean return over portfolios 6 - 10 (larger
companies), so that a reverse J-shape distribution of returns across the size portfolios
is observed 8 . This indicates that, if attention is focused on the larger companies, such
as the top 1000 companies, according to the authors, the reversals of firm size effect
would be observed.
Further evidence of a firm-size effect comes from studies on the January effect. Many
studies find that returns are higher for smaller than bigger firms in January
(Reinganum, 1983; Keim, 1983; Roll, 1983; Berges et al., 1984). These studies reveal
that most smaller firms' abnormally high returns are due to their abnormally high
returns in January. Roll (1983) in fact, finds that the small-firm effect is significant in
the first four trading days in January, and then becomes much less marked in
subsequent trading days in January. More evidence and explanation on the January
effect are presented below.
8 In the study, portfolio 1 consists of the smallest companies, while portfolio 10 consists of the largest
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2.3.2: Seasonal Anomalies: The Januar y effect and its explanation
The January effect refers to the tendency of stock prices to decline slightly in the last
few trading days of December and then move up in January 9 . Much of the year's price
appreciation occurs in the month of January. One of the earliest studies is Rozeff and
Kinney (1976). The authors find seasonal patterns in an equal-weighted index of
NYSE over the period 1904-74. Specifically, the average return in January is about
3.5%, while other months average about 0.5%. Over one-third of the annual return
occurs in January alone. Tax-related transactions, biases arising from bid-ask spread
and time variation in risk premia are among the reasons frequently advanced in
subsequent studies. Some studies, however, suggest a behavioural approach to explain
the January effect.
The most popular explanation for this effect is tax-related transaction. It is
hypothesised that tax laws encouraged investors to sell securities which have
experienced recent price declines, so that (short-term) capital losses can be offset
against taxable income. This will press the price further down. After the tax year-end,
i.e. January, investors will buy the stocks again, and this buying pressure will increase
the price, providing abnormally high returns in January. This is known as the tax-loss
selling hypothesis. Importantly, the hypothesis relies on the assumption that investors
will wait until the tax year-end to sell their common stock 'loser'. Additionally, it is
believed that small firm stocks are likely candidates of tax-loss selling since they
typically have higher variances of price changes, and therefore a larger probability of
large price declines. That is why the January effect is often analysed in relation to the
size effect.
companies.
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Dy! (1977) is among the first to observe this phenomenon and proposes the tax year
trading hypothesis. Based on a random sample of 100 stocks traded on the NYSE
between 1948 through 1970, he observes that there is a significant trading volume in
December in common stocks which had undergone a substantial price change during
the preceding year. Specifically, the data reveal abnormally low volume for stocks that
have appreciated during the year, presumably reflecting the year-end capital gain tax
lock-in effect, and abnormally high volume for stocks that have declined in price
during the year, presumably reflecting year-end tax loss selling.
Keim (1983) analyses the January effect in relation to the size effect. Using a set of
data from the NYSE and AMEX for the periods 1963 to 1979, he finds that daily
abnormal returns are higher in January than in the other months, and that the relation
between abnormal return and size is always negative and more pronounced in January.
For example, the average size premium is 30.3% annually, but is only 15.4% if the
premium in January is excluded. Furthermore, more than 50 percent of the January
premium is attributable to large abnormal returns during the first week of trading in
the year, particularly on the first day. A similar observation is reported in Reinganum
(1983). He finds that abnormally high returns are yielded by small firms in January,
and concludes that this January effect is consistent with the tax-loss selling
hypothesis. However, tax-loss selling cannot explain the entire January effect since the
small firms least likely to be sold for tax reasons (prior year's winners) also exhibit
large average January returns. Lakonishok and Smidt (1984) look at the trading
characteristics of listed companies by size and year-end behaviour for the period 1970
through 1981. They notice a tendency across all size deciles for price to rise on the last
This is also referred to as the turn-of-the year effect.
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trading day of the year. Additionally, small firms exhibit abnormally high returns for
the 5 turn-of-the-year days.
Keim (1989) demonstrates that the occurrence of systematic trading patterns
introduces bias into returns computed with closing transaction price (i.e., bid or ask).
He observes that at the turn-of-the year, there is a distinct shift in investor buying and
selling behaviour - the abrupt end of tax-loss selling at the end of the year.
Specifically, there is a marked tendency for end-of-day prices in December to be
recorded at the bid, and end-of-day prices in early January to be recorded at the ask
prices. This can result in large portfolio returns on the last trading day in December
and the first trading day in January; even if the 'true' price is unchanged, returns
measured with transaction prices tend to be biased upward. Since the bid-ask spread,
as a percentage of the price, is larger for lower-priced stocks, this trading pattern bias
is larger for such stocks. Keim's finding is supported by the evidence in Griffiths and
White (1993), who find that before the tax-year end, transactions are initiated more by
sellers (at bid prices) and after the tax-year end, transactions are initiated more by
buyers (at ask prices). Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) also report similar results.
In addition, Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) argue that the January effect is primarily a
low-share price effect and less so a size effect. To prove this, they divide their samples
into five groups based on size, and then further divide this size-based group into
another five groups based on price. They discover that within each size group, January
returns exhibit an inverse relationship with stock price. However, within each price
group, there is little relation between January returns and firm size.
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The trading patterns of individuals and institutional investors at the turn of the year
studied in Sias and Stark (1997) also support the tax-loss selling hypothesis and give
little credence to the alternative hypothesis of	 Consistent with
the first hypothesis that individual investors sell stocks that have declined in value
(losers) in order to realise tax losses, stocks with more individual investors interest
underperform those with more institutional investors interest in late December, but
outperform them in early January. The authors find that the trading behaviour of
individual investors is more important than trading behaviour of institutional investors
at the turn of the year, and is more responsible for the turn-of-the year and the January
effect.
The validity of the tax-loss selling hypothesis, however, is refuted in a number of
studies. Constantinides (1984) demonstrates on both theoretical and empirical grounds
that there are strong economic reasons for taxable investors to take into consideration
the holding period status (i.e., long-term or short-term) of their stocks and the time
relative to the end of their tax year in deciding on the realisation of their capital gains
or losses. Jones, Pearce and Wilson (1987), using data extended as far back as 1871,
document that the January effect existed long before income taxes had an effective
impact, and that no significant change occurs in the January effect after income taxes
are imposed in the US.
Another popular explanation for the January effect is the time-variation in risk premia
(for examples, Tinic and West, 1984; Ritter and Chopra, 1989). It is believed that
'° The 'window-dressing' hypothesis suggests that the turn-of-the year effect and the resultant January
effect is due to the year-end portfolio rebalancing of institutional investors. Since the success of fund
managers is evaluated in relation to their peers, it is argued that these managers buy winners and sell
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systematic risk varies across the year. Tinic and West (1984) for example, report that
when the two-parameter test of CAPM is analysed for seasonality, the relationship
between returns and systematic risk is consistently positive only in January. They
show that the estimated slope coefficient (risk premium) of the relationship between
average returns and systematic risk on the NYSE is significantly positive only in
January. When the risk-returns analysis excludes January, the estimated risk premia
are not significantly different between months. This suggests that returns are higher in
January because risk is high during that month. This is supported by Rogalski and
Tinic (1984). They reported that betas of small firms tend to be 30 to 60 percent larger
in January than in the other months.
There are also evidence of January effect in the non-US markets. Gultekin and
Gultekin (1983) examine the association between stock market seasonality and the
tax-loss selling hypothesis in major industrialised countries1 . Their results indicate a
prevalent association between the large mean returns and the turn of the tax year as
predicted by the tax-loss selling hypothesis. These findings, like those in the US, do
not rule out a tax induced January effect in most of the countries except Australia, and
also a tax induced April effect in the UK'2.
Brown, Keim, Kleidon and Marsh (1983) analyse the returns to Australian stocks
using monthly data from 1958 to 1981. They find that average returns to most
Australian stocks are substantially larger in January and July than in the other
losers in order to present respectable year-end portfolio holdings, and justify to clients as prudent
investments.
These are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US.
12 The beginning of tax year of all these countries is January 1, except Australia (July 1) and the UK
(April 1 for corporations, and April 6 for individuals).
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months' 3 . Moreover, the small-size decile shows fairly constant premium across
months. Therefore, the size effect does not appear to be seasonal. They conclude that
tax-loss selling hypothesis does not explain the January or turn-of-the-year effect.
Berges, McConnell and Schiarbaum (1984) document the same phenomenon in
Canada using 391 companies listed on the Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges
from the period 1950 to 1980. Their results reveal that returns in January are
significantly higher compared to the other months even though Canada does not have
capital gain tax until 1973. This implies that the tax-loss selling hypothesis cannot
explain the January effect there.
A very recent study by Baker and Limmack (1998) discover that the January and April
effects exist in the UK, but they are not solely due to tax-related trading. Besides, the
persistence of the calendar seasonalities is not always observed. During the period
1956-199 1, it was observed that April returns have become less 'dominant' in the later
years than January, even though both months still generate higher returns than the
other months. Another interesting result in this study is that the small firm effect is not
observed in January or April, but is more prevalent in the other months. This is
therefore inconsistent with the findings in many US studies, which find that returns of
small firms are mostly earned in January.
In the absence of a US style tax regime, the explanation for this end-of -year effect
may be behavioural. Shefrmn and Statman (1985) (reproduced in Thaler, 1993) propose
a theory of investor behaviour which employs prospect theory based on an 'S'-shaped
13 The fiscal year-end for tax purposes in Australia is June 30.
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utility function, mental accounting, regret aversion and self-control. When an investor
purchases a stock, he opens what may be termed a mental account for that particular
security. The reference point for this account is the purchase price of the stock. It is
suggested that many investors are reluctant to sell a losing stock - even when this
would appear to be the rational option - because they do not want to close this mental
account at a loss, relative to their reference point. Shefrin and Statman link this
behavioural characteristic with December, the year end, which they suggest is a focal
point for US investors' mental accounting;
"Financial service firms frequently remind investors about the importance
of not leaving tax planning decisions until December. We conjecture that tax
planning in general, and loss realisation in particular, is disagreeable and
requires self control. Should this be the case, then it is reasonable to expect
that self-motivation is easier in December than other months because of its
perceived deadline characteristic. Thus, a concentration of loss realisations
in December is consistent with our behavioral framework..."
(Shefrin and Statman, 1985, reproduced in Thaler, 1993, pp. 5 16-17)
Although the above quote makes reference to tax planning, which may not be relevant
to investors in other countries, the idea that December acts as a focal point for loss
realisation is potentially useful.
Nevertheless, though it has been documented for more than 20 years, the puzzle still
remains; if January provides abnormally higher returns than the other months, why
couldn't arbitrage eliminate it? After so many years since it is first studied rigorously
in Rozeff and Kinney (1976), newer studies, such as that of Haugen and Jorion (1996)
still document this anomalous findings in the US.
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2.4: Mean Reversions and the Overreaction Effect
2.4.1: Introduction
More recently, there is a resurgence of studies on the time-series predictability of
stock returns. However, instead of examining serial correlation of short-horizon
returns such as daily or weekly common in earlier studies, these studies investigate
returns over longer horizons. Evidence suggests that there is a significant negative
serial correlation in stock returns over a long period of time. This suggests that future
returns can be predicted by using historical prices, another instance which may violate
the weakest-form of the EMH. Fama and French (1988) find that the serial correlation
of returns becomes negative for 2-year returns, reaches minimum values for 3-5 year
returns and then moves back towards zero for longer return horizon. This is supported
by the evidence in Poterba and Summers (1988). The argument is that there is a
transitory, mean-reverting component of stock price, which is weak for daily or
weekly holding periods, but is significant in long-horizon returns, the notion first
tested in Shiller's (1984) and Summers' (1986) model incorporating fads or irrational
bubbles. While agreeing that this mean-reverting behaviour of returns may be due to
irrational behaviour of investors, Fama and French (1988) also emphasise that this
observation may be due to rational time-varying expected returns, and thus is still
consistent with the EMH.
The mean reversions of stock price over a long period interval has actually been
implicitly investigated in overreaction studies like De Bondt and Thaler (1985)'.
14 There is another line of study investigating mean reversions in stock returns. Instead of looking at
return horizons over one to five years, this study investigate return reversals over a shorter time periods,
such as monthly, weekly and even daily . Zarowin (1989) investigated whether contrarian strategy of
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They observe that stocks which perform very well (badly) in a period of 3-5 years tend
to earn lower (higher) returns in the subsequent 3-5 years period. instead of discussing
this phenomena in terms of the component of stock price, they interprete their findings
as a manifestation of investors' irrational behaviour. Investors are argued to overreact
to whatever moves the stock price, especially as it relates to earnings. Consequently,
De Bondt and Thaler propose the 'Overreaction Hypothesis', i.e., stocks experiencing
bad performance in the past period (losers) tend to perform better in the subsequent
period, and vice versa for good performing stocks (winners)' 5 . In other words, there
are mean reversions in stock returns over a certain period of time 16 . This phenomenon
is also called the 'winner-loser' effect. The fact that an investor can earn abnormal
profit by buying past losers and short-selling past winners, a trading strategy using
past prices as the information set, implies that the market is not efficient in its weakest
form. A consistent abnormal profit earned by such a contrarian investment strategy
that exploits negative serial dependence in asset returns may thus provide another
defect to the EMH.
buying previous month losers and short-selling previous month winners can provide significant returns
in the following month. His results indicate that the strategy earn significant abnormal returns of 2.5%
per month. Brown and Harlow (1988) examine stocks with residual returns that gain or lose 20 and 65
percent between 1 to 6 months; they found that there is a larger rebound for losers and no decline for
winners except in the first month. Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) also use a strategy of buying
losers and selling short winners in the previous month; this arbitrage strategy earns 1.36% per month
with profits mostly generated by prior losers. Howe (1986) and Lehman (1990) form winners and losers
based on the previous week returns. For the next 10 weeks, Howe observes that winners earn -13.0%,
while losers earn + 13.8%. Lehman finds that for $1 long in zero-investment arbitrage portfolio, 39 cents
is earned every 6 months, with two-third of the profits generated by losers. Return reversals are also
found within days. Dyl and Maxfield (1987) find that in each of 200 trading days selected randomly,
the 3 stocks with the largest 1-day gain underperform the market by 1.8%, while the three stocks with
the largest loss outperform the market by 3.6% over the next 10 days.
15 Actually, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) are not the first to observe the reversals of performance of
winners and losers. A pioneering work by Graham and Dodd (1934) had actually revealed such
phenomenon, and they had shown that investors could employ the contrarian strategy by means of
exploiting mean reversions of winners and losers to earn superior profits. De Bondt and Thaler's work
serve as the first attempt to systematically examine whether investors stereotype companies based on
past share price performance data.
16 According to Forbes (1996), the literatures on mean reversion and overreaction are often perceived to
be separable with relatively few cross-references between them. However, one fact emerges from these
two lines of study; they offer a single coherent critique of the EMH.
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2.4.2: Overreaction phenomenon in the psychology of individual decision making
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) argue that investors in the financial market systematically
overreact. According to their Overreaction Hypothesis, asset prices tend to
overrespond to news, particularly as it relates to earnings. De Bondt (1989) further
argues that the hypothesis would stand or fall with the evidence on the relative
sophistication of humans as intuitive statisticians.
Evidence in cognitive psychology literature reveals that humans are poor Bayesian
decision makers, i.e., they fail to take into account prior probabilities and combine
them with the information on-hand in revising beliefs or in making decisions or
predictions (see for examples, Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Grether, 1980; Nisbett, et
a!. 1983; Camerer, 1987; Rucai, 1992). From a series of experiments, Kahneman and
Tversky (1972, 1973) find that humans appear to give more weight to recent
information without much consideration to prior or base-rate data. People tend to
make predictions based on judgmental heuristics, which often lead to biased decisions,
and sometimes results in systematic errors (Bazerman, 1986). There are three types of
heuristics, namely representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment. A
representativeness heuristic is an assessment of the degree of correspondence between
a sample and a population, an instance and a category, or generally between an
outcome and a model. Biases are generated when the frequency of the outcomes is not
well correlated with the model. Another heuristic observed is the availability heuristic;
people assess the frequency, probability, or likely causes of an event by the degree to
which instances or occurances are readily 'available' in memory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1973). Biases are generated when the frequency of the event in question is
not perfectly correlated with its ease of recall. Anchoring and adjustment refer to the
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tendency of people to make assessment by starting from an initial value and adjusting
this value to yield a final decision. Regardless of the basis of this initial value (e.g.
historical precedent, random information, etc), adjustments from the initial value tend
to be insufficient (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Thus, different initial values yield
different decisions, which are biased toward the initial values.
The degree of emotional involvement and the immediate availability in their memory
with regards to the problem lead people to use simple matching rules when making
predictions, as noted by Kabneman and Tversky (1982); "the predicted value is
selected so that the standing of the case in the distribution of outcomes matches its
standing in the distribution of impressions" (p. 416). This use of short-cuts or rule-of-
thumbs to simplify the decision making process is an instance of judgmental
heuristics, which violate the basic statistical principles, such as the considerations of
base rate, sample size, probability distribution and regression towards the mean.
Similarly, Grether (1980), in furthering earlier works by Kahneman and Tversky
(1972, 1973) on representativeness heuristics, concludes that "individuals tend to give
too much weight to the 'evidence' and thus too little weight to their prior beliefs,
though priors are not ignored' (p. 553).
One of the reasons why individuals tend to regress insufficiently towards the mean in
making a prediction is due to what Andreassen (1987) terms the attributional effects.
The expectation that changes will either persist or regress to previous levels depends
in large part on whether causal attributions are provided to explain recent changes. If
these attributions are provided, then the tendency to make regressive predictions will
diminish. Using financial markets as an illustration, Andreassen argues that news
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media provide such causal attributions when describing price changes. For example,
to attribute a recent price rise, the media will search for those good news or facts from
the many available which provide a coherent explanation for the rise, while ignoring
those which do not. Similarly, bad news will be provided to explain recent price falls.
By providing more attributions of greater coherence and extremity, the media increase
the likelihood that individuals will expect recent changes to persist with no return to
previous levels. This may, in effect, cause prices to remain high after they have risen,
and to stay low after they fall. In a later experiment, Andreassen (1990) finds that
news reports affect investors' forecasts by increasing the salience of any trend.
In making decisions or predictions, people also often rely on intuition and fail to use
statistical inference when extrapolating time series data or events. For example,
Eggleton (1982) concludes that "individuals display only limited ability to perceive
and intuitively utilise the statistical characteristics of these time series for their
extrapolations" (p. 94). Moreover, Eggleton also suggests that even where
sophisticated techniques are employed, human intuitive judgement remains as an
essential ingredient in their applications.
Another characteristic of human decision making is undue optimistic bias or
overconfidence (Schmalansee, 1976; Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Brenner, et al., 1996;
Pulford & Colman, 1996). This overconfidence is usually more associated with
positive outcomes. Pulford and Colman, for example, examine the relationship
between overconfidence and base rate of behaviour, and how this relationship differs
from events with positive versus negative outcomes. Using 98 subjects with ages
ranging from 18 to 43 years, they observe that significant overconfidence occurs, but
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it is greater for positive outcome than negative outcome items. Griffin arid Tversky
suggest that although overconfidence is not universal, it is prevalent, often massive,
and difficult to discriminate. It can lead people to focus on the strength or extremeness
of the available evidence with insufficient regards for its weight or credence. This
overconfidence phenomenon is also important because confidence controls action
(Heath and Tversky, 1991). It has also been argued that overconfidence, like
optimism, makes people feel good and moves them to do things that they would have
not done otherwise.
Another interesting finding on human decision making is that individuals tend to
follow others when making a decision. This is called herd behaviour or herding
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Banerjee, 1992; Zeckhauser et a!. 1991). These
individuals are noticed to ignored their own beliefs and information in forming
decision rules even though the information may posses substantive value. Benerjee
shows that the resulting equilibrium of herding is inefficiency. In business, Scharfstein
and Stein argues that managers are reluctant to act according to their own beliefs or
information for fearing that their contrarian behaviour will damage their reputation as
sensible decision makers.
The above evidence, however, does not suggest that humans are not rational all the
time. According to a theory in cognitive psychology called Cognitive-Experiential
Self Theory (CEST)' 7 individuals apprehend reality by two interactive, parallel
processing systems. These are the rational system and the experiential system.
Decisions made under a rational system rely on analytical, deliberative and
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extensional judgements, while the experiential system on intuitive, automatic and
heuristic judgements. Behaviour is guided by the joint operation of the two systems,
with their relative influence determined by the nature of the situation and the degree of
emotional involvement. The greater the emotional involvement, the greater the shift in
the balance of influence from the rational to the experiential processing system.
Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) observe that when subjects are carefree and happy or
confronted with positive outcomes, they are more apt to process information in the
experiential mode. However, when they are distressed or preoccupied with avoiding
negative outcomes, they are more apt to process information in the mode of rational
system. They also study the consequences when the two modes are put into conflict
with each other, and find that most subjects, although fully aware that such behaviour
is irrational, choose to behave in accordance with the intuitive mode, i.e., experiential
system overrides the rational system.
The above evidence comes mostly from lab experiments in which the settings are
different from the economic reality. Deficiencies resulting from the use of
hypothetical questions and settings, such as the lack of monetary incentives or stakes
in the parts of the subjects and no opportunity for learning are usually coined as the
reasons behind the seemingly irrational subjects' behaviour. To counter these
arguments, Richard Thaler, one of the leading sceptics of economic models
incorporating rational expectations, claims that there is evidence showing that even
with monetary incentives, the nonrational behaviour persists (see for example,
Grether, 1980). Moreover, for learning to be effective, feedback should be immediate
and accurate (Thaler, 1994). These conditions are not always met in the real world.
17 For an elaborate description and discussion of CEST, see Epstein (1991), Epstein et al. (1992), and
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For example, feedback is often delayed, and even when failure is recognised, there
may be multiple explanations for it.
If the findings from the psychological studies above can be applied to economics, it
can therefore be suggested that economic agents, such as individual investors may not
be rational decision makers too. It follows that their tendency to use intuitive
judgement and heuristics without much regard to basic statistical rules has in effect
deviated from the theory of economics, namely that choice and judgement are made
consistent with the expected utility theory and the principle of optimisation. This
further suggests that the economic assumption of individual rational expectation, i.e.,
individuals assign weight to each outcome of their choice, is not valid. In fact, there is
a great deal of evidence dismissing the economic assumption that agents are rational
optimisers (for examples, Simon, 1986; Zeckhauster et a!. 1991)
In the financial market context, De Bondt (1989), in his survey article on overreaction,
described some evidence which suggested some indications of market overreaction.
For example, prices tend to overshoot due to the presence of optimistic traders, who
are argued to determine the stock's market value (e.g Miller, 1977), and that the
market, due to waves of optimism and pessimism, may temporarily overvalue or
undervalue stocks based on their current or future earnings and dividends (see P/E
anomaly of Basu, 1978, 1982; Shiller, 1984). If individuals are found to overweigh
more recent and perhaps dramatic news events in revising beliefs, then there are
reasons to expect market participants to be so in the stock markets.
Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994)
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2.4.3: DeBondt and Thaler's Overreaction Hypothesis and its critiques
Based on the results in experimental psychology studies above, De Bondt and Thaler
hypothesise that investors in the stock market overreact (to new information) in the
initial period and subsequently correct themselves. Their overreaction hypothesis
asserts that stock prices take temporary swings away from their fundamental values
due to waves of optimism and pessimism. Investors are argued to make bias decisions
persistently. For example, they tend to base their decision on the most recent, most
readily available and most striking information instead of revising their belief in the
maimer prescribed by Bayes' rule. In short, they interpret this evidence as a
manifestation of irrational behaviour of the market participants18.
In their 1985 paper, De Bondt and Thaler examine monthly returns of NYSE firms
between 1926 to 1982. Two portfolios, consisting of 35 extremely bad performing
stocks (losers) , and 35 extremely good performing stocks (winners) based on the
stocks past three years market-adjusted excess returns, are formed. This 3-year period
is labeled as the portfolio formation period. The market-adjusted excess returns for
each stocks, Uj, are obtained by using the equation;
18 DeBondt and Thaler's interpretation of winner-loser performance reversals is in fact consistent with
the price-earning hypothesis of Basu (1977). The latter finds that low price-earning ratio (PIE) stocks
outperform high P/E stocks. His price-earning hypothesis asserts that the PIE ratio may determine the
future performance of firms due to exaggerated investors' expectation. Specifically, he conjectures that
exaggerated optimism regarding growth in earnings and dividends leads, on average, to high PIE stocks,
while exaggerated pessimism leads to low P/E stocks. In other words, high PIE stocks are overvalued,
and low P/E stocks are undervalued. Low PIE stocks have been regarded by many as value stocks,
while high PIE stocks as growth or glamour stocks. Besides their relatively low price in relation to
earnings per share (according to Basu), value stocks are also those whose prices are low in relation to
cash-flow per share (Lakonishok et a!. 1994), book-value per share (Fama and French, 1992), and
dividend per share (Blume, 1980; Rozeff, 1984), while growth stocks have relatively high price in
relation to those same variables. These empirical studies have revealed that value stocks generally
produce higher returns than growth stocks in the US. The same observation is generally true in a 21-
countries study by Bauman, Conover and Miller (1998). Higher risk attached to value stocks is one of
the explanation (Fama, and French, 1992), but many others believe the difference in performance is the
result of systematic suboptimal market behaviour on the part of market participants (see for examples
Lakonishok et a!. 1994, Porta eta!. 1997), which is consistent with DeBondt and Thaler's Overreaction
Hypothesis.
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= R, - Rmt
	(2-12)
where the market return, Rmt, is based on the average returns of an equally weighted
CRSP listed firms. The excess returns in the subsequent 3-year period, labeled as the
test period, are then calculated for both portfolios. This process is repeated for sixteen
non-overlapping 3-year periods, starting January 1933. Using this procedure, they find
that losers outperform the market by 19.6 percent and winners underperform the
market by 5.0 percent in the test period, so that the excess returns for the former is
24.6 percent higher than the latter. They also find that the excess return in the 3 years
test period is asymmetric, i.e., much larger for losers (in absolute term). Most of the
winner-loser effects occur during the second and third years of the test period. In
addition, they notice that most excess returns are realised in January.
The proposition of the overreaction hypothesis by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) has
generated much interest and controversy in subsequent years. Several studies are
sceptical about the hypothesis and advance alternative explanations. Chan (1988)
rejects the overreaction hypothesis by presenting an argument based on changes in
equilibrium-expected returns. Specifically, he argues that stocks with a series of
negative abnormal returns will experience an increase in their equity betas, and thus
increase their expected returns. This is because equity beta is a function of gearing
(i.e., the relative market values of debt and equity). With other factors remaining
constant, a reduction in stock price will lead to increased gearing and therefore,
increase equity risk. Likewise, the 'winner' stocks which experience a series of
positive abnormal returns have their betas decreasing, and thus lower the expected
returns. He claims that there is a measurement error in beta estimated from the rank
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period (RP) as done by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), i.e., since Loser's beta increases
during the rank period, the rank period beta underestimates test period beta (TP)
Therefore, beta should be estimated directly in the test period using the regression
below;
R, - Rfi = a11(1-D) + a21D, + 13j(Rm t Rj) + J3jD (Rm(-Rf)Dt + Ei	(2-13)
where t = 1 to 72 months (i.e., the first 36 months for RP and the second 36 months
for TP), D is a dummy variable which is equal to 0 in RP and 1 in TP, a is the Jensen
Performance Index which measures abnormal performance of portfolio i, and /3 is the
beta which measures the systematic risk of portfolio i. It is found that Loser's beta
increased in TP by 0.23, while for the Winner, the beta decreased by 0.22, and for the
arbitrage portfolio, the beta increases by 0.453. Overall, he finds that when risk is
properly controlled for, the contrarian strategy does not yield significant abnormal
returns.
Chan' s (1988) contention that the change in the risk contributes to the higher return
for loser firms in the test period is supported by the evidence in Ball and Kothari
(1989). Constructing a time series of 52 annual returns for each of 20 portfolios where
portfolio 1 consists the poorest performers and portfolio 20 of the best performers in
the 5-year ranking period, they find that these extreme portfolios do show share price
reversions. However, the increase in return of loser stocks (35.6 percent) is
accompanied by an increase in beta from 0.91 to 1.62. Likewise, for winner stocks, the
decrease in return by 33.4 percent is accompanied by a decrease from 1.51 to 0.86 in
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their betas. Their result, therefore, prove the importance of time-varying risk as an
explanation behind the mean reversion of returns implied by the overreaction
hypothesis.
Jones (1993) looks at time-varying risk premia and returns to a contrarian strategy. He
suggests that it is possible that the evidence of overreaction reported in studies such as
De Bondt and Thaler may be due to the pattern of market movements. Assuming stock
returns are described by the market model, it is expected that when the market is
rising, the greatest winners (losers) will be those stocks with the largest (smallest)
formation period betas. During market declines, the greatest winners (losers) would be
expected to be those with the smallest (largest) formation period betas. If, in addition,
risk premia are larger (smaller) after the market has declined (risen), there will be a
positive (negative) correlation between the risk premium and the formation period
beta for the loser (winner) portfolio. Jones calculates correlations between three-year
risk premia and betas, for 17 non-overlapping periods starting from the late 1 920s. He
also calculates three-year autocorrelations for non-overlappings three-year periods,
starting at monthly intervals from 1929. He obtains results which, it is claimed, are
consistent with the negative three-year autocorrelation in the US stock returns reported
in studies like Fama and French (1988). Thus, Jones suggests that the apparent
patterns in US stock returns, and the contrarian profits reported in De Bondt and
Thaler (1985) are consistent with rational time-varying expected returns.
Zarowin (1990) challenges the overreaction hypothesis on the grounds of market value
differentials. Consistent with the hypothesis, he finds that poorest earners outperform
best earners over 36 months subsequent to the extreme earnings year. However, he
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claims that these are smaller firms, i.e., losers tend to be smaller by the end of the
ranking periods. When both winner and loser groups are matched by size, all return
discrepancies disappear, except in January. He also analyses the periods when losers
are smaller than winners, and in periods when winners are smaller than losers. He
discovers that when losers are smaller, they outperform the winners. When winners
are smaller, they outperform the losers. Therefore, Zarowin concludes that losers'
superior performance over winners during the 3-year test periods is due, not to
overreaction, but to size discrepancies. In other words, this phenomenon is just
another manifestation of the size effect documented by previous studies (for example,
Banz,1981, and Reinganum, 1981).
Related to the size effect, another attack on overreaction comes from those who
examine the bid-ask spread bias (see for example, Kaul & Nimalendran, 1990; Conrad
& Kaul, 1993). Especially true for small, low-priced firms which have proportionally
bigger bid-ask spread and high chances of non-trading, bid-ask spread may induce
spurious autocorrelation. The used of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in De
Bondt and Thaler (1985) is also criticised by the above authors. Conrad and Kaul
claim that the method may exaggerate the observed mean reversions in stock prices.
Furthermore, they also claim that cumulating single-period return over 3-5 years
returns would incur the strategy substantial transaction costs. A buy-and-hold return
metric should be used instead.
The critiques of Chan (1988), Ball and Kothari (1988), Zarowin (1990), Conrad and
Kaul (1993) and the others have not gone unchallenged. In their subsequent paper, De
Bondt and Thaler (1987) reject the explanation that the winner-loser effect is
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explained by changes in risk as measured by CAPM-betas. They argue that though the
(zero-investment) arbitrage portfolio has a positive beta of 0.22, this is insufficient to
explain its average annual return of 9.2 percent in the test periods. The dismissal of
risk-changes as the explanation is also evidenced in Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vislmy
(1994), who also offer a behavioural-based explanation for the success of the
contrarian strategy; investors are argued to make judgement errors and extrapolate
past growth into the future for winner stocks. Examining value stocks (associated with
losers) and glamour or growth stocks (winners), the authors find that the formers are
no riskier than the latters.
Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) present an evidence which is consistent with
the overreaction hypothesis and dismiss size-based explanations. After adjusting for
size when calculating abnormal returns, they observe the presence of an economically-
significant overreaction effect. This effect is actually much stronger among small
firms, and according to them, this is due to predominant individual investors in small
firms who might overreact. Albert and Henderson (1995) also dismiss the notion that
overreaction effect is a manifestation of the size effect. The authors claim that there is
a bias in the way firms are ranked in the Zarowin's study. Using a different control,
they observe an overreaction effect that is distinct from the size effect. Therefore, once
again the overreaction hypothesis is restored even though the argument against it
continues. Even Fama (1991) recognises that despite fierce challenges, the
overreaction hypothesis is still an unresolved issue.
With regards to the bid-ask spread bias raised by Conrad and Kaul (1993), Loughran
and Ritter (1996) argue that though monthly CARs on low-priced stocks are affected
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by bid-ask spread bias, they do not benefit from the advantages of compounding.
These two factors, thus, largely offset each other. The use of CARs by De Bondt and
Thaler (1985) instead of buy-and-hold returns for measuring both prior and test period
returns, therefore, does not affect their findings. In fact, studies using buy-and-hold
returns to form portfolios, such as in Ball and Kothari (1989) and Chopra, et al
(1992), find greater differences in test period returns that studies using CARs to form
portfolios. Loughran and Ritter further claim that the buy-and-hold method provides a
sharper distinction between portfolios when classifying firms; but once the portfolios
are selected, the CARs and buy-and-hold returns will produce similar conclusions.
Despite the inconclusive explanation that investors overreact as implied by the
overreaction hypothesis, and other explanations based on changes in risk and firm
size, one fact is clearly observed from the studies mentioned above and other studies
examining the phenomenon: there is evidence of strong January seasonals in the price
reversals, particularly for the loser stocks. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, Figure 3, p.
805) clearly shows that the Cumulative Average Residuals (CARs) for loser portfolio
increase substantially in months 13, 25, 37 and 49 (i.e., the Januaries ) in the test
periods. It is also quite clear from the figure that the cumulative CARs for the loser
portfolio decline between October and December. This observation is consistent with
the tax-loss selling hypothesis which, arguably, explains the January effect. Other
researchers, such as Zarowin (1990), Jegadeesh (1991), Pettengill and Jordan (1990)
and Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) also report strong January seasonal in the
price reversals of common stocks. In fact, when loser and winner portfolios of
comparable size are matched, Zarowin (1990) observes that a performance differential
is only present in January. This is confirmed in Fant and Peterson (1995). The authors
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reveal that January returns are inversely related to the holding-period returns of the
prior three years, while February through December returns are positively related to
prior returns.
2.4.4: Do earnings drive overreaction?
De Bondt and Thaler's overreaction hypothesis claims that investors overreact to new
information, and later correct themselves. However, they do not specifically test what
information drives overreaction. Their earlier work (1985) on overreaction only
examines whether or not stock prices systematically overshoot. It is only in their
1987 paper that they take a stand on what drives overreaction, i.e., earnings. In the
paper, they show that winners' and losers' earnings show reversal patterns that are
consistent with overreaction. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) further investigate the
overreaction phenomenon in the actual market by studying security analysts' earnings
forecast. Regression 2-14 below, which regresses actual earnings changes on
forecasted changes, will illustrate whether analysts overreact to earnings changes;
= a + b[F(A) -A, 1] + e,
where A, actual earnings-per-share for year t;
A, 1 = actual earnings-per-share for year t-j;
F(A) = forecast of earnings-per-share for year t;
a = intercept term;
b = slope coefficient;
e, disturbance term (E (e,) 0).
(2-14)
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Efficient forecasts generate an intercept of zero and a slope of unity (see Figure 2-1).
A positive (negative) intercept indicates bias towards pessimism (optimism), while a
slope greater than (less than) unity indicates under-reaction (overreaction).
De Bondt and Thaler examine earnings forecasts on the International Brokers Estimate
System (IBES) tapes, made at horizons of 1 and 2 years. They use a number of
different deflators for actual and forecasted changes in earnings, including the
standard deviation of past earnings. Their regressions generate results consistent with
a bias towards optimism and overreaction when forecasting earnings, although the
degree of overreaction is less at a 1-year horizon than at a 2-year horizon. De Bondt
and Thaler interprete these results as evidence of possible overreaction to earnings
news, behaviour which they suggest may be mirrored in stock prices.
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Figure 2-1: Overreaction and under-reaction to earnings chaig
b> I (under-reaction)
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However, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) argue that the extreme forecasted changes
identified by De Bondt and Thaler need not indicate an overreaction to earnings but
could indicate an overreaction to other information sources or may be related to the
'incentives structure faced by analysts' (p. 1205). They describe the De Bondt and
Thaler analysis as an investigation of generalised overreaction, rather than
overreaction specifically related to earnings. To investigate whether analysts overreact
to earnings information (prior earnings changes), Abarbanell and Bernard carry out
regression 2-15, using the stock price as the deflator;
A,-F(A) =a+b[A11 -Al2] +e,	 (2-15)
where A 1 = actual earnings-per-share for year t;
F(A) = forecast of earnings-per-share for year t;
a = intercept term;
b = slope coefficient;
e, disturbance term ((E (e1) = 0).
The regression will identify whether analysts place too much weight, or to little
weight, on past earnings performance when forecasting future changes in earnings.
For example, if prior earnings changes are positive (negative), and analysts overreact,
then forecasts of earnings will be greater (less than) realised earnings. When analysts
under-react, positive (negative) prior earnings changes will lead to forecasts of
earnings being less than (greater than) realised earnings (see Figure 2-2). If analysts'
forecasts are efficient, then the slope is zero. A slope coefficient greater than (less
than) zero indicates an under-reaction (overreaction) to prior earnings changes.
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Figure 2-2: Overreaction and under-reaction to prior earnings changes
Prior earnings change
	 Analysts reaction
Under-reaction	 Overreaction
A 1
 - A 2 > 0	 A - F(A)> 0	 A - F(A) <0
A 1 - A 2 <0	 A - F(A) <0	 A - F(Aj> 0
A-F(A)
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Abarbanell and Bernard carry out regression 2-15 for forecasts made at 1-quarter, 2-
quarter, 3-quarter and 4-quarter horizons. The regression coefficients indicate that US
analysts under-react to prior earnings changes, although this under-reaction reduces
over time. Results do not differ significantly between large and medium size firms,
although large firms display slightly more under-reaction. They therefore conclude
that the overreaction identified by De Bondt and Thaler is not easily characterised as
an overreaction to earnings.
2.4.5: Evidence of overreaction in non-US markets
Since De Bondt and Thaler's (1985, 1987) papers, other researchers have replicated
the study to test for overreaction hypothesis in other stock markets. In the UK, Power,
Lonie and Lonie (1991), MacDonald and Power (1991), Power (1992) and Dissanaike
(1993, 1997) find evidence which support the hypothesis. Power et a!. (1991), for
example, reports that the loser portfolio earns a Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)
of 86 percent during the 5-year period subsequent to the companies being identified as
'non-excellent', while winner portfolio earns -47 percent over the same period.
MacDonald and Power (1991) use a 3-year test period to study this contrarian
investment strategy, and find that the strategy yields an excess returns of 29 percent on
average. More recently, Dissanaike (1997) confirms the existence of investor
overreaction in the UK stock market. Using methods employed by Chan (1988) and
Ball and Kothari (1989) to control for time-varying risk, he finds little evidence to
support the claim that price reversals are due to changes in betas. Moreover, he claims
that his sample restriction, i.e., using large and better-known companies, minimises
the biases created by the bid-ask effect and infrequent trading, and reduces the
possibility that reversals are primarily a small-firm phenomenon. Another UK study
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by Clare and Thomas (1995), however, has a different conclusion. The authors find
that though losers outperform winners by a statistically significant 1.7% per annum,
this phenomenon is actually due to the size effect, as claimed by Zarowin (1990).
Their findings, therefore, provide little evidence to support overreaction in the UK
stock market.
In Australia, the evidence of successful contrarian investment strategy by means of
exploiting overreaction, is weak. An investigation by Brailsford (1992) using
Australian stocks between 1958 to 1987 reveals that there is no mean reversion in the
returns of extreme portfolio of losers or winners. This evidence, therefore, fails to
support the overreaction hypothesis in Australia. A Canadian study by Kryzanowski
and Zhang (1992) also finds weak evidence of overreaction. Using monthly returns of
stocks listed on the Toronto Stocks Exchange from 1950 to 1988, they use a
formationitest periods of 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 10 years. Their results revealed that for one-
and often two-year test periods, there is a statistically significant continuation
behaviour for winners and losers. For longer test periods (i.e., 3, 5, 8, and 10 years),
there are evidence of mean reversions, but statistical tests performed reveal that these
reversals are not significant. Also, they do not find any statistical evidence that the
market overreaction effect is a manifestation of either the size or January effects.
Evidence in a Spanish study by Alonso and Rubio (1990) supports the overreaction
hypothesis. The authors find that after controlling for size when estimating excess
returns, the losing stocks in the Spanish equity market earn 24.5 percent more than the
winning stocks 12 months after portfolio formation. The hypothesis is also supported
in a Brazilian study by de Costa (1994). The study shows that two years after the
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portfolio formation date, losers outperform the market by 17.63 percent, while
winners underperform the market by 20.25 percent. It also shows that differences in
risk do not account for the performance differentials.
In the Far-East, a study of (long-run) overreaction is conducted by Wang (1997).
Three markets are looked at - the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the Stock Exchange of
Hong Kong, and the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The author finds that both winner and
loser portfolios exhibit share price reversals in all of the different 3-year non-
overlapping test periods in the Japanese and Taiwanese markets. The same is also true
for Hong Kong, though abnormal returns earned from contrarian strategy are not
uniformed across all sub-periods. This is due to the high volatility of this market. She
also claims that risk factor cannot explain the results of her analyses. Overall, the
study concludes that the behaviour of losers and winners in the Japanese, Taiwanese
and Hong Kong stock markets is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis.
Richard (1997) conducts quite a different study. He uses the total returns of 16
national market indices to create portfolios of loser and winner indices, assuming the
markets are well-integrated with common international risk factors. Using
methodology similar in many respects to that of De Bondt and Thaler, he finds that for
horizons of one year or less, test-period returns show statistically insignificant positive
autocorrelation. However, for horizons of more than one year, and especially 3 and 4
years, losers outperform winners. A contrarian strategy (defined as returns on losers
less returns on winners) yields an average 6.4% and 5.8% for 3- and 4-year horizons
respectively. He also observes that winner-loser reversals are larger among the smaller
markets, which he suggests may be due to market imperfections there.
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According to Power and Lonie (1993) in their review article on overreaction, the
(long-run) overreaction effect may be more important than other anomalies such as
firm-size and seasonality effects. There are some reasons for this. First, the
overreaction anomaly is easy to exploit even by the average investors. This is done
simply by buying firms experiencing extremely bad performance ('loser') over the
past 3-5 years, and selling short firms experiencing good performance ('winner'
stocks). Since the holding period is more than 3 years, transaction cost is minimal.
Secondly, the return from exploiting overreaction or winner-loser effect is much more
substantial. De Bondt and Thaler documented 24.6 percent over 3 years by buying
'loser' stocks and selling 'winner' stocks short. Whereas, a much smaller return is
earned from exploitation of other anomalies.
2.5: Related Studies on the Malaysian and Far-Eastern Markets
Fewer studies have been carried out in the Malaysian and other Far-Eastern markets,
as compared with those in the US and the UK. They are also carried out fairly
recently, and are mostly replication and extension of what have been done in the US.
This section will first review some studies on the efficiency and anomalies in the
Malaysian market, followed by the other markets.
2.4.1: Studies on the KLSE
a. Market efficiency
A relatively small number of studies have been done on the KLSE to examine its
efficiency, with mixed findings. Lanjong (1983) studies the efficiency of the KLSE in
the weak form, i.e., whether prices follow a random walk. Using a serial correlation
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test to examine the monthly returns during the period 1974 -1980, for the 104 most
actively traded stocks as appeared in Gazette' 9, he finds no significant serial
correlation between the successive time lags. He also employs the runs test, and
observes that the results from the test corroborate the results using serial correlation
tests. He therefore concludes that there is indication of market efficiency (in the weak
form) in the KLSE.
Barnes (1986) also concludes that overall, the KLSE "exhibited a surprisingly high
degree of (weak-form) efficiency, in view of its thinness and its age as a stock
exchange" (p.616). Like Lanjong, he also employs the serial correlation test and runs
test on 30 relatively well-traded stocks, and spectral analysis on 6 sectoral indices for
the six years ended 30th June 1980, using the first differences of the monthly share
prices' natural logarithms. Using the serial correlation test, only 2 stocks exhibit a
departure from the random walk model at a 1 percent level of significance 20 . Using the
runs test, Barnes finds that only one stock exhibits non-randomness at the 1 percent
level.
Laurence (1986) examines weak-form efficiency and the distribution of daily returns
of 16 KLSE's most consistently traded shares during the period 1973-1978. For lag 1,
5 of the shares had significant non-zero serial correlation. For lag 2, there are also 5
shares. Using the runs test, he finds that 3 out of 16 shares exhibit non-randomness at
the 3 standard errors. He also observes that the distribution of successive price
changes over time on the exchange is leptokurtic and distinctly non-normal. He
concludes that the characteristics of the weak form market efficiency of the KLSE
19 This is a monthly magazine published by the KLSE
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parallel closely those found in the NYSE, and suggests that differences in relevant
information sets may be more apparent than real, i.e., in small market price-forming
information may be disseminated very rapidly without sophisticated communication
teclmology, hordes of analysts, large numbers of business journal and intensive market
regulations.
Another study on the weak-form efficiency of the KLSE is done by Yong (1987), who
examines all 170 stocks that are traded on a weekly basis from January 1977 to May
1985, as reported by Utusan Malaysia and the New Straits Times21 . Using the serial
correlation test for individual lag (lags 1, 2, ..., 8), he discovered that each stock
classification22 exhibits a high percentage of independence between the percentage
price change at time t and at time t + k, for k = 1, 2, .. .8. This is confirmed by the Q-
statistics test which tests the serial correlation for all lags combined. However, results
from the runs test indicate that a high percentage of stocks exhibit non-randomness in
their percentage price changes. The main explanation given for this is that these stocks
are inactively traded. Like Laurence(1986), he also observed the non-normality of the
distribution of the percentage changes of stock prices. Overall, the study concludes
that the KLSE is less efficient (in the weak sense of the EMH) than the previous
studies suggest.
More evidence of weak-form market inefficiency on the KLSE is documented by
Mohd. Ariffin and Power (1996), who examine short-run overreaction of the market.
The authors look at the weekly performance of loser and winner portfolios of 10
20 Barnes did not specify the lag of the serial correlation of his study.
21 These are widely-circulated daily newspapers in Malaysia. The former is written in Malay language
while the latter is in English.
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companies each, using market-adjusted excess returns to form the portfolios. They
observe that during their study period from January 1990 to December 1994, the
contrarian strategy of buying losers and selling winners would earn investors positive
returns only during the first two weeks after portfolio formation dates. The short-run
overreaction effect seems to disappear after that period.
Published studies on semi-strong market efficiency tests on the KLSE are scarce.
Dawson (1981) analyses returns earned by investors who buy the 'Stock of the Month'
as recommended by Malaysian Business, a widely circulated business magazine in
Malaysia. This study covers the period 1973-1980, using 85 stocks. During the first
six months following the recommendations, the stocks are able to beat the market
even after adjusting for market changes. These high abnormal returns are not due to
the risk associated with the stocks since after calculation, it is found that the stocks are
not riskier than the average. After 6 months up to month 12, this advantage
disappears. Since it takes some months for the prices to adjust to the information,
Dawson concludes that the KLSE is not yet (semi-strong) efficient.
Nassir and Mohamad (1993) also analyse the behaviour of prices following the 'Stock
of the Month' recommendation by Malaysian Business. Their study uses 128 stocks
recommended between 1975 to 1989. The price movements are measured in terms of
abnormal returns which are estimated using the market-adjusted and risk-adjusted
return approaches. Their results using the first approach reveal that several months,
especially the last 2 months before the announcement month, the stocks' prices
already start to rise. The post-announcement returns are positive, but are not
22 The stock classifications are: 1) Industrial, 2) Finance, 3) Hotel, 4) Property, 5) Plantation, and 6) Tin
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significant. Using the risk-adjusted return approach, the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) in period -11 to 0 is close to zero. However, 3 months after the announcement
month up to month 9, the abnormal returns are positive. In fact, the CAR after 9
months is 5.34 percent. Estimating transaction costs of 2.7 percent, investors can still
make excess profit by following professional analysts' share recommendation. Like
Dawson (1981), they conclude that the KLSE is not efficient in the semi-strong form
in relation to analysts share recommendations.
Nassir and Mohamad (1993) also analyse the effect of annual earnings and dividend
announcements on prices of shares listed on the KLSE. 699 earnings announcements
are collected from a sample of 233 stocks. For dividend announcements, 300 dividend
increases and 202 dividend decreases are included. The behaviour of the monthly
closing prices of these stocks are observed for the period January 1975 to December
1989. Two classes of earnings and dividend announcements are investigated, i.e.,
earnings and dividend increases and decreases. The results reveal that for earnings and
dividend increases, the abnormal returns are significantly positive several months
before the announcements, but are not significantly different from zero during the
post-announcement periods. For earnings and dividend decreases, the abnormal
returns are negative several months before the announcement months, but are not
significantly different from zero during the post-announcement periods. Evidence also
suggests that market reaction to information contained in the announcement is almost,
if not fully, reflected in share prices by the end of the announcement months,
especially for the frequently traded stocks. Furthermore, there is no significant
difference between the average excess returns of earnings and dividend changes for
less frequently and more frequently traded samples, suggesting that the market does
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not discriminate the price adjustment between thinly and 'thickly' traded stocks.
Overall, the KLSE appears to be near efficient in the semi-strong form for both
earnings and dividend announcements.
b. Market anomalies
There are also a few studies done on the KLSE investigating some anomalies to
market efficiency. Nassir and Mohamad (1987) examine the January effect using 2
broad market and 6 sectoral indices of the KLSE between 1970 and 1986. They find
that the average returns for January are significantly positive and higher in magnitude
as compared with those for the other months during the period under study. However,
the tax-loss selling hypothesis is not relevant here since there is no capital gains tax
arising from transaction of securities in Malaysia.
Contradictory evidence is reported by Yong (1989) who also examines the January
effect in the KLSE. Using monthly returns of 6 sectorial indices, he finds that 5 out of
6 sectors exhibit higher returns in January compared to the other months. However,
using F-statistics, these higher returns are not significant. Therefore, he concludes that
there is no January seasonality in Malaysia.
Ho (1990), using the KLSE Composite Index from 1977 to 1987, documents
significant negative Monday returns in Malaysia. However, the lowest return of the
week is on Tuesday, while the highest return occurs on Friday. He also observes that
the January return is higher than the returns in the other months, and the difference is
significant at a 5 percent level. Investigating the day-of-the-week effect in January
versus non-January, he finds that Monday and Tuesday returns are positive in January,
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but are not significant. However, for non-January, the returns are significantly
negative. In addition, Ho also documents the turn-of-the-lunar-year effect in
Malaysia23
The January effect is also found in the KLSE by Wong et a!. (1990). Six of the
market's sectoral indices, namely industrials, finance, hotels, properties, tins and
plantations have significantly higher January returns compared to the other months.
However, a Chinese New Year (CNY) effect is also detected. Measuring returns in the
Chinese Lunar Calendar year, the authors observe that the CNY effect rally starts as
early as two months prior to the first day of the new year.
2.4.2: Empirical studies on other Far-Eastern markets
It is usually perceived that the institutional characteristics of a market, such as the
stringencies of disclosure requirements, control on inside trades, thinness and
volatility of markets, discontinuities of trade, lack of supply of securities, etc., may
significantly affect the main function of the resource allocation of funds, and hence
the efficiency of the market24 . In this sense, we can expect that share prices in the
Asian Emerging Markets (AEM5) would demonstrate greater deviation from a
random walk, since the degree of structure and organisation is, supposedly, lesser in
the AEMs than in the US or other developed economies. In order to ascertain this
belief, the following paragraphs will briefly review some of the studies examining the
characteristics and efficiency of each individual market and the markets as a whole.
23 The Lunar year is the new year for the ethnic Chinese, who are the dominant investors in the
Malaysian market. The beginning of this lunar year occurs mostly in February (see Table 3-1, in
Chapter 3)
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a. Interdependence among AEMs and between AEMs and the developed markets
The general findings are that, with few exceptions, there is a low degree of
interdependence among AEMs, compared to those among the developed markets,
suggesting an opportunity for portfolio diversification. Divecha et a!. (1992) found
that most markets in emerging countries have lower correlation with each other,
compared to those among the developed countries. Not only that, the correlation
between AEMs and those in the developed markets is also smaller than that among the
developed markets (Cheung & Ho, 1991). Lee et a!. (1990) claim that inconsistent
with the existence of important 'world' market factors, the returns on the markets
under their study25 seem to be generated by a process that implies a good deal of
underlying independence.
The highest degree of interdependence is observed in the Singapore-Malaysia cluster,
whose correlation was found to be 0.90 in Divecha et a!. (1992). Cheung & Ho (1991)
also found that this cluster has the highest correlation (0.669), but it seems that the
cluster breaks down in the last two years of their study 26. Another study which
documents high correlation between Malaysia and Singapore is Ball (1992), with a
coefficient of 0.78. According to the author, this is attributable to the close relation
between the economies of these two countries. Other markets which have relatively
high correlation with each other are Hong Kong-Singapore-Japan (Ko & Lee, 1991;
and Lee et a!. 1990) and Malaysia-Singapore-Hong Kong (Divecha et a!. 1992).
Among the AEMs, the Korean market emerges as the market with the lowest
correlation with the others, while Taiwan is only weakly correlated with Singapore
24 See Drake (1985) for further and related discussion.
25 These are Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan and the US
75
Chapter 2
and Japan (Ko & Lee, 1991)27. The same study also finds relatively weak cross-
correlation between AEMs and the US market 28 . However, when one-day lagged
correlation with the US is examined, the coefficients increase significantly (except for
Korea). Similar results are found in Ball (1992). This suggests that the US market
leads the Asian markets by a one-day interval.
b. Volatility and risk-return trade-off
There is also evidence that the returns and their standard deviations in the emerging
markets are generally higher than those in the developed markets, reflecting the higher
volatility in the former. The following table is extracted from Claessens et al. (1995)
which shows the data ending December 1992.
Table 2-1: Summary statistics of monthly percentage changes in total return indexes
Country
Indonesia
Malaysia
South Korea
Philippines
Taiwan
Thailand
Japan
UK
US
Starting date
Jan 1990
Jan 1985
Jan 1976
Jan 1985
Jan 1985
Jan 1976
Jan 1976
Jan 1975
Jan 1976
Mean	 Std. deviation
-0.019	 9.397
1.154	 7.606
1.772	 9.335
	3.775
	
11.023
	
2.835	 15.271
	
1.86 1	 7.435
	
1.02
	 5.20
	
2.04	 6.87
	
1.19	 4.39
Sharpe ratioa
-0.108
0.152
0.190
0.343
0.186
0.250
0.196
0.297
0.27 1
Note:
a. The Sharpe ratio is the ratio of the mean return (column 3) to the standard deviation (colunm 4)
Source: Adapted from Claessens, S., Dasgupta, S., and Glen J. (1995)
26 They study the markets in Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore,
Taiwan, Japan, Australia, the UK and the US between 1977 to 1988
27 The most recent study by Wu (1997), however, reveals that after Taiwan liberalises the market by
allowing foreign institutional investors to directly invest in its stock market in 1991, the movement of
the market is affected by the markets in Tokyo, New York and Hong Kong
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The table clearly shows that the standard deviations are higher in all AEMs, and the
returns are on average, also higher, notably for the Philippines and Taiwan, compared
to the three developed markets of Japan, the UK and the US. The Sharpe ratio, defined
here as the ratio of mean return to the standard deviation, indicates that the AEMs,
(except the Philippines) have lower risk-return tradeoff than the markets in the US and
UK. Though not included in Claessens et al. (1995), it should be mentioned that the
Hong Kong market is also one of the most volatile in AEMs. This evidence can be
found in Ko et al (1991).
c. Random walk tests
Ang & Pohlman (1978) test the serial correlation of weekly stock prices in Hong
Kong, the Philippines and Singapore, together with Australia and Japan 29. Their
results reveal that the average serial correlations for Hong Kong, the Philippines and
Singapore markets are higher than for the US. Interestingly, however, the degree of
serial correlation for these markets is generally very similar to those in Europe. As the
lag increases, the deviation from the random walk decreases, implying that market
thinness has indeed delayed the price adjustment to relevant information. Overall, the
author concludes that these newer and less established markets are at least efficient in
the weakest sense, and therefore, the degree of institutional organisation which is
supposedly less developed in most smaller markets, may not be a requisite for an
efficient market.
28 Surprisingly, Malaysian market has the highest correlation among the developing markets with the
US, i.e., 0.70, according to Divecha, et al. (1992)
29 The time periods of study are as follows; Hong Kong (9/97 - 11/74), the Philippines (9/73 - 11/74),
Singapore (5/72 - 11/74), Australia (5/70 - 11/74) and Japan (5/70 - 11/74)
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Claessens et al. (1995), also examine the serial correlation of prices in emerging
markets30 . They found that of the six AEMs in their sample (see Table 2), only the
Philippines exchange, which has a first-order serial correlation of 0.338, exhibits
significant predictability in the rates of return. The second-order serial correlations for
all six markets, including the Philippines, however, are not significant.
Yang (1991) finds that the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) is not weak form efficient
in terms of 1-day interval. For a 1-month interval, however, only a small number of
stocks display systematic behaviour. Similar results are found by Chu (1991), who
observes the random movements of the TSE stocks for longer returns horizons, such
as monthly, but not daily. However, Lock (1996) does not find any evidence of a
random walk even when using weekly or monthly price changes. Results of
regression, runs and variance ratio tests on the value-weighted index indicate that the
TSE is not weak-form efficient. The result of the efficiency of the TSE are therefore
quite mixed.
The efficiency of the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) is more conclusive. At least four
studies reveal that the exchange is not efficient in the weak form. Kim (1991), Ayadi
& Pyun (1994), Kim (1992) and Koh (1989) document results inconsistent with the
random walk behaviour of KSE stocks. Another study by Lee (1989) rejects the
hypothesis of weak-form efficiency for daily returns, but does not reject the hypothesis
for monthly returns. The study also concludes that though less efficient than the US or
30 Emerging markets and AEMs are used interchangeably because many studies do not just concentrate
on the markets in the developing Pacific Rims, but all the developing markets in the world. AEMs are
therefore only parts of the emerging markets.
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other major European markets, the KSE is as weak-form efficient as the other less
developed countries' markets.
Besides Ang & Pohlman (1978), there are a few other studies on the Stock Exchange
of Singapore (SES). D'Ambrosio (1980) examines six daily closing indices 3 ' from
January 1973 to December 1975 to test for the random walk hypothesis in the SES.
Employing runs tests and serial correlation tests, he discovers that three of the indices,
i.e., Industrials, Hotels and Tins, do not conform to the hypothesis. Moreover, the runs
tests indicate that these indices are dependent. Overall, the SES has higher serial
correlations compared to those in western markets, and therefore the author concludes
that the prices in the exchange do not behave in the manner consistent with a random
walk. This result is consistent with Ko & Lee (1991), who claim that daily share price
returns in Singapore exhibit very high dependent structure. Contradictory evidence is
found in a study by Laurence (1986). Using 24 stocks as samples, the runs test and
serial correlation test reveal mixed results. Some stocks exhibit random walk
behaviour, while some others deviate from it. The distribution of successive price
changes are observed to be leptokurtic and distinctly non-normal. Overall, he claims
that the weak-form efficiency characteristics of SES parallel closely those found in the
NYSE. Another study by Ruth et al. (1995) suggests that SES is not efficient in the
semi-strong form.
In the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), Surmsrisuwan (1996) uses spectral analysis
to examine the time series behaviour of stock returns. He discovers that there is no
recognisable or significant pattern in the returns of stocks. The Durbin-Watson test
31 They are Industrials, Hotels, Tins, Plantations, Construction and Finance
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used also indicates that there is low autocorrelation in the samples. Therefore, the
author concludes that SET is weak-form efficient.
d. Seasonalities and other anomalies
As more and more studies document various types of anomalies to the Efficient
Market Hypothesis in the western markets, researchers replicate the studies using data
from the developing markets. One of the most popular anomalies studied is the stock
market seasonality. This includes the investigation of the day-of-the-week effect and
turn-of-the-year, or January effect.
Claessens et al. (1995) found that for the AEMs in their study, only Korea exhibits the
January effect. For Indonesia, the months which are significantly different from the
others are February and September. In the Philippines, the months are June, August
and September, while in Malaysia, they are May and August. No one particular month
in Taiwan and Thailand is observed to yield significantly different returns from the
other months.
In contrast to Claessens et cxl. (1995), Tong (1992) does not find any January effect in
Korea. The same observation is reported for Taiwan. However, there is a February
effect in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Saturday returns are significantly positive but
Monday returns are non-negative in both Korea and Taiwan. Chang (1991) documents
significantly higher average returns on Friday and Saturday in the Korean Composite
Stock Price Index. He also detects significant positive January returns (at the 10
percent level), but it is not the highest in the year.
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Another study on stock return seasonalities in the AEMs is Ho (1990). Friday emerges
as the day with the highest returns in Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand, while Saturday and Wednesday have the highest returns in
Korea and Taiwan respectively. Tuesday yields the most negative returns in Korea,
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. For Hong Kong and the Philippines, the lowest
return is observed on Monday. Besides the day-of-the-week effect, the author also
documents January effects in Hong Kong, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore.
This carmot be explained by the tax-loss selling hypothesis since there is no capital
gains tax in these countries. Returns are lowest in September in Hong Kong, and
August in the Philippines. Malaysia and Singapore, the two most closely related
markets, have the lowest returns in November. The highest return in Thailand is in
October, while the lowest return is in April. Ho also observes a significant Chinese
New Year effect in Malaysia and Singapore.
Further evidence of stock market seasonalities in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Singapore market are documented in Lee (1992). His results indicate the presence
of a January effect in Japan, Taiwan and Singapore. In Korea, there are significant
positive returns in December, but negative returns in January. Returns in Hong Kong
are significantly positive in January and December.
Lee et a!. (1990) examine the daily closing price indices of Korea, Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Singapore, Japan and the US markets. Day-of-the-week effects seem strong
and persistent in most Asian markets except Taiwan. Negative Monday returns are
observed in Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore, but the magnitude is less than that in
the US. Wednesday and Friday returns rank first and second in order of magnitude in
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most of the countries, except Taiwan. In Korea, Saturday returns contribute about one-
half of the returns generated over the 9-year period of study32.
Chan et al. (1996) investigate seasonality and cultural influences on four Asian stock
markets, namely the KLSE, SES, SET and SEB 33 , using the main market indices in
each country, arid in the case of SET, some individual stocks. On all four markets, a
strong day-of-the-week effect is observed. In the KLSE, Monday returns are
significantly negative and the lowest in the week (-3.8%), while Friday returns are
significantly positive and the highest (15.9%). In fact, Friday yields the highest returns
for the Bombay and Thai markets too (27.4 % and 29.0% respectively). The highest
return for Singapore is on Thursday (12.1%), which is only slightly more than Friday
(11.1%). The lowest return in Singapore is on Tuesday (-7.2%), which is significant at
the 5 percent level. F-statistics also reject the hypothesis of equal monthly returns in
the KLSE and SES, but not for SET and SEB. January and December effects are
present in both KLSE and SES which, the authors suggest, reflect the higher level of
integration of the SES and KLSE with the international investment community.
Higher January returns in Singapore is in fact consistent with Gultekin & Gultekin
(1983), who also find that the month yields the highest returns. Besides the January
and December effects, the Chinese New Year effect is also evident on the SES and
KLSE, but not on SET and SEB.
32 The study covers the period 1980-88
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2.5: Summary and Conclusion
This chapter introduces the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), and reviews works
related to the hypothesis, market anomalies and mean reversions (or overreaction) in
the stock markets. Evidence is reviewed from both the US and Western developed
markets, as well as the Malaysian and other Far-Eastern markets. Based on the
evidence, a conclusion can be made that market efficiency issues are far from fully
resolved. More evidence, including that from smaller and developing markets, is
needed to answer whether or not markets are efficient, and hence whether or not share
prices are predictable.
Stock Exchange of Bombay, India
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CHAPTER 3
SEASONALITY IN MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE,
HONG KONG AND THAILAND
3.1: Introduction
Stock market seasonality has been widely documented in the U.S. and other markets.
Numerous studies have established that returns are different across the year. In particular,
January has been found to consistently yield the highest return compared to the other
months in most markets. The same phenomenon is generally observed in the Far-eastern
countries, which in many aspects have different economic, institutional and cultural
settings from the western, established markets. This phenomenon, popularly termed the
January effect, is a subject of immense interest since it may provide another evidence
which violates the weakest form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
This chapter will seek to add further evidence of stock market seasonality, and in
particular, the January effect, in the Far-eastern markets by examining four relatively
established markets in the region. These are the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange of
Malaysia (KLSE), the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), the Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong (SEHK), and the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). In addition, the chapter will
also investigate a phenomenon peculiar to some markets in this part of the world, namely
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the Chinese New Year Effect. This refers to the tendency of stock prices to increase
around the Chinese New Year. It would be interesting to see if country-specific factors
can explain seasonal patterns in the stock markets.
3.2: The Chinese New Year and Its Effect on Stock Prices
Like the Gregorian or Western calendar, the Chinese calendar is a 12-month calendar
year. However, it is not fixed. The calendar is based on a lunar year of about 50.5 weeks,
with a 'leap' year of 55 weeks every three years to keep it in step with the Gregorian
calendar which is based on the solar year. The first day of the year occurs on the first
moon in January or February. Table 3-1 gives the date of the first day of the Chinese
New Year (CNY) from 1970 to 1996 in the Gregorian calendar. As can be seen, the first
day of the new year is mostly observed in the month of February. Between the period
1975 - 1996, the CNY is in February for 15 out of2l years. Even when it falls in January,
it tends to be in the last week of that month.
In Malaysia, the Chinese New Year is celebrated on a grand scale. It is not only celebrated
by the Chinese, but also by the other ethnic groups. It is customary for the Chinese to give
'Ang Pows' (normally cash money) as gifts to friends and relatives which range from a
few to several thousands Malaysian Ringgit during this festive season. Many companies,
especially the Chinese-owned ones, would pay bonuses in occasion with the festival. The
first two days are declared as national holidays by the Federal Government. Like
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Government offices and other corporations, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange is closed
for trading for two days.
The interest in studies on the CNY effect began at the turn of this decade. The idea to
study the effect of such cultural and country specific events may stem from the findings of
returns seasonality documented much earlier in the western markets, such as the January
effect. It may also be due to the claims in Wachtel (1942) that festive seasons such as
Christmas and New Year will bring cheer and new hope. Such psychological attributes
may provide an alternative, non-economic explanation to seasonalities such as the
January effect.
Yong (1989), who investigates seasonality in the KLSE, observes that monthly returns are
highest in January. However, December and February are not far behind. Rejecting any
explanation based on tax-related trading, he attributes this seasonality to the celebration
of the CNY in Malaysia. The giving of 'Ang Pows' requires some cash. One way of
generating cash, according to the author, is by speculating in the stock market. He
suggests that investors start to enter the market as early as December. As more investors
enter the market, prices are driven up. Once the festive season is over, i.e., in February,
these speculators move out from the market, and decrease prices. This suggestion is in
fact consistent with Wong et al. (1990), who claim that share prices start to rise as early
as two months prior to the CNY, though others such as Chan et a!. (1996) and Ho (1990),
also observe that several days after celebration, the prices are still high.
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Therefore, it seems that the CNY rally takes place two months prior to the celebration,
and continues up to several days after the new year. In the Gregorian calendar term, it
means that the period will include the last weeks of December and the first two or three
weeks of February, depending on the date of the CNY in the Gregorian calendar. For
example, if the CNY falls in the middle of February, then the rally may start as early as
the beginning of the third week of December, and finish by the end of the third week of
February. This CNY effect, however, may not be the only seasonal factor here. The
January effect can also be claimed to exist causing returns to be higher in January.
Though the tax-loss selling hypothesis is not relevant in all these markets since there is no
capital gains tax, there might also be other acceptable explanations which upheld the
January effect, such as the liquidity factor (i.e., payment of bonuses at year end by
corporations), and the influence of foreign investors.
It is expected that three of the markets in this study, which have a preponderance of
Chinese investors, i.e., Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong, will show some indications
of the CNY effect. However, this is not the case for Thailand. Though there is a sizeable
number of them, the Chinese are not the dominant group of investors in Thailand. Even
the CNY is not generally proclaimed as the official holiday in Thailand, unlike the other
markets above.
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Table 3-1: First day of CNY in the Gre gorian calendar (1975 - 1996)
Year	 Dates in Gregorian Calendar
1975	 11th February
1976
	 31 st
 January
1977
	
1 8th February
1978
	 7th February
1979
	 28th January
1980
	 16th February
1981
	 5th February
1982
	 23 January
1983
	 12th February
1984
	 1st February
1985
	 20th February
1986
	
7th February
1987
	 29th January
1988
	 16th February
1989
	 6th February
1990
	 29th January
1991
	 14th February
1992
	 4th February
1993
	
22' January
1994
	 9th February
1995
	 30th January
1996	 19th February
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3.3: Data and Methodology
To investigate stock market seasonality in this chapter, we employ the main index of each
country's common stocks. These are the Kuala Lumpur Composite Price Index for
Malaysia, the SES-All Share Index for Singapore, the Hang Seng Price Index for Hong
Kong, and the SET Price Index for Thailand. These are all value-weighted indices, and
are regarded as the main market barometer in each country.
Returns are obtained from Datastream, which records the daily value of the indices as far
back as follows; KLSE from January 1980, SES from January 1986, SEHK from January
1975, and SET from January 1976. To maximise the number of observations, therefore,
the period of study will start from the above starting dates as recorded in Datastream up
to December 1996. In addition, the study period for each of the indices (except for the
Singapore's SES) will also be partitioned into two sub-periods; i) from respective starting
dates above to December 1986, and ii) from January 1988 to December 1996. The main
reason behind this partition of periods is to avoid any effect of the worldwide October
1987 crash. Besides, stock markets in Asia generally grew very rapidly starting in the late
1980s, after a long period of stagnancy in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Figure 3-1).
It is therefore appropriate to see if seasonal patterns exist in periods of stagnancy and in
periods of rapid growth. For SES, due to shorter data availability period, only two periods
will be looked at; the whole period of 1986-1996, and the (post October 1987 crash)
period of 1988-1996.
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Monthly returns data are derived from the logarithmic daily returns, computed as follows;
Rid = ln -----
[I	 (3-1)
L1d-1
where RJ,d is the return of the index at day d, Id is the index value at day d, and Id-i is the
index value at day d-1. The daily returns are then cumulated to obtain the monthly
returns, Rim, using the following equation;
Rim
 =>RJd
	 (3-2)
To determine whether any seasonal pattern exists, both the parametric (ANOVA) and
non-parametric (Kruskal-Wallis test) will be employed. The F-statistics obtained from
ANOVA will be used to test the null hypothesis that there is no difference in mean
monthly returns, while the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis statistics test the null
hypothesis that there is no difference in median monthly returns of the indices, and is
described in equation 3-3 below;
12n,[R, _]2
KW=
N(N+l)
where n is the number of observations in each month, N is the total number of
observations, R 1 is the average of the ranks in month i, and R is the average of all the
(3-3)
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ranks. This test generates a statistic which tests the null hypotheses that return
distributions are identical across all twelve months.
It should be noted that the parametric tests assume that the underlying distribution is
normal. If this assumption holds, this test is more powerful than the non-parametric tests.
Furthermore, the parametric tests are based on the sample means, so even if the
population is not normal, sample means will still be approximately normally distributed.
To check on the normality of the distribution of the market logarithmic returns, some
descriptive statistics of the markets, including the skewness and kurtosis, are given in
Table 3-2. It appears that all the four markets tend to have negative skewness. However,
only SEHK returns show pronounced skewness. The skewness of KLSE returns are not as
pronounced as those of the SEHK. For SES and SET, the normality of their returns
caimot be rejected. The symmetrical nature of SES, SET and to some extent KLSE, are
obvious from the histograms in Figure 3-1. The returns on each of the markets also tend
to be more fat-tailed than would be expected from a normal distribution, as implied by the
positive kurtosis values. This indicates that the distribution of returns tend to have more
extreme observations, and this is especially true for SEHK. Overall, it is fairly safe to
claim that the distribution of returns of most of the markets do not depart excessively
form normality. Besides, the Normal Approximation Rule or the Central Limit Theorem
can be imposed here which might lead to the t-test and F-test still being valid.
Furthermore, to back up the results from the parametric tests in this chapter, the non-
parametric tests such as the Kruskal-Wallis test ( and the Wilcoxon signed ranks test and
Mann-Whitney U-test in later chapters) will also be given.
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Table 3-2: Descriptive statistics of daily market lo garithmic returns
KLSE	 SES	 SEHK	 SET
Mean	 0.00040	 0.00029	 0.00077	 0.00042
Std. Dev.	 0.01345	 0.00989	 0.01725	 0.01251
Minimun	 -0.17067	 -0.09403	 -0.40542	 -0.09295
Maximum	 0.11062	 0.14313	 0.14763	 0.10349
Kurtosis	 18.35651	 28.31860	 65.90470	 11.00077
Skewness	 -1.36556	 -0.18815	 -3.06607	 -0.36277
No. of observation	 4434	 2868	 5738	 5479
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Figure 3-1: The distribution of daily market logarithmic returns
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Once the overall differences of monthly returns are determined, further tests are employed
to examine whether returns in any particular month are different from other months. This
will be achieved by using two dummy-variable regressions. These regressions, however,
will be carried out using the returns from the whole period only. The first regression will
test whether returns in the month with the highest return is significantly higher than the
return in each of the other months. Since the January effect is tested here, it is
presupposed that this is the month of January. The regression, therefore, takes the
following form;
R = a + b 1Feb + b2Mar + ............+ b11Dec + e,	 (3-4)
where R the returns for each of the month of the indices;
Feb = a dummy variable, which equals 1 for February observation, and 0
elsewhere;
Mar = a dummy variable, which equal 1 for March observation, and 0 elsewhere;
,
a the intercept term, which indicates the expected value R for January;
b11 = the coefficient for February .....December, which measure the
difference between February .....December returns and January returns;
e = the error term, which follows the usual OLS assumption'.
The assumptions are, i) the expected value of each e, is zero (linearity), ii) the variance of each e, is
constant (homoscedasticity), iii) any pair of errors e, and e are uncorrelated (independence), and iv) the
independent variables are fixed (not random).
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In cases where January is not the month with the highest return, the equation above
should be adjusted accordingly. The second regression will examine if returns in that
particular month are significantly higher than for the other months combined, and is given
below;
R1 = Øo + ØjJan + e,
	 (3-5)
where R1 = the mean monthly returns of the indices;
Jan = the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for observations in January and 0
otherwise;
Øo = the intercept term, which measures the mean returns for the eleven
months excluding January;
the coefficient for January, which measures the difference between the mean
returns in January and the other eleven months of the year;
et = the random error term which follow the usual OLS assumptions.
Again, if January is not the month with the highest returns, the dummy in 3-5 will be for
that particular month.
To test for the Chinese New Year (CNY) effect, the appropriate 'event window'
surrounding the first day of the celebration is first defined. (Table 3-1 gives the date of the
first day of the CNY in the Gregorian or Western calendar). Several previous studies use
different 'window'. Ho (1990) looks at the returns during the nine trading days before and
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3.4: Results and Discussion
Before the details of the results of the tests described previously are presented, the time-
series movements of each index in Figure 3-2 are first charted. The correlation between
each pair of the indices is also calculated, and the results are presented in Table 3-3.
Figure 3-2 quite clearly shows that the markets in Malaysia, Hong Kong and Thailand
started to grew rapidly beginning in the late 1980s, after a quiet period in the prior years.
Though it is also true, I couldn't show this for the SES since the SES-All Share Index
data is only available starting 1986. It also reveals how the October 1987 crash also
affected the four markets, especially Hong Kong. This is not very surprising since a lot of
foreign investors are involved in the market. After the crash, the indices started to climb
tremendously beginning in 1988. It is thus appropriate that the period of this study is
partitioned into two, i.e., pre-1987 and post-1987.
The correlation matrix in Table 3-3 shows that the stock markets in Malaysia and
Singapore are highly correlated. The correlation of 0.629 is the highest among any pairs
in the sample. In fact, many previous studies such as Claessen et al. (1995), Cheung and
Ho (1991), and Divecha et al. (1992), have documented similar findings. This is not
surprising when one bears in mind that these two markets had many cross-listings prior to
1990. The correlation between KLSE and SEHK, and between SEI-IK and SES are also
high (0.398 and 0.377 respectively). The SET has the lowest correlation with the others.
This is most probably due to the low level of foreign investors' participation in the SET.
In fact, SET is regarded as the least-open market among the four.
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Figure 3-2: Time-series movement of the indices
Movement of KLSE Composite Index (1 980-96)
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Figure 3-1 (continued)
Movement of SET Price Index (1 975-96)
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Table 3-3: Correlation matrix of the indices (1986-1996)
KLSE	 SES	 SEHK	 SET
KLSE	 1.000
SES	 0.629	 1.000
SEHK	 0.396	 0.377	 1.000
SET	 0.345	 0.342	 0.280	 1.000
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The results of the test described in the previous section will now be presented. Table 3-4
shows the percentage monthly returns on each indices under study. It also gives the
results of the ANOVA and the Kruskal-Wallis test. For the whole period, i.e., the first
panel under each country headings, returns are highest in the month of December in the
KLSE, SES and SET. This is quite surprising as no study (to my knowledge), has found
similar results. Only the SEI-[K shows the highest return in January, which is consistent
with studies like Gultekin and Gultekin (1983), Lee (1992), and Ho (1990). It should be
noted, however, that though previous studies do not find December to yield the highest
returns in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, they report that the month usually ranks
among the highest in generating returns (see for examples, Yong, 1989; Ho, 1990; and
Chan et a!. 1996).
Looking more closely at the KLSE, December yields an average 3.9% return in the period
between January 1980 to December 1996. The second highest return is observed in
February, whose average return is 3.5%. At the 0.05 level, the returns in these two months
are significantly different from zero. Similar observations can be seen for the sub-period
1988-96. Monthly returns of 5.7% and 4.1% respectively for December and February rank
the highest in the period. The table also reveals that overall, there is no significant
difference between monthly returns, as reflected by the F-value and the Kruskal-Wallis
statistics. In sub-period 1980-86, October yields the highest returns, but none of the
months are actually different from zero.
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In the SET, December (2.9% and 6.0% respectively) is the month with the highest returns
in the whole period and in sub-period 1988-96, while October (4.3%) occupies the top
spot in the sub-period 1976-86. However, all these are not significantly different from
zero. The F-statistics and the Kruskal-Wallis statistics also reveal that there is no
difference in the monthly returns. Like the KLSE, therefore, there is no January effect in
the SET.
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The January effect, however, can be observed in Singapore and Hong Kong. In the SES,
the average January return of 3.1% is the third highest in the year after December, which
yields an average return of 3.5%. The other month with a return statistically different
from zero is May (3.4%). The sub-period 1988-96 reveals very similar results, whereby
January yields a returns of 3.4%. In fact, the Kruskal-Wallis statistics (p-value = 0.049)
suggest that monthly returns are different in this sub-period.
In Hong Kong, the January effect is most pronounced. For the whole period of 1975-96,
the Hang Seng Index yields an average January return of 6.2%, followed by December
(4.4%) and April (3.6%). January also ranks the highest in the 1975-86 sub-period,
followed by April and December with a return of 8.9%, 5.7% and 4.9% respectively. This
finding is consistent with Ho (1990) and Cheung, Ho and Wong (1994). Furthermore,
higher returns in the months of January and April may be due to the close relation
between the markets in Hong Kong and the UK, which also has higher returns in those
months. (see for examples, Levis, 1985; Reinganum and Shapiro, 1987; Corhay,
Hawawini and Michel, 1987). Not only that there is the same tax year-end in Hong Kong
and the UK, but also there are 19 stocks of the 33-stock Hang Seng Index which are listed
in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The influence of the LSE, may thus contribute to
the higher returns in those months. It should also be noted that since the return preceding
April, i.e., March, is always negative, we can suggest that the tax-loss selling by foreign
investors may be possible here. In the sub-period 1988-96, October has the highest return
of 6.1% which is significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. In all three periods,
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however, the F-value and the Kruskal-Wallis statistics indicate that overall, there is no
difference in the monthly returns.
Table 3-5 gives the results of the dummy-variable regression in equation (3-4), which
tests whether the month with the highest return has a significantly higher mean return
than each of the other months. This means that we are testing whether December has
significantly higher returns than the returns in each of the other months in Malaysia,
Singapore and Thailand. For Hong Kong, the return in Januaiy is compared with the
returns in the other months to determine whether it is significantly higher. The slope
coefficients (b 1 , b2, ..., b 11 ) are expected to be less than zero. A one-tailed test is therefore
appropriate. The Durbin-Watson statistics are also calculated to check whether there is
any serial correlation in the residuals of the regressions. The results are presented in the
last row of Table 3-5.
As can be seen, the mean December return is significantly higher than March and
November in the KLSE, while in the SET, the month is only significantly higher than
November at the 0.05 level. In the SES, the December effect is more pronounced. Its
return is significantly higher than that of the other four months, namely March, August,
September and October. In Hong Kong, the mean January return is significantly higher
than for March, and September. It is also significantly higher than for June, August,
October and November at the 0.05 level. The January effect is therefore very pronounced
in Hong Kong. With regards to serial correlations in the residuals of the regressions, the
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Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that generally, there is no significant serial correlation
present in the residuals of the regressions.
The results for the second regression (equation 3-5) are summarised in Table 3-6. The
regression is used to test whether December in the case of Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand, and January in the case of Hong Kong, have returns significantly higher than
the average returns of the other eleven months. Again, a one-tail test is appropriate with
the expectation that the slope coefficient (0 ') is greater than zero. From the table, it is
clear that the mean returns in December are not statistically different than the average
returns of the other months in Malaysia and Thailand. In Singapore, however, the t-
statistic of 1.69 indicates that the mean December return is significantly higher at the 0.05
level than the average return of the other months. Lastly, in Hong Kong, the return in
January is significantly higher than the average return in the other months (t = 2.53).
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Table 3-5: Test of equal returns in month with the hi ghest return and in each of
the other months for market indices
Month	 Malaysia	 Thailand	 Singapore	 Hong Kong
January	 -0.0248	 -0.0130	 -0.0047
(-0.91)	 (-0.54)	 (-0.19)
February	 -0.003 8	 -0.0244	 -0.0 145	 -0.0377
(-0.14)	 (-1.02)	 (-0.58)	 (-1.42)
March	 -0.0509	 -0.0290	 -0.048 1	 -0.0755
(-1 .86)*	 (-1.22)	 (-1 93)*	 (2.84)*
April	 -0.0062	 -0.0254	 -0.0167	 -0.0266
(-0.23)	 (-1.07)	 (-0.67)	 (-1.00)
May	 -0.0110	 -0.0100	 -0.0017	 -0.0425
(-0.40)	 (-0.42)	 (-0.07)	 (-1.60)
June	 -0.0279	 -0.0101	 -0.0321	 -0.0527
(-1.02)	 (-0.43)	 (-1.29)	 (_1.98)*
July	 -0.0440	 -0.01 12	 -0.0300	 -0.0376
(-1.61)	 (-0.47)	 (-1.20)	 (-1.41)
August	 -0.0655	 -0.0224	 -0.0521	 -0.0633
(_2.39)*
	 (-0.94)	 (_2.09)*	 (-2.3 8)*
September	 -0.0440	 -0.0259	 -0.05 15	 -0.0786
(-1.61)	 (-1.09)	 (2.07)*	 (2.96)*
October	 -0.0376	 -0.0182	 -0.0604	 -0.0450
(-1.37)	 (-0.76)	 (2.42)*	 (-1 .69)*
November	 -0.0480	 -0.0454	 -0.0340	 -0.0685
(_1.75)*
	 (-1 .90)*	 (-1.36)	 (_2.57)*
December	 -0.0187
_________________ _________________ _________________ _________________ 	 (-0.70)
D-W	 1.79	 1.76	 1.72	 1.88
Notes;
Results are based on the regression;
R, = a + bjFeb + b2Mar + ............+ b1jDec + e
where, R = the returns for each of the month of the indices,
Feb = a dummy variable, which equals 1 for February observation, and 0
elsewhere,
Mar = a dummy variable, which equal 1 for March observation, and 0
elsewhere,
a = the intercept term, which indicates the expected value R for January,
b11 = the coefficient for February .....December, which measure the
difference between February .....December returns and January returns,
e = the error term, which follows the usual OLS assumption.
For Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, the month with the highest returns is December, while for hong
Kong, the month is January. The equation above should thus be adjusted accordingly for Malaysia,
Thailand and Singapore.
t-statistics are in parentheses. The critical value of the t-statistics above is -1.65, at the 0.05 significant level,
using a one-tailed test.
D-W is Durbin-Watson statistics which test the autocorrelation in the residuals of the regression above.
* indicate significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 3-6: Test of equal returns in month with the hi ghest return and in the
other months of the year combined
Market	 'Best' Month a Vs. Rest of Year
t-statistic
Malaysia	 0.0331	 1.63
Thailand	 0.0214	 1.23
Singapore	 0.0314	 1.69*
Hong Kong	 0.0497	 2.53*
Notes:
Results are based on the regression;
R, = Øo + ØjJan + e1
where R, = the mean monthly returns of the indices,
Jan = the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for observations in January and 0 otherwise,
Øo = the intercept term, which measures the mean returns for the eleven months
excluding January,
= the coefficient for January, which measures the difference between the mean
returns in January and the other eleven months of the year,
e1 = the random error term which follow the usual OLS assumptions.
For Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, the 'best' month (i.e., the month with the highest returns) is
December, while for Hong Kong the best month is January. The equation above should be adjusted
accordingly for Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore.
* indicates significant at 0.05 level, using a one-tailed test.
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Table 3-7 summarises the results of the analysis of the CNY effect, while Figure 3-2
shows graphically the CNY effect in the markets. It seems quite clear that three of the
markets which have a large number of Chinese investors, i.e., Malaysia, Singapore and
Hong Kong, show signs of the CNY effect. In Malaysia, the average returns 40 days prior
to the CNY are higher than the average daily returns for the whole year excluding those
40 days and 5 days after the celebration. This is consistent with Wong et al. (1990), who
find that the CNY rally starts two months before the new year. On average, an investor
will earn 0.1% daily during these 40 days. At 0.05 level, this is significant. The return
after the CNY is even higher. The daily average of those five days is 0.45% (t 2.33) and
is statistically higher than the average for the whole year. In Singapore and Hong Kong,
returns are significantly higher 40 days preceding the first day of the CNY. On average,
daily returns are 0.14% (t = 2.61) and 0.23% (t = 3.20) in Singapore and Hong Kong
respectively during this period. However, unlike in Malaysia, though returns are higher
than the year's average 5 days after the CNY, it is not significant in Singapore. A very
different result is found in Hong Kong. Investors actually earn a negative return of 0.11%
daily 5 days after the celebration when trading resumes. Not surprisingly, a significant
CNY effect in Thailand is not observed. This is consistent with Chan et a!. (1996) who
find a very weak CNY effect in the market, but significant evidence for the markets in
Malaysia and Singapore. Although returns are higher surrounding this festive season, they
are not statistically different from the returns of the rest of the year. One obvious
explanation for the absence of such effect here is that the Chinese are not the dominant
investors in the SET. In adition, the CNY is not declared as an official holiday in
Thailand.
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Table 3-7: The Chinese New Year effect
Country	 N	 A	 B	 C
Malaysia (1981-96)	 16	 0.00015	 0.00104	 0.00454
Std. dev.
	
0.00118	 0.00213	 0.00736
t-statistics	 1.95*	 2.23*
Singapore (1987-96)
	 10	 0.00013	 0.00142	 0.00255
Std. dev.	 0.00090	 0.00 126	 0.00504
t-statistics	 2.61*	 1.44
Hong Kong (1976-96)
	 21	 0.00045	 0.00228	 -0.00 108
Std. dev.	 0.00120	 0.00263	 0.00849
t-statistics	 3.20*	 -0.77
Thailarid(1977-96)	 20	 0.00039	 0.00114	 0.00149
Std. dev.	 0.00 128	 0.002 19	 0.00622
t-statistics	 1.58	 0.74
Notes:
N = number of observations.
A = average daily returns for the whole year, excluding 40 days prior to and 5 days after
the first day of the CNY.
B = average daily returns 40 days prior to the CNY.
C = average daily returns 5 days after the CNY.
t-statistics test the null hypotheses that H 0 : A = B arid H0: A C, against the alternative
hypotheses H: B > A and H 1 : C > A respectively.
* indicates significant at 0.05 level, using a one-tailed test.
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Figure 3-3: Market returns surrounding the CNY in KLSE. SES, SEHK and SET
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Cumulative daily returns surrounding CNY in SET (1976-96)
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3.5: Summary and Conclusion
Stock market seasonality in four Far-Eastern markets is investigated in this chapter.
Specifically, two analyses are carried out; i) analysis of the January effect, and ii) analysis
of the Chinese New Year (CNY) effect. The evidence suggests that the January effect
does not exist in Malaysia and Thailand. Instead, it is found that there are strong
December and February effects in Malaysia. In Thailand, no month shows any different
returns than the others. The January effect, however, is found in Singapore and Hong
Kong. December and May also have statistically higher returns than the other months in
Singapore. The January effect is most pronounced in Hong Kong. In addition, April
returns are also high, which may indicate the relevance of the tax-loss selling hypothesis
here.
An analysis of the CNY effect reveals that three markets which have a large Chinese
involvement, show significant positive returns surrounding the celebration. In Malaysia, it
is found that the effect is especially more pronounced five days after the market is open
following the CNY holidays. Daily returns 40 days preceding the first day of the CNY are
also high. The CNY effect is also observed in Singapore and Hong Kong. However,
unlike that in Malaysia, the markets in Singapore and Hong Kong show a more
pronounced CNY effect prior to the festive season. The rally starts as early as 40 days
before the celebration. The effect, however, is not strong after the market re-opens.
Lastly, there is no CNY effect in Thailand. One obvious reason is that this market does
not have many Chinese investors.
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CHAPTER 4
FURTHER EVIDENCE OF MARKET
ANOMALIES IN THE KLSE: THE
OVERREACTION EFFECT
4.1: Introduction
Over the past decade, a body of research has emerged suggesting that over the long
term, some predictability may exist in stock returns (for examples, De Bondt and
Thaler, 1985, 1987; Fama and French, 1988; and Poterba and Summers, 1988). This
long term behaviour in returns is often characterised as evidence of overreaction by
market participants, or linked with a possible mean-reverting returns process. As past
returns are being used as the information set to make predictions, the evidence
suggests that the market is not weak-form efficient.
Studies on return predictability over short intervals (weekly and monthly returns)
using serial correlation tests and runs tests have already been done in the Malaysian
market. The results generally confirm what has already been discovered in the US and
developed markets, namely that the time-series movement of price changes is best
characterised by a random walk (e.g., Yong, 1987; Barnes, 1986; Laurence, 1986;
Lanjong, 1983). To my knowledge, there are no published studies examining the
behaviour of returns over longer intervals, ( for example, studies on the long-run
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overreaction effect) in Malaysia. It is the aim of this chapter to investigate stock
market overreaction in the KLSE. The results would not only add to the growing
evidence on stock market overreaction as a whole, but also revise any conclusion on
market efficiency in the Malaysian context.
4.2: Descriptions of Data and Methodology
4.2.1: Data
Daily stock returns are calculated using data obtained from Datastream. This online
computer database gives the daily closing prices of KLSE listed firms, adjusted for
stock splits and dividends. The price given is the mid-market closing price, i.e., the
bid-ask average, and is therefore not subject to the bid-ask spread bias problem noted
in US studies (for examples, Kaul and Nimalendran, 1990; Conrad and Kaul, 1993).
Because the KLSE is a relatively young market, and because it has developed at a
considerable rate, it is decided that data from the 1970's may be rather out-of-date for
this type of study. Data from the eleven year period 1986-1996 inclusive, is used here.
The availability of data from Datastream, especially dividend data, also influences the
choice of time-period for the study. Companies whose share prices and dividends are
not available in Datastream starting 1986 are deleted from the sample. This procedure
leaves 166 companies, all of which are from the main board of the exchange, to be
included in the study' (The full list of these companies are given in Appendix 1). One
result of following this procedure is that it makes sure that only long-established and
perhaps the bigger companies are included in the sample; in fact 66 of them are
actually constituents of the KLSE Composite Index in 1996. These 166 companies, on
117
Chapter 4
average, represent about 50% of the market value of the main board, and slightly less
than 50% of the value of the whole market (see Table 4-1). I also ensure that every
sector on the main board of the exchange is represented in the sample, as can be seen
in Table 4-2. At least a 30% representation from each sector can be observed in the
sample.
It should be noted that the sample selection procedure above may cause a survivorship
bias in the data set. Some companies which went bankrupt (and therefore delisted)
during the study period may be omitted, and this is more likely to be true for portfolio
of losers (see later for definition). However, I believe that this problem will not be as
serious as it may appear. A list of delisted companies is obtained from the list of
suspendedldelisted companies published in the KLSE's Investors Digest. Since 1986,
there are only 7 Malaysian incorporated companies whose ordinary shares are delisted
from the exchange. However, except for one company, these shares are delisted due to
acquisition, merger, and reorganisation of the companies, and not due to bankruptcy,
as described by the publication. This can be further seen in Table 1-1 (Chapter 1),
which shows the number of companies listed by country of incorporation and the new
listings for the period 1973-1996. It is clear that the percentage of delisted companies
mentioned above is negligible in comparison to the total number of companies.
Moreover, DeBondt (1985) suggests that concern over the possibility that a higher
attrition rate associated with the 'winner' and 'loser' shares compared with the
population attrition rate might bias the magnitude of the overreaction effect was
misplaced. I therefore believe that the results in this chapter will least likely be
affected by a survivorship bias.
None of the sample companies comes from the second board since the second board, which consists of
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Table 4-1: Average market capitalisation of the samples and the market, in RM billions
Year	 Sample	 Main Board	 %	 Total Market	 %
1986	 33.1	 64.5	 51.3	 64.5	 51.3
1987	 36.3	 73.9	 49.1	 73.9	 49.1
1988	 49.7	 98.7	 50.4	 98.7	 50.4
1989	 83.3	 156.0	 53.4	 156.1	 53.3
1990	 82.3	 131.1	 62.8	 131.7	 62.5
1991	 90.4	 159.9	 56.5	 161.4	 56.0
1992	 103.2	 242.9	 42.5	 245.8	 42.0
1993	 291.3	 606.1	 48.1	 619.6	 47.0
1994	 241.3	 493.0	 48.9	 508.9	 47.4
1995	 264.8	 542.8	 48.8	 565.6	 46.8
1996	 330.5	 665.7	 49.6	 705.8	 46.8
Table 4-2: Sectoral profile of companies in the samples
Sector	 Number	 in	 Number	 in	 Percentage
sample	 sectorsa	 (%)
Consumer products	 29	 57	 50.9
Industrial products 	 37	 85	 43.5
Construction	 8	 20	 40.0
Trading/services	 24	 63	 38.1
Finance	 14	 47	 29.8
Hotels	 2	 5	 40.0
Properties	 28	 55	 50.9
Plantations	 18	 39	 46.2
Minings	 6	 11	 54.5
Totals	 166	 382
Note:
a. as at 28 June, 1996.
smaller firms, was only introduced in 1989.
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4.2.2: Portfolio formation
Logarithmic returns are used, which are equivalent to the continuous-time returns;
[,d +DJd
R. =lnJ"	 Dj,d-1
where; R,d = return of security] during day d;
DJd = dividend per share of security] received in day d;
= price of security] at the end of day d;
'3jd-I = price of security] at the end of day d-1.
According to Strong (1992), the logarithmic returns are both theoretically and
empirically preferable. Theoretically, they are analytically more tractable when linking
together sub-period returns to form returns over longer intervals, i.e., by simply
adding up sub-period returns. Empirically, logarithmic returns are more likely to be
normally distributed , and so conform to the assumptions of standard statistical
techniques. In addition, the use of logarithmic returns is common in much of the
overreaction literature.
A procedure similar to that of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) to construct portfolios, is
used here. Daily market-adjusted excess returns, ERs, are calculated for every stock]2,
thus;
2 DeBondt & Thaler (1985) use three types of return residuals - market-adjusted excess returns, market
model residuals, and excess returns that are measured relative to Sharpe-Lintner version of CAPM. It
turns out that whichever the three are used, the results are similar and do not affect their main
conclusion. Therefore, they only report results based on market-adjusted excess returns. Using this type
(4-1)
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ER, = - Rmt	(4-2)
where R, and Rmt are the returns of stock j and market respectively. The KLSE
Composite Price Index, is used as a proxy for the market. Results from a number of
studies (such as those of DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) indicate that evidence of
overreaction is not sensitive to whether abnormal performance is measured relative to
the market (as here), or relative to some other expected returns model (such as CAPM
or market model). This conclusion is perhaps not surprising; a major study conducted
by Brown and Warner (1980) finds that sophisticated expected returns models
perform no better than simple models, for identifying abnormal performance in
equities3.
Cumulative excess returns, CERs, are then calculated over the 3 years starting January
1986 and ending December 1988, described here as the portfolio formation period
(FP);
	
CERJ = ER11
	(4-3)
where T is the number of days in the three year period. Stocks are ranked based on
their CERs over the 3-year period, and assigned to 10 portfolios of equal number of
of returns, there is no risk adjustment except for movement of the market as a whole, and the adjustment
is identical for all stocks.
Their simulation analysis reveals that the simplest model of all in measuring abnormal performance -
the mean adjusted returns model - is able to detect abnormal performance no less frequently than the
other more sophisticated models, such as those which are based on the market and risk adjusted returns
models. Furthermore, the power of the tests does not appear to be enhanced by using risk adjustment
procedures suggested by the Asset Pricing model. In fact, the authors suggest that more complicated
methodologies can actually make researchers worst off, as these models can bring their own problems.
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stocks. Portfolio 1 consists of stocks with the highest CERs (winners) while portfolio
10 is made up of stocks with the lowest CERs (losers). With 166 stocks in the sample,
I allocate 17 stocks each in the winner and loser portfolios 4 . According to DeBondt
and Thaler (1985), overreaction effect is especially true for the extreme portfolios; not
only that the movements in stock prices will be followed by subsequent price
movements in the opposite direction, but also the more extreme the initial price
movement, the greater will the subsequent adjustment be. I therefore concentrate only
on these two portfolios.
In the following 3 years, i.e., from January 1989 to December 1991, described here as
the test period (TP), the CERs of all stocks in the winner and loser portfolios are
calculated. The mean of these CERs represents the cumulative excess returns for an
equal weighted portfolio, with daily rebalancing. This procedure is repeated, with
starting date for FP and TP being advanced by one year, i.e., January 1987, January
1988, and so on for FP, and correspondingly January 1990, January 1991, and so on
for TP. This procedure yields a total of 6 FPs and TPs for the analysis, summarised in
Table 4-3 below. Hereafter, for brevity, individual formation and test periods will be
referenced by the numbers 1,.. .,6, as defined in the table. As the table reveals,
overlapping periods are used in this study. However, this may not create a problem
since for all statistical tests in this study, a pooled data of test periods is not used.
Thus, problems such as double or even triple counting of data is avoided. Moreover,
an extended period would be needed if non-overlapping periods were to be used. For
Different studies have defined portfolios of winner and loser differently. DeBondt and Thaler define
winners and losers as being the best and worst 35 performing stocks respectively. Zarowin (1990) uses
the top and bottom quintiles, Chopra, et a! (1992) the top and bottom 5%, and Kryzanowski and Zhang
(1992) and Dissanaike (1997) the two extreme deciles. Clare and Thomas (1995) suggest that
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Table 4-3: Formation period and test period for KLSE stocks
Period	 Formation Period (FP)
	 Test Period (TP)
1	 1986-88	 1989-91
2	 1987-89	 1990-92
3	 1988-90	 1991-93
4	 1989-91	 1992-94
5	 1990-92	 1993-95
6	 1991-93	 1994-96
example, a six non-overlapping periods means that the required data set should go as
far back as 1979, the year when the KLSE was just 6 years formally established, with
just over 200 companies listed and no index that represented the whole market 5 . Not
only that, none of the KLSE companies with 1979 data is available in Datastrearn for
analysis6 . Furthermore, as argued by Dissanaike (1997), the use of non-overlapping
periods does have its own shortcomings, such as the inevitable loss of information and
the failure to detect any effect of economy-wide (3-5 years) cyclical factor on the
consistency of the success (or failure) of the contrarian strategy. Therefore,
disaggregated results and tests for individual test periods would be given more
emphasis, whilst the aggregated results would only be given to show the overall
picture.
The whole procedure above (see equation 4-3) represents the arithmetic method' in
computing cumulative excess returns, and is in fact commonly used in oveneaction
differences in de1mnin niner and kr tthus could eplarn the different results in overreaction
studies. The nuthors t mehs ne qturthk n 1mn lrtfo1LOs.
mentioned earlier. the KI L Con ste tnde. as oni' launched in 1986. Prior to its introduction,
investors could onl aue the nket taed on the then e'sin sh. secioral indices.
'KLSE companies' shai'e data ar onl aadabk m Dtu- 	 horn 1985 onwards. This, however,
involves very fc comanes
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studies. However, Dissanaike (1993, 1994) argues that it is an unsatisfactory and
inaccurate method in computing multi-period returns from single-period returns since
the strategy involves rebalancing to equal weights in each single period. He suggests
the buy-and-hold method be used. Instead of adding up together single period returns,
they should be multiplied, as shown below;
CERBJI =-(Hr , — Urm,),	 (4-4)
where CER BH is the mean CER for winner and loser portfolios using the buy-and-
hold strategy, N is the total number of stocks in the portfolios, T is the total number of
time periods (days), rp is the return on stockj in day t, where the return is defined as
the price-relative inclusive of dividends, and r,, is the return on the market in the
same period. This method does not imply any rebalancing; the success of contrarian
strategy is judged purely on the basis of the one-off decision to buy or sell at the
portfolio formation date. It involves lower transaction costs, and is less affected by the
problem of infrequent trading. However, as pointed out by Dissanaike, the buy-and-
hold method could result in a reduction of diversification as stocks whose prices have
risen over time, will carry more weight in the portfolio than those whose prices have
fallen.
For comparison, the results using the buy-and-hold method above will also be
reported. Any differences in the results can therefore be attributable to the return
metric being used. However, to be in line with most of the overreaction studies, the
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results using the arithmetic method of computing cumulative excess returns will be
given more prominence.
4.2.3: Testing for overreaction
A number of tests are conducted to analyse overreaction in the KLSE. The tests in
parts (a) and (b) in this chapter provide an initial investigation of the overreaction
effect in the KLSE stocks. Part (a) investigates whether stocks with poor (good) price
performance over a three-year period, become relatively better (worse) performers
over the following three-year period. This process would be consistent with
overreaction by market participants, and suggests a possible mean reverting
component in the generating process for KLSE stock returns. The potential for
exploiting these patterns through arbitrage is investigated in part (b), where test period
excess returns are compared between winner and loser portfolios. The next chapter
(Chapter 5) will analyse, in more detail, the results of the initial investigation of
overreaction patterns examined in parts (a) and (b) above by looking at two possible
factors which have been proposed as an alternative explanation for overreaction,
namely time-varying risk and the size effect. Chapter 6 will examine any potential
seasonal patterns in the excess returns profile for winner and loser portfolios.
The test procedures used here include both parametric and non-parametric methods.
Although parametric tests are more powerful, non-parametric tests are generally more
robust to non-normal distributions and extreme observations.
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a. Differences between formation period and test period CERs for a specific portfolio
For all individual winner and loser portfolios, a comparison is made between CERs in
the formation period and in the test period. Are good/poor CER values in the first
three years (the formation period, FP) followed by a reversal of fortunes in the next
three years (the test period, TP)?
The winner and loser portfolios for a particular period p (p = 1, 2, ..., 6) each contain
17 stocks and therefore there are 17 FP and TP CER values. Since changes in CERs
for a specific portfolio are tested here, two tests for related samples are used; the
parametric paired t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. The
hypotheses for the t-test are as follows, relating to the mean CER values in the FP and
TP;
For winner portfolios:
H0: CERFP=CER7p
Hj: CERFP>CERTP
For loser portfolios:
H0: CERr CER
Hj: CERTP>CERFP
The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test is employed in a similar manner, although it tests for
general shifts in the distribution rather than concentrating on the mean of the
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distribution. For additional information, median CER values are also calculated.
These tests are conducted for each of the six periods (p = 1, 2, ..., 6).
b. Differences between winners' and losers' CERs in the test periods
Assuming no transaction costs, an arbitrage portfolio, created by short selling winners
and buying losers generates cumulative excess returns for the portfolio, CERA, i.e.;
CERA
 = CERL - CER
	 (4-5)
where the cumulative excess returns are the values obtained over the test period for
winners (CERw) and losers (CERL). Under a random walk process, such an arbitrage
portfolio would not be expected to generate excess returns. Significant differences in
test period CERs for winners and losers would indicate potential profits from the
contrarian based arbitrage trading strategy. Differences in winners' and losers' test
period CERs are examined here using tests for independent samples; the parametric t-
test for two independent samples, and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test. Here
we are concentrating only on the test period CERs; we examine the CER differentials
for winners and losers for each period (p = 1, 2, ..., 6). Both the winner and loser
portfolios for a particular period contain 17 stocks and thus 17 CERs. The hypotheses
for the t-test are that, in the test period;
H0: CERL CERV
Hj : CER L
 > CERV
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The Mann-Whitney U-test is not based on the mean CER values but examines general
differences in central tendency. Median CER values are also calculated. The results of
the initial test of stock market overreaction in parts (a) and (b) above will be given in
section 4.3 below.
4.3: Initial Evidence of Mean Reversion in KLSE Stock Returns
Table 4-4 gives the CER differentials between formation period and test period for
both winner and loser portfolios. It shows that in all period, winners' mean and
median CER values are higher in the formation period than in the test period, as
reflected in the positive CER differentials in colunm 2. The differences in the
formation period and test period CERs for this portfolio are all significant at the 0.05
level. The reverse is true for loser portfolios; in all periods, the mean and median CER
values are significantly greater in the test period than in the preceding formation
period. These results are therefore consistent with those in the US and the UK studies
reviewed earlier in Chapter 2. For comparison, the results of the same analysis using
the buy-and-hold method are also reported in Table 4-5. No major differences are
observed between the results in Table 4-4 and Table 4-5, even though using the buy-
and-hold method generally yields less significant results (except for periods 2 and 6
for winner portfolio) than using the arithmetic method.
Both tables therefore give a strong indication that there are significant return reversals
in KLSE stocks. Specifically, stocks which perform very well in a three-year period
relative to the market, will experience a reversal of fortune in the next three years as
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their prices decline. The reverse is true for those which experience a price decline in
the three-year formation period. Their returns in the next three-year are higher relative
to the market. This evidence is therefore consistent with returns patterns which may
be expected in the presence of market overreaction or mean reverting behaviour in
stock returns.
Figure 4-1 illustrates the mean reversions in the level of CERs of winners and losers
in each of the 3-year formation period (year -3 to year -1) and 3-year test period (year
1 to year 3). As can be seen, the performance differential of winners and losers
diverges in the formation period. Roughly towards the end of the third year of the
formation period, however, the CER values tend to converge; winners' CERs start
losing the momentum and is decreasing at a fast rate, while losers' CERS is improving
and is increasing at a fast rate, too. As predicted by the overreaction hypothesis, the
fortune of both portfolios reverses in the test period, as revealed by the figure. Losers
start to outperform winners as early as the first half of the first year in the test period.
The rate of divergence in performance increases until the end of the first year. The
performance of losers slow down thereafter, while winners start to pick up again at a
steady rate. Roughly towards the end of the third year into the test period, the CER
values of the portfolios converge again. Consistent with the claim made by DeBondt
and Thaler, the figure reveals that, winners' and losers' fortune changes in an interval
of three years.
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Table 4-4: CER differentials between formation period and test period for winner
and loser portfolios, using the arithmetic method
A. Winner portfolios
Period	 Mean CERFP	i-value	 Median CERFP	Wilcoxon test statistic
- Mean CERTP	- Median CER1
1	 0.63	 5.19*	 0.60	 149.0*
2	 1.50	 13.14*	 1.48	 153.0*
3	 0.99	 5.40*	 1.02	 147.0*
4	 0.75	 4.96*	 0.82	 144.0*
5	 0.74	 3.50*	 0.74	 135.0*
6	 2.15	 9.66*	 2.14	 153.0*
B. Loser portfolios
Period	 Mean CER1	i-value	 Median CERTP	Wilcoxon test statistic
- Mean CERFP	- Median CER
1	 1.87	 11.88*	 1.93	 153.0*
2	 1.09	 5.58*	 0.93	 153.0*
3	 1.73	 7.86*	 1.60	 153.0*
4	 1.37	 10.48*	 1.36	 153.0*
5	 0.54	 5.18*	 0.52	 153.0*
6	 0.60	 6.66*	 0.59	 153.0*
Notes:
CERFP = cumulative excess returns over 3-year formation period;
CER1	= cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period;
i-value = t-statistic for paired t-test of differences in sample means;
Wilcoxon = Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test statistic for testing differences in sample median between two
related samples;
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 4-5: CER differentials between formation period and test period for winner
and loser portfolios, using the buy-and-hold method
A. Winner portfolios
Period	 Mean CERFP	t-value	 Median CERFP	Wilcoxon test statistic
- Mean CERTP	- Median CERTP
1	 0.593	 3.29*	 0.645	 133.0*
2	 1.532	 15.95*	 1.527	 133.0*
3	 0.905	 2.07*	 1.224	 118.0*
4	 0.539	 1.68*	 0.804	 114.0*
5	 0.658	 1.95*	 0.773	 124.0*
6	 2.062	 11.89*	 2.078	 153.0*
B. Loser portfolios
Period	 Mean CERTP	t-value	 Median CERTP
	
Wilcoxon test statistic
- Mean CERFP	  Median CERFP
1	 1.552	 7.40*	 1.478	 153.0*
2	 1.009	 3.41*	 0.629	 153.0*
3	 4.360	 2.93*	 2.186	 150.0*
4	 1.139	 4.02*	 0.943	 152.0*
5	 1.071	 5.78*	 0.909	 153.0*
6	 0.050	 5.48*	 0.446	 153.0*
Notes:
CERFP
 = cumulative excess returns over 3-year formation period;
CERTP
 = cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period;
t-value = t-statistic for paired t-test of differences in sample means;
Wilcoxon = Wilcoxon Signed Ranics test statistic for testing differences in sample median between two
related samples;
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level.
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Figure 4-1: Mean reversions in the level of winners' and losers' CERs in the formation and test
periods, pooled across six periods
Year
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Following on from the results in Tables 4-4 and 4-5, the results in Tables 4-6 and 4-7
provide some evidence of the CER differentials between winners and losers in the
three-year test periods. It actually summarises how much profit an arbitrageur would
reap (or losses he will suffer) by using a contrarian investment strategy of buying
losers and short-selling winners.
Table 4-6 clearly shows that losers consistently outperform winners in all six test
periods. As predicted by the overreaction hypothesis, mean and median CER values
are greater for losers than for winners. However, only in three periods are the
differences significant at a 0.05 level, i.e., periods 2, 3 and 6. Thus, the potential
profits from an arbitrage portfolio may not always exist (or be worth exploiting) once
transaction costs are taken into account. The results of the analysis using the buy-and-
hold method are given in Table 4-7. Though there are some differences, there are also
some striking similarities in the results. The most notable difference is that losers no
longer outperform winners consistently in the test period, as is observed in periods 1,
4 and 5 where winners actually perform better. However, statistically, this is not
significant at any conventional level; the observed t-values of -0.96, -0.53 and -0.85
are considered small. The similarity of the results can be seen in terms of the periods
where losers outperform wiimers, and the significance of these superior performances.
In periods 2, 3 and 6, losers significantly outperform winners, just as they do when the
arithmetic method is used (see Table 4-6), though the t-values and the Mann-Whitney
U-statistics are comparatively smaller. Therefore, we can claim that though the use of
different return metric may change the CER values of some winner and loser
constituents, it does not significantly affect the overall results regarding mean
reversions of both portfolios. Hereafter, therefore, only the results based on the
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Table 4-6: Differences between winners' and losers' CERs in the test periods.
using the arithmetic method
Period	 Mean CERL Mean CERw Mean CER L f-value Median CERL	M-W-U
- Mean CERw	 - Median CER
1	 0.075	 -0.008	 0.083	 0.45	 -0.02 1	 306.0
2	 0.067	 -0.397	 0.464	 2.67*	 0.176	 371.0*
3	 0.922	 0.072	 0.850	 3•44*	 0.049	 388.0*
4	 0.607	 0.376	 0.231	 1.25	 0.014	 330.0
5	 0.540	 0.356	 0.184	 1.03	 0.721	 320.0
6	 0.153	 -0.424	 0.577	 3Ø7*	 0.314	 377.0*
Notes:
CERL
 = losers' cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period;
CERw = winners' cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period;
f-value = t-statistic for f-test of differences in sample means for two independent samples;
M-W-U = Mann-Whitney U-test statistic for testing differences in sample medians between two
independent samples;
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 4-7: Differences between winners' and losers' CERS in the test periods,
using the buy-and-hold method
Period	 Mean CERL Mean CER	 Mean CERL	f-value	 Median CERL	M-W-U
- Mean CERw	 - Median CERw
	
-0.248	 0.025	 -0.223	 -0.96	 -0.248	 255.0
2	 -0.012	 -0.429	 0.441	 1.61**	 0.013	 330.0
3	 3.551	 0.161	 3.390	 2.19*	 1.400	 371.0*
4	 0.374	 0.590	 -0.216	 -0.53	 0.253	 284.0
5	 0.162	 0.442	 -0.280	 -0.85	 0.051	 274.0
6	 0.049	 -0.336	 0.385	 2.60*	 0.636	 397.0*
Notes:
CERL = losers' cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period;
CER	 = winners' cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period;
f-value = f-statistic for f-test of differences in sample means for two independent samples;
M-W-U = Mann-Whitney U-test statistic for testing differences in sample medians between two
independent samples;
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level;
** indicates significant at the 0.10 level.
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arithmetic method for computing excess returns will be reported.
Table 4-6 also indicates a degree of asymmetry regarding the test period CERs for
winner and loser portfolios. Mean CERs for losers are positive for all six periods,
indicating above-market performance as expected. However, CERs for winners are
negative for only three periods (p = 1,2,6). Winners' CERs in periods 3, 4 and 5 are
still positive. Thus, the under-performance of winners in the test periods is not as
dramatic as the above-market performance of losers. This may be due to the fact the
KLSE was booming tremendously in these periods, especially in 1993, so that it
offsets some effect of overreaction for winners (i.e., by reducing their price decline)
while at the same time, it amplifies the overreaction effect for losers (i.e., by
increasing their excess returns). That is why overreaction is more pronounced for the
loser stocks in this market. The asymmetry mirrors results from the US (De Bondt and
Thaler, 1985), and the UK (Power, 1992) studies of overreaction, and can be seen in
the graphical representation of the KLSE data in Figure 4-2. Panel A shows the CERs
of winners and losers, cumulated over the 36 months test period for the whole periods
combined, while Panel B the cumulated CERs for each test period. With the
exceptions of the first 20 months in test period 3 and the first 14 months in test period
4, the panels generally reveal the superiority of performance of losers over winners in
all six test periods.
There are two possible (rational) explanations for this observed phenomenon. One is
that, the systematic risk (beta) of losers and winners have changed from the formation
to test periods, and that there may be some risk differences between losers and
winners in the test periods. Secondly, it may be that this overreaction effect is just
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another reincarnation of the size effect. Losers yield higher excess returns because
they have become smaller in the test periods, while winners have become bigger in the
test periods. These two possibilities are explored in the next chapter.
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Figure 4-2: CERs for winner and loser portfolios. cumulated over 3-year test period
A. All period
0.40
0.30
0.20
w
0 0.10
0.00
-0.10
—+-- Losers
[—w—wnj
-, (I) Z -,	 -) (I) Z	 '	 ) Cl) Z
Month
B. Subperiods I
	 6
0.80
0.60
0.40
UI0 0.20
0.00
-0.20
PEIOD 1(1989-91)
M.M J S N J M M J S N 4 M M 4 S N
Month
F
_-Loser 
I
H
_Wnni
0.40
0.20
0.00
UI
o -0.20
-0.40
-0.60
PERIOD 2 (1990-92)
Month
-.•--. Loser
—4— Wnner
137
Los er
—g—Wnner
PEOD 5(1993-95)
Month
---Loser
—u—Wnner
Chapter 4
PE1OD 3(1991-93)
1.00
n 0.50
LII
C.) o.00
-0.50
M M J S N J MM
Month
—.--Loser
—U-- Wnner
NJMMJ SN
0.80
0.60
, 0.40
w 0.20
C.)
-0.20
-0.40
PElOD4(1992-94)
Month
0.20
0.00
w -0.20
C.)
-0.40
-0.60
PERIOD 6 (1994-96)
N J M M J S N	 '--Loserl
—U-- Wnner
Month
138
Chapter 4
4.4: Limitation: Transaction Costs for Daily Returns
This chapter's analysis of KLSE stocks utilises daily returns. However, realising such
returns would require daily trading, which would incur substantial transaction costs.
As described in Chapter 1, there are some costs associated with trading on the KLSE,
such as the brokerage fees (see section 1.3.1). Therefore, the potential for profitable
exploitation of the overreaction effect documented in the study may be severely
limited. Even though the buy-and-hold method used in the previous section, to some
extent, has already reduced transaction costs, this section will look at another way to
reduce transaction costs, using the arithmetic method in computing returns. The
comparison of winner and loser portfolios, used in section 4.3, is therefore repeated,
but using annual returns data also obtained from Datastream. This low frequency
trading will incur relatively small transaction costs, since only three times the costs are
incurred in the three-year period. Because transaction costs are taken into
consideration, any profit earned will therefore be more realistic. The results are
summarised in Table 4-8. It appears that the use of annual returns does not change the
results substantially. The results indicate that the contrarian trading strategy offers
potential profits for each of the six test periods, although winner-loser differences are
only significant at the 0.05 level for two of these periods, i.e., periods 2 and 3.
Recalling the results from the analysis using daily returns, the differences in CERs is
also significant for period 6, besides the two periods above. In period 2 and 3,
employing a contrarian strategy will earn an investors a gross profit of 34.9 % and
71.3% respectively. Therefore, it can be argued that, the contrarian investment
strategy of buying losers and selling winners is worth undertaking. The winner-loser
anomaly is indeed worth exploiting.
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Table 4-8: Differences between winners' and losers' CERs in the test periods, using annual returns
Period	 Mean CERL Mean CER	 Mean CERL t-value Median CERL 	M-W-U
- Mean CERw
	
- Median CER
1	 0.236	 0.008	 0.228	 1.30	 0.118	 330.0
2	 0.150	 -0.199	 0.349	 2.15*	 0.176	 353.0*
3	 0.759	 0.046	 0.713	 3.06*	 0.666	 373.0*
4	 0.583	 0.350	 0.233	 1.27	 0.022	 331.0
5	 0.472	 0.325	 0.147	 0.85	 0.002	 320.0
6	 0.119	 -0.172	 0.291	 1.54	 0.318	 340.0
Notes:
CERL 	losers' cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period;
CERw = winners' cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period;
t-value = t-statistic for t-test of differences in sample means for two independent samples;
M-W-U = Mann-Whitney U-test statistic for testing differences in sample medians between two
independent samples;
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level.
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4.6: Conclusion
The analyses in this chapter provide strong evidence that there are patterns of mean
reversions in KLSE stock returns. Stocks which underperform the market in a three-
year period (losers) are found to fare better than the market in the following three
years. The opposite is true for stocks which have outperformed the market (winners);
they fmd that their fortune reverses in the subsequent three-year period. There is also
evidence of potential profits from arbitrage trading based on short selling winners and
buying losers. Using different methods in calculating cumulative excess returns does
not change the results significantly. Although the main analysis using daily returns
makes an assumption that there is no transaction costs, further analysis using annual
returns and buy-and-hold returns suggests that profitable opportunities are still there to
be exploited.
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CHAPTER 5
DO TIME-VARYING RISK AND SIZE EXPLAIN
OVERREACTION?
5.1: Introduction
Preliminary findings in Chapter 4 are consistent with the findings in US and UK studies
that there are mean reversions in stock returns over the long-term in the KLSE. Winner
and loser stocks over the past 36 months will experience reversals in their fortunes in the
following 36 months. The argument, as advanced by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), is that
investors overreact to new information, such as earnings announcements, due to wave of
optimism and pessimism, and subsequently correct themselves. This irrational behaviour
of market participants is the reason why stock prices take temporary swings away from
their fundamental values, and leads De Bondt and Thaler to investigate the overreaction
hypothesis.
However, two major arguments have been advanced against the hypothesis. Firstly, as
claimed by Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989), there is a measurement error in beta
estimated from the rank period as done by DeBondt and Thaler; since losers' betas
increase during the rank period, the rank period beta underestimates the test period beta.
Secondly, mean reversions are claimed to be the consequences of changes in the size of
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winners and losers (Zarowin, 1989, 1990). An increase in the winner's price in the
formation period will result in an increase in its market value. Likewise, a decrease in the
loser's price in the formation period will result in a decrease in its market value. It may be
that differences in the market value for winners and losers explain any return differentials,
as predicted by the size effect. In other words, overreaction is really a reincarnation of the
size effect.
The objective of this chapter is to provide additional evidence which will help to resolve
the above issues. An analysis of the relationship between risk and mean reversions will
first be carried out, followed by an analysis of the size effect and its interaction with mean
reversions in the KLSE stock returns.
5.2: Description of Methodo1oy
5.2.1: Testing the relationship between overreaction and changes in systematic risk
Any excess returns which are identified in tests (a) or (b) in section 4.2.3, may be
explained by changes in systematic risk (beta). For example, for firms experiencing
significant price appreciation (i.e., winners), the market value of equity rises and gearing
falls - assuming no changes in the market value of debts - thus reducing beta. The reverse
process applies to losers. These changes may explain the apparent overreaction in stock
returns, detected in part (a). It may also be that there exist significant risk differentials
between loser and winner portfolios in the test period. This may explain excess return
differentials identified in part (b) of the analysis.
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In order to determine whether time-varying risk and risk differentials play a role in the
performance of winner and loser portfolios, the following test is carried out. Systematic
risk is first estimated for winner and loser portfolios for both formation and test periods,
using the market model as below;
R 1
 = a, + /i,Rmt + e t	(5-1)
where R, is the return of stock i, Rmt is the return of the market, cx, is a constant term, and
e11 is the error term. The slope coefficient, or $, represents the systematic risk of the
stock. Estimated betas are then examined for evidence that (i) the beta for specific
portfolios changes from the formation period to the test period, and (ii) that the test period
beta is greater for losers than for winners, thus explaining return differentials.
For parts (i) and (ii), tests for related samples and independent samples are employed
respectively. These tests are identical to those used to examine differences in CERs for
tests (a) and (b) in Chapter 4. Thus, for the first analysis, two tests for related samples are
used here; the parametric paired t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
test - to examine changes in a portfolio's beta values over time. The hypotheses for the t-
tests are as follows, relating to the mean beta values in the test period (TP) and the
formation period (FP);
For winner portfolios:
H0: BETA FP BETA p
Hj: BETAFP > BETATP
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For loser portfolios:
H0: BETATPBETApp
Hj : BETATP > BETAFP
The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test is employed in a similar manner, as a non-parametric
alternative. The second analysis concerns beta differential between winners and losers in
the test periods. Differences in winner and loser test period betas are examined here using
tests for independent samples; the parametric t-test for two independent samples, and the
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test. The hypotheses for the t-test are that, in the test
period;
H0: BETA L
 = BETAW
Hj : BETAL > BETAW
The Mann-Whitney U test is also utilised to examine differences in winners' and losers'
beta values in the test periods, as a non-parametric alternative to the t-test. Section 5.3
will discuss the results obtained from the test in this section.
5.2.2: Testing for size effect and and its interaction with overreaction
In order to determine whether size effect has any influence on the mean reversion of CER
values for winner and loser portfolios, an investigation is first carried out to determine
whether a size effect is present in the KLSE stocks. All of the same 166 firms are first
ranked based on their market values at the end of each formation period. The market
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value data is obtained from Datastream. The largest and smallest 17 firms are placed into
two extreme portfolios. Test periods CERs for these small firms and large firms portfolios
are examined for evidence of the size effect. Tests for independent samples are employed
(t-test and Mann-Whitney U-test) to examine whether, on average, the small firm
portfolio generates greater CERs than the large firm portfolio. The hypotheses for the t-
test are that, in the test period;
H0: CER small = CER large
H1 : CER small > CERI arg e
To examine whether there is any interaction between overreaction and firm size effect,
the number of common firms between the winner/loser and small/large firm portfolios is
described. The potentially profitable portfolios are the small firms portfolio and the loser
portfolio. To examine any potential interaction, the following bi-variate regression
models are used. For the loser firms portfolio, the importance of firm size (at the end of
the formation period) is examined using the regression;
CER TPJ = 01 + 02.SIZEFP1 + Vj	 (5-2)
where SIZEFPJ is the market value of firmj at the end of the formation period and v is a
random error term following usual OLS assumptions. The influence of the formation
period CERs is therefore controlled for whilst investigating the effect of size on the test
period CERs. If size has additional explanatory value, then the slope coefficient should be
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negative and significant. The non-parametric Spearman rank correlation coefficient for
these two variables is also computed.
For the small finn portfolio, the importance of being a (formation period) loser is
examined using the regression;
CERTPJ = TI + 72. CERFPJ +
	 (5-3)
where CERTPJ and CERFPJ are the test period and formation period CERs for stockj, and
% is a random error term following the usual OLS assumptions. The main idea of
regression 5-3 is to study the relationship between formation period CERs on test period
CERs while controlling for firm size, so that any excess return reversals observed could
not be attributed to size differentials. Since all firms in this portfolio are small, the loser
effect should be indicated by a significant negative slope estimate. The non-parametric
Spearman rank correlation is also computed for these two variables.
For regressions 5-2 and 5-3, significant overreaction and size effects will lead to negative
values for 02 and 72 respectively; thus one-tail t-tests are employed here. The null and
alternative hypotheses for these regressions are as follow;
H0: 02O
Hj: 02<0
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H0. 72=0
Hj:	 <0
5.3: Time-Varying Risk and Mean Reversions
This section reports the results of the analysis in section 5.2.1. Recall that CER values for
wiimers are significantly greater in the formation period than in the following test period
(see Table 4-4, Chapter 4). The opposite is true for losers. However, this apparent
evidence of overreaction or mean reverting behaviour could be the result of changes in
systematic risk between formation period and test period. If winners' beta values decrease
and losers' beta values increase, this may explain the results in Table 4-4. The results in
Table 5-1 below provide some evidence on beta changes.
It reveals that for winners, the mean and median beta values are generally greater in the
formation period than in the test period. However, this difference is only significant for
one of the six periods (p = 3). More interestingly, for the final period (p 6), the average
formation period beta is significantly less than the test period beta. It would be difficult
to suggest that the beta changes reported here could explain the significant evidence of
mean reversion for winners reported in Table 4-4, Chapter 4. For losers, it is found that
test period betas are greater than formation period betas; this difference is significant for
four out of six periods under study (p = 1,2,4,5)'. While these changes may explain
For period 5, the parametric t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test produce quite
inconsistent results insofar as significance is concerned. However, this is in fact, not a major inconsistency.
The p-value of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (not reported in the table) is actually 0.054 - very closed to
being accepted at the 0.05 level of significance.
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Table 5-1: Systematic risk (beta) differentials between formation period and test period
for winner and loser portfolios
A. Winner portfolios
Period	 Mean BETAFP	t-value	 Median BETAFP	Wilcoxon test statistic
- Mean BETATP	- Median BETATP
	
0.03	 0.59	 0.03	 86.0
2	 0.02	 0.26	 0.02	 73.5
3	 0.23	 347*	 0.22	 133.5*
4	 0.11	 1.29	 0.11	 102.0
5	 0.08	 0.72	 0.09	 82.0
6	 -0.35	 -3.80k	 -0.34	 138.0x
B. Loser portfolios
Period	 Mean BETATP	t-value	 Median BETATP	Wilcoxon test statistic
- Mean BETAFP	- Median BETAF?
	
0.47	 8.92*	 0.46	 153.0*
2	 0.36	 3.18*	 0.36	 121.5*
3	 0.01	 0.07	 -0.01	 73.0
4	 0.56	 5.52*	 0.58	 148.0*
5	 0.21	 1.90*	 0.14	 111.0
6	 0.05	 1.07	 0.05	 91.0
Notes:
BETATP = Beta estimated over 3-year test period;
BETAFP = Beta estimated over 3-year formation period;
t-value = t-statistic for paired t-test of differences in sample means;
Wilcoxon = Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test statistic for testing differences between two related samples
* indicates significant at 0.05 level;
indicates that this test statistic is the 'wrong sign' in relation to the one-tail test. Using a two-tail test, this
t-value is highly significant (even at 0.01 level).
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increased returns in the test period, the changes for the two non-significant period (p 3,
6) would unlikely explain the significant overreaction pattern for losers identified for
these periods (see Table 4-4). Thus, the mean-reverting behaviour identified in Table 4-4
may be partly explained by time-variation in beta values, particularly for losers, but beta
changes do not appear to offer a full explanation of this effect.
The results in Table 4-6 in the previous chapter indicate that, over the three-year test
periods, losers generate larger CERs than winners. This could be attributed to the
differences in test period betas for winners and losers. In fact, Table 5-2 below reveals
that for three of the six test periods (p = 1,4,5), betas for loser firms are significantly
greater than for winners. This may partly explain the CER differentials in Table 4-6.
Recalling the results in Table 4-6, the largest loser-winner CER differentials are found to
be in periods 2, 3 and 6. However, Table 5-2 indicates that the beta differentials are not
significant for periods 2 and 3, and even shows that for period 6, the losers' beta is
smaller than the winners' beta, as indicated by the negative sign. Instead, beta
differentials are largest for periods 1, 4 and 5, where the CER differentials are not
significant (see Table 4-6). These results suggest that changes in systematic risk of
winners and losers, and risk differentials between the two, are unlikely to provide a
complete explanation for overreaction effects in the KLSE, as documented in Chapter 4.
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Table 5-2: Differences in systematic risk (beta between winners and losers in the test periods
Period	 Mean BETAL	t-value	 Median BETAL	M-W-U
- Mean BETA W	- Median BETAW
	
0.736	 8.08*	 0.81	 436.0*
2	 0.059	 0.37	 0.27	 327.5
3	 0.024	 0.24	 0.08	 308.0
4	 0.559	 6.35*	 0.60	 423.5*
5	 0.517	 5.26*	 0.57	 406.5*
6	 -0.378	 3.15x	 -0.40	 380.0x
Notes:
BETAL = losers' beta estimated over 3-year period;
BETAW = winners' beta estimated over 3-year period;
t-value = t-statistic for t-test of differences in sample means for two independent samples;
M-W-U = Mann-Whitney U test statistic for testing differences between two independent samples
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level;
X indicates that this test statistic is the 'wrong sign' in relation to the one-tailed test. Using a two-tailed test,
this t-value is highly significant (even at the 0.01 level).
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As reviewed earlier in Chapter 2, Jones (1993) suggests that the apparent overreaction in
stock returns may be due to the time-varying risk premia as a results of the movement in a
three-year real business cycle. However, the calculations of meaningful correlations and
autocorrelations for three-year non-overlapping periods requires a time series of data
greater than that available for the KLSE. Thus, similar calculations to those of Jones (p.
129, Table 3 and footnote 3) are not possible at this stage of the KLSE history.
5.4: Size Effect and Overreaction
Table 5-3 summarises the mean market value and CERs of portfolios constructed using
the stocks of the 17 largest and smallest firms, in each of the six periods. A huge
difference in size, as represented by the market value at the end of the formation period,
between both portfolios can clearly be observed in columns 2 and 5. There are also some
indication of mean reversions in the CER values for both portfolios which take place in
the formation and test periods. For small firms, all but one period (p = 6) record positive
CER values in the test periods, suggesting a better performance than in previous periods.
For large firms, the performance is generally worse in the test period, with the exception
of period 5. Like those in the winner-loser analysis, these observations therefore suggest
that there is also some indication of 'mean reversion' in the performance of portfolios
formed on the basis of size.
Table 5-4 presents test period CER differences for both size-extreme portfolios. This
process is similar to the test of overreaction in Section 4.2, except that portfolios are
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Table 5-3: Mean market value and CERs of small and large firms portfolios
Period	 Small	 Large
	
MV	 FPCER	 TPCER	 MV	 FPCER	 TPCER
1	 19.6	 -1.2140	 0.3500	 1585.0	 0.2846	 0.0734
2	 42.4	 -0.3730	 0.0106	 2451.0	 0.2926	 -0.0875
3	 40.4	 -0.2671	 0.8679	 2419.3	 0.4539	 -0.1771
4	 47.4	 -0.1410	 0.8705	 2596.0	 0.3085	 0.0392
5	 50.5	 -0.4872	 0.8172	 2982.6	 0.2271	 0.2524
6	 251.7	 0.4726	 -0.0572	 7444.6	 0.6204	 -0.1318
Notes:
MV Market value in RM millions at the end of the formation period;
FPCER = Cumulative excess returns in the formation period;
TPCER = Cumulative excess returns in the test period.
Table 5-4: The firm size effect: CER differentials between small firms and large
firms portfolios in the test periods
Period	 Mean CER5maii -	 t-value	 Median CERsmaii -	 MWU
Mean CERi&ge	 Median CERiarge
1	 0.28	 1.36	 0.35	 350.0*
2	 0.10	 0.43	 0.07	 315.0
3	 1.05	 457*	 1.08	 405.0*
4	 0.83	 4•35*	 0.58	 400.0*
5	 0.57	 3.83*	 0.60	 391.0*
6	 0.08	 0.48	 0.05	 307.0
Notes:
CERsmaii = Small firms' cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period;
CERiarge = Large firms' cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period;
t-value = -statistic for t-test of differences in sample means for two independent samples;
M-W-U = Mann-Whitney U- test statistic for testing differences between two independent samples;
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level.
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based on size rather than on formation period CERs. It reveals that there is evidence of
the firm size effect for KLSE stocks. All periods show positive differentials between
small firms' CER values and large firms' CER values, indicating that on average, the
former yields higher returns than the latter. For three periods, i.e., periods 3, 4 and 5, the
evidence of size effect are significant at 0.05 level. It may be that the apparently strong
performance of loser firms as found in Table 4-6, may be a manifestation of the size
effect. Losers outperform winners because they may have become smaller in the test
periods. Therefore, a preliminary analysis is done to investigate whether winners have
become smaller and losers have become larger in the test period. The results of this
preliminary analysis is presented in Table 5-5, which shows the changes in average
market values of winner and loser firms from formation period to test period. It can be
seen that on average, losers are smaller firms than winners; this could explain why losers
outperform winners over the test period. However, it is also obvious that except for
period 6, losers are smaller than winners in the formation periods. Therefore, it seems that
the change in performance of the winner and loser stocks as reflected in their return
reversals is not due to the change in size as asserted by Zarowin (1989,1990). In other
words, the overreaction effect observed in the KLSE is not a manifestation or
reincarnation of the well-known size effect.
Why then are losers outperformed by the winner stocks? It may be that the overreaction
effects and the firm size effects operate independently. Further evidence of this can be
seen in Table 5-6 where the number of firms which are both the constituents of loser and
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small firms portfolios at the beginning of the test period, is counted 2. It would be
interesting to know if losers are actually small firms. The same procedure is done with
winner and large firms portfolios. The results reveal that, on average, only 25 percent
overlap occur between loser and small firm portfolios. The figure is slightly higher for
winner and large firms portfolios, i.e., 29 percent. It can therefore be suggested that losers
are not the smallest firms, and winners are not the largest firms.
2 Using the argument put forward by Zarowin (1989, 1990) who argues that losers are becoming smaller by
the end of formation period (or equivalently at the beginning of test period), and winners are becoming
bigger, we can look at small firms portfolio as losers, since at the end of formation period, their share price
is at the lowest level. Likewise, large firms portfolio is winner portfolio since at the end of formation period,
their price is at the highest level.
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Table 5-5: Market value of the winner and loser portfolios during formation periods and test periods
Period	 Winner	 Loser
FP	 TP	 Change (%)	 FP	 TP	 Change (%)
1	 693	 1496	 116 -	 65	 226 -
	 248
2	 379	 649	 71	 82	 141	
72
3	 764	 1769	 132	 135	 498	
269
4	 909	 2369	 161	 284	 847	
198
5	 822	 2995	 264	 358	 1061	
196
6	 1127	 2479	 120	 1322	 2038	
54
Average	 782	 1959	 151	 374	 802	
114
Notes:
FP = 3-year formation period;
TP = 3-year test period;
Market values (in RM millions) are the three-year average across FP and TP.
Table 5-6: Number and percentage of losers in the small firms portfolio, and.
in thelarge firms portfolio
Period	 Losers in small	 Percentage	 Wirmers in Large	
Percentage
firms portfolio	 firms portfolio
1	 5	 29%	 8	
47%
2	 5	 29%	 3	
18%
3	 3	 18%	 6	
35%
4	 4	 24%	 5	
29%
5	 8	 47%	 3	
18%
6	 0	 0%	 4	
24%
Average	 4.17	 25%	 4.83	
29%
Note:
There are 17 companies in each portfolios
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Table 5-7: Results of OLS regressions on CER against SIZE for loser portfolio
Period	 R2 (%)	 Spearman
1	 -0.235	 0.00137	 50.1	 0.283
(-1.85)	 (3.88)c
2	 -0.204	 0.00192	 16.9	 0.277
(-0.98)	 (1.74)
3	 0.605	 0.00064	 9.7	 0.150
(1.89)	 (1.27)
4	 0.641	 -0.00004	 0.7	 0.172
(3 . 86)*	 (-0.32)
5	 0.665	 -0.00012	 12.8	 -0.373
(5.07)*	 (-1.49)
6	 0.174	 -0.00001	 0.3	 0.002
(1.32)	 (-0.20)
Notes:
Results are based on the OLS regression;
CERTPJ
 = + 2.SIZEFPJ
where CERTPJ = cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period for loser firmj;
SIZEFPJ = market value of loser firmj, at the end of formation period;
Spearman = Spearman rank correlation coefficient;
1-statistics are ii parentheses;
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level;
indicates that this test statistic is the 'wrong' sign in relation to the one-tailed test. Using a two-tailed test
this t-value is highly significant (even at the 0.01 level).
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Table 5-8: Results of OLS regression on CER 1
 against CERFP for the smallest firm portfolio
Period	 yi	 12	 R2 (%)	 Spearman
1	 0.059	 -0.240	 4.5	 -0.240
	
(0.15)	 (-0.84)
2	 -0.034	 -0.121	 0.8	 -0.088
	
(-0.14)	 (-0.35)
3	 0.562	 -1.147	 34.7	 0.542*
	
(2 . 80)*	 (_2.83)*
4	 0.749	 0.862*	 28.0	 0.569*
	
(4.95)*	 (-2.42)
5	 0.688	 -0.266	 15.7	 -0.324
	
(5 . 14)*	 (-1.67)
6	 -0.048	 -0.020	 0.1	 -0.039
	
(-0.32)	 (-0.10)
Notes:
Results are based on the regression;
CERTPJ
 11 +
CERTPJ 	cumulative excess returns over 3-year test period for small firm];
CERFPJ = cumulative excess returns over 3-year formation period for small firm];
Spearman = Spearman rank correlation coefficient;
t-statistics are in parentheses;
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level.
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The regression results and Spearman coefficients in Tables 5-7 and 5-8 examine the size
effect for loser firms, and the overreaction effect for small firms. If these effects are in
operation, the slope coefficients and Spearman coefficients should be negative.
Table 5-7 shows that for loser firms, the slope coefficient is negative for three out of the
six periods (p = 4,5,6), but never significant, and the Spearman rank correlation
coefficient is negative for only one period (p = 5). This suggests that when formation
period performance is controlled for (i.e., all similar losers), the size effect offers little
additional explanation for test period CERs. In fact, it may suggest that there is a positive
relationship between test period CERs and firm size when prior period CERs are
controlled for. This can be seen in the significant slope coefficient for period 1, with a
high R2 value (50.1%). Furthermore, five periods show a positive Spearman rank
correlation coefficients. For small firms (Table 5-8), there is stronger evidence for the
presence of an overreaction effect. For all six periods, both the slope coefficients and the
Spearman coefficients are negative, and for two periods (p = 3,4), the slope is significant
at the 0.05 level. Thus, even when size is controlled for, formation period CERs contain
explanatory power for test period CERs.
5.5: Limitation: Thin Trading and Beta Estimation
As noted by many previous studies (for examples, Dimson, 1979; Brown and Warner,
1980), the systematic risk or beta estimated from stocks which are traded infrequently
may be biased downward. This is especially true for high frequency data such as daily
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returns, since the chances of infrequent trading are greater for such data. The infrequent
trading of these stocks may induce negative serial correlation in return series. Small firms
are argued to suffer more from this beta misestimation, since they are less frequently
traded. Therefore, returns for small firms are overestimated.
Although the use of daily returns data in this study greatly increases the number of
observations (and degrees of freedom) for regression analysis, the presence of thin trading
in the KLSE presents potential problems for the estimation of the beta. However, a
number of arguments can be made here. Even though a number of 'beta correction'
techniques have been suggested (for examples, Scholes and Williams, 1977; Dimson,
1979), empirical studies which have used these corrections in thinly traded markets have
noted that these corrections can bring their own problems. These problems are noted in
Canadian stock market studies by Fowler and Rorke (1983), and Boabang (1996). In
addition, none of the formation period (FP) and test period (TP) beta values for winner
and loser portfolios, presented in Table 5-9 below, appear overly extreme.
Table 5-9: Mean beta estimates for winners and losers during formation period (FP) and test period (TP)
Period	 Winners' mean beta	 Losers' mean beta
FP	 TP	 FP	 TP
1	 0.85	 0.82	 1.08	 1.55
2	 1.16	 1.14	 0.84	 1.20
3	 1.11	 0.88	 0.90	 0.91
4	 0.97	 0.86	 0.86	 1.42
5	 1.02	 0.94	 1.25	 1.46
6	 0.95	 1.30	 0.87	 0.92
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5.6: Summary and Conclusion
Following on from the initial results in Chapter 4, further analyses are performed to
examine if time-varying risk, or beta, and size could explain the observed mean
reversions in the KLSE stocks returns. It is found that generally, the betas of the winners
(losers) decrease (increase) from formation period to test period, and that the change is
more dramatic for loser portfolios. However, significant beta differentials between winner
and loser portfolios in certain test periods do not correspond to the significant
performance differentials of the portfolios in those periods. Therefore, the observed
patterns of mean reversions in the KLSE are not fully explained by the changes in the
systematic risk.
The evidence in this chapter also suggests that there exists a size effect in the excess
returns of small and large KLSE firms. Small firms are found to outperform large firms in
all periods of the study. However, the overreaction effect, as manifested in the return
reversals of winner and loser portfolios detected in Chapter 4, is not explained by this size
effect. Initial evidence confirms that the constituents of loser and small firms portfolios
are not the same. The same is true for winner and large firms portfolios. Furthermore, it is
also found that losers are generally smaller, and winners are generally larger in both
formation and test periods.
Results from regression analyses suggest that when prior period returns are controlled for,
there is no clear relationship between test period returns and firm size. However, when
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firm size is held constant, it is found that prior period returns do have predictive value on
test period returns, suggesting the presence of an overreaction effect which is independent
of the size effect. To conclude, there is a separate firm size effect acting upon KLSE
stocks. However, this effect does not explain the overreaction effect in the market.
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CHAPTER 6
SEASONALITY AND OVERREACTION
IN THE KLSE
6.1: Introduction
One of the most common findings in the literature on stock market overreaction is that
there is a strong pattern of seasonality in the abnormal performance of the stocks (e.g.
DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987; Chopra, et al.,1992; Zarowin, 1990). In particular,
mean reversions in returns are observed to occur mostly in the month of January, and that
this seasonal pattern is more pronounced for the losers. This is perhaps not surprising as it
may relate to the January effect widely documented in stock market seasonality literature.
As for the Malaysian market, the evidence on stock market seasonality is quite mixed.
Though there are a few studies which do not document January effect (e.g. Claessen, et
al., 1995), most studies generally find that the effect does exist there. However, the
significance of the January effect is not unanimously agreed. Nassir and Mohamad (1987)
and Ho (1990), for instance, claim that the effect is significant, but this is refuted by Yong
(1989). The results in this very study (Chapter 3), find that although the mean January
return is positive, it is not significantly different from zero. Instead, as previously
reported, December and February record the highest returns for the period 1980-96.
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Seasonality in the excess returns profile of KLSE stocks is the subject of analysis in this
chapter. The same portfolios of winners and losers from the previous chapter are studied
to determine whether excess returns are concentrated in any particular months. In
addition, the relationship between seasonality and the size effect is also investigated. The
following section will describe the test procedure.
6.2: Description of Methodology
6.2.1: Seasonality and mean reversion in the winner and loser portfolios
To test for any seasonal pattern in the excess returns detected in the previous chapter, a
number of tests will be performed. The first tests are descriptive in nature and use data
pooled across six test periods. This is to produce an 'overall picture' of any possible
seasonal patterns which might be present. Here, monthly CERs are presented in tabular
and graphical forms for both winner and loser portfolios, and casually inspected for any
abnormal monthly performance. As will be seen later, in this chapter, it appears that
CERs for February are larger than for the other eleven months. This is consistent with a
possible Chinese New Year effect in the general level of market returns, as suggested by
Ho (1990), Wong et a!. (1990), and Chan et al. (1996), and also by the evidence in this
study in Chapter 3
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The second set of tests are then introduced, which are applied to each test period
individually. This ensures no 'double counting' which can occur with pooled data. In
order to test the existence of a possible February effect, two Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
linear regressions are carried out using daily excess returns, averaged across all seventeen
firms in the winner and loser portfolios. The models employ dummy variables to
investigate seasonalities in the pattern of excess returns, and are described by equations 6-
1, and 6-2 below;
ER,=	 + f2FEB,+e,	 (6-1)
where ER, = the mean daily returns across all 17 firms in the loser and winner portfolios;
FEB, the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for observations in February and 0
otherwise;
= the intercept coefficient, which measures the mean returns for the eleven
months excluding February;
= the coefficient for FEB, which measures the difference between the mean
returns in February and the other eleven months of the year;
= the random error term which follows the usual OLS regression assumptions
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ER, = + Ø2JAN + Ø3MAR + ...........+ Ø12DEC +	 (6-2)
where, ER = the mean daily excess returns across all 17 firms which make up the
wirmer or loser portfolios;
JAN = a dummy variable, which equals 1 for January observation, and 0
elsewhere;
MAR = a dummy variable, which equals 1 for March observation, and 0
elsewhere, and so on through December observations;
= the intercept term, which indicates the expected value for February;
(/)q = model parameters (q = 1, ...., 12);
= the error term, which follows the usual OLS assumption.
Regression 6-1 investigates whether there is a significant difference between daily excess
returns earned in February, and those earned in non-February periods. The estimated
intercept parameter (P) is the average daily excess return in the non-February periods,
while the dummy slope (P) indicates the February-differential for daily excess returns. It
is the sign, and significance of the dummy slope which is important from the viewpoint of
investigating seasonalities in excess returns. The hypothesis test is stated here in the form
of a one-tailed test;
H0: ['2=O
Hj: ['2>O
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The second regression, i.e., equation 6-2, also investigates seasonalities in excess returns,
but the dummy slopes (02..... , 012) indicate the differential between daily excess returns
for each of the individual non-February months, compared to daily excess returns for
February. Again, the hypothesis test is stated in the one-tail form;
Ho: 02=0
Hj: 02 < 0, conducted separately for q = 2, ....., 12.
Of course the regression analyses are parametric in nature, so to provide additional
evidence of seasonalities in excess returns, a non-parametric approach is also used here.
The CERs for each month are investigated for each of the six pest periods, for both
winner and loser portfolios. For each portfolio and test period, three monthly CERs can
be calculated for each of the seventeen stocks (i.e., three January CERs, three February
CERs, and so on) since all test periods span three years. Thus, for each portfolio and test
period, 51 CERs can be obtained for each month. For each portfolio and test period,
median CERs are calculated and the distribution for each set of 51 monthly CERs are
compared using the Kruskal-Wallis test, described earlier by equation 3-3 and
reintroduced in the equation below;
r_ -2
12nR1
 —R]
KW=
	
	 (6-3)N(N+1)
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where n, is the number of observation in each month, N is the total number of
observations, R 1 is the average of the ranks in month i, and R is the average of all the
ranks. This test generates a statistic which test the hull hypotheses that CER distributions
are identical across all twelve months. In addition, there is an opportunity to test how the
mean rankings for observations in the twelve groupings differ from the mean rank for all
observations, using the z-calculation below;
(N+1)
2
(N 1N/
zg = _________________
I /(flg —ii
12	
J
where Zg = z-value for group g,
g = 1,2......, 12 (i.e., Jan, Feb....., Dec);
= average of the ranks in group g;
N = total sample size;
flg = number of observations in group g.
A number of statistical programmes generate this statistic automatically with the Kruskal-
Wallis output (e.g. MINITAB). The critical values for Zg may be obtained from a standard
normal distribution table. However, a two-tail test is employed here because of the nature
of the procedure. Unlike the regression analyses which compare 'other' months with
February, the z-test used here compares each month with the average for the whole
sample. Although we can hypothesise that 'other' months will have lower CERs than
(6-4)
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February, it is difficult to hypothesise how each month's CERs will compare to the
overall mean, with the exception of February which we would expect to be greater than
the mean. For this reason, a two-tailed test is employed for the z-test.
It should be noted that both the parametric and non-parametric tests employed here
examine seasonalities in excess returns for winner and loser portfolios, rather than testing
for seasonalities in the general level of returns. This chapter is concerned with the
overreaction effect, and some of the factors that may influence it, rather than seasonalities
per se, as we have seen in Chapter 3.
6.2.2: Seasonality and size effect
A lot of evidence have been established from the US studies that the January effect is
primarily a small-firm effect; abnormally higher January returns are observed mostly
among the smaller firms. This study therefore investigate whether higher February excess
returns have any links with the size of firms. The dummy-variable regression in equation
6-1 is used again, except that portfolios are constructed on the basis of size, instead of
prior period returns. The two extreme-size portfolios, i.e., the small and large firms
portfolios in each of the six test periods, as described in section 5.2.2, Chapter 5, are used.
The regression is described below;
ER1 = ,% + ,%2FEB1 + e,	 (6-5)
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where ER, the mean daily excess returns across all 17 firms in the small and large
firms portfolios;
FEB, = the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for observations in February and 0
otherwise;
= the intercept coefficient, which measures the mean returns for the eleven
months excluding February;
= the coefficient for FEB, which measures the difference between the mean
returns in February and in the other eleven months in the year;
e, = the random error term which follows the usual OLS regression assumptions.
Regression 6-5 investigates whether there is a significant difference between daily excess
returns earned in February, and those earned in non-February months, within the small
and large firms portfolios. The estimated intercept parameter (Zj) is the average daily
excess return in the non-February periods, while the dummy slope (A 2) indicates the
February-differential for daily excess returns. The sign and significance of the dummy
slope will determine whether there is any relation between February and size effects. The
hypothesis test is stated in the form of a one-tailed test;
H0: ,%2=O
H1: I%2>O.
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6.3: Seasonal Patterns in the Mean Reversions of Winners and Losers
Table 6-1 shows both the mean monthly CERs and cumulative CERs for winners and
losers, for each month in the three year test period, pooled across all six periods in this
study. Figure 4-2, panel A, from the previous chapter is also reproduced in Figure 6-1
below, to illustrate graphically the existence of seasonal pattern in excess returns. Pooling
CER values across all six test periods (p = 1, 2,..., 6) is problematic because of the
overlapping time periods (see Table 4-3), which could result in double or triple counting
of some firms' CER values; firms in the winner portfolio for period 1989-91, for
example, may likely be in the same portfolio for period 1990-92. For this reason, the
pooled sample is only used for descriptive analysis, providing an 'overall picture' of the
behaviour of excess returns. The pooling procedure provides a compact method of
illustrating returns patterns which appear to exist in the KLSE.
The most noticeable aspect of these results are; (i) the absence of any January effect, and
(ii) the presence of a strong February effect, possibly related to the Chinese New Year
effect as described in Wong, et al. (1990), Ho (1990) and Chan, et al. (1996). This
process may be illustrated with reference to Figure 6-1 which shows monthly CERs for
winner and loser portfolios in the test periods. Table 6-1 indicates that for losers, the
largest monthly increases in CERs occur during the first, second and third February in the
test period. Indeed, these three February CER values (6.8%, 7.7%, and 7.5%) represent
more than half of the total CERs for losers over the three year test period (39.2%).
However, it is unlikely that February effect explains fully the observed mean reversions in
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Table 6-1: Average monthly CERs and avera ge cumulative CERs for winners and losers
pooled across all six test periods
Month	 Winner	 Loser
Mean CER for
	
Monthly	 Mean CER
	
for	 Monthly
__________	 month j	 cumulative CER	 month	 I - cumulative CER
J	 -0.031	 -0.031	 0.024	 0.024
F	 0.037	 0.006	 0.068	 0.092
M	 -0.018	 -0.012	
-0.026	 0.066
A	 0.013	 0.000	 0.015	 0.082
M	 -0.006	 -0.005	 0.014	 0.095
J	 0.015	 0.010	
-0.044	 0.052
J	 0.015	 0.025	 0.039	 0.090
A	 0.015	 0.040	
-0.006	 0.084
S	 0.017	 0.057	 0.052	 0.136
O	 0.000	 0.057	
-0.026	 0.110
N	 -0.004	 0.053	 0.042	 0.152
D	 -0.014	 0.039	 0.009	 0.162
J	 -0.018	 0.021	 0.036	 0.198
F	 0.044	 0.065	 0.077	 0.275
M	 -0.015	 0.050	
-0.041	 0.234
A	 -0.004	 0.046	 0.004	 0.238
M	 -0.012	 0.035	 0.005	 0.242
J	 -0.025	 0.010	
-0.034	 0.209
J	 0.005	 0.006	 0.013	 0.221
A	 -0.003	 0.003	 0.002	 0.223
S	 0.030	 0.033	 0.055	 0.278
o	 -0.016	 0.017	
-0.004	 0.274
	
N	 -0.013	 0.004	 0.035	 0.309
	
D	 -0.017	 -0.013	 0.004	 0.313
J	 0.001	 -0.013	
-0.027	 0.286
F	 0.036	 0.023	 0.075	 0.361
	
M	 0.00	 0.024	
-0.053	 0.308
	
A	 -0.003	 0.020	 0.002	 0.3 10
	
M	 -0.018	 0.002	 -0.003	 0.307
J	 -0.011	 -0.008	 -0.015	 0.292
J	 0.005	 -0.003	 0.03 1	 0.323
	
A	 0.006	 0.003	 0.012	 0.335
	
S	 0.026	 0.029	 0.034	 0.369
	
O	 -0.009	 0.020	 0.004	 0.373
	
N	 -0.009	 0.011	 0.024	 0.397
	
D	 -0.017	 -0.006	 -0.005	 0.392
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Figure 6-1: CERs for winner and loser portfolios, cumulated over 3-year test period,
pooled across 6 periods
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excess returns; excluding the month will still leave losers with a substantial CER value of
17.2%. This result contrasts with US findings suggesting that most overreaction occurs
during January. The same observation, i.e., higher CER values in February, also appears
to be present for winners. Monthly CER values for the three Februarys are all positive
(3.7%, 4.4% and 3.6%) despite there being an overall negative value for the three-year
CER (-0.6%). Over a 36-month period, losers outperform the market by 3 9.2%, while
winners underperform the market by 0.6%, so that a contrarian trading strategy of buying
losers and selling winners short could earn an arbitrageur a profit of 39.8%'.
It is likely that these results are related to the Chinese New Year (CNY) effect suggested
by other studies reviewed in Chapter 2, and also by the findings in Chapter 3 in this study.
The findings in Chapter 3 reveal that returns are higher surrounding the CNY holidays in
the KLSE, especially 5 days after trading resumes. As the CNY occurs mostly in the first
half of February (see Table 3-1), I believe there are some possible links between the
celebration and the excess returns of losers and winners here. In the absence of capital
gain taxes in Malaysia, a behavioural-based explanation might provide the answer for this
phenomenon. For example, it may be that for countries where there is a strong Chinese
cultural influence like Malaysia, the end of the Chinese new lunar-year acts as a focal
point for investors' 'mental accounts' 2. However, more research is needed to examine this
possibility.
However, it should be noted that as assumed in Chapter 4, there is no transaction cost here. In reality, all
transactions in the KLSE do incur such costs, which vary according to the amount transacted as described in
Section 1.2 in Chapter 1.
2 See the discussion on 'mental accounting' on page 4
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It should be noted that here this chapter investigates the contribution of the February
effect, or Chinese New Year effect, to the overreaction profile of stocks rather than the
general level of returns on those stocks. Plotting CERs for winners and losers, for all 36
months of the test period @ooled across all six test periods) illustrates these effect. The
plot in Figure 6-1 also, as mentioned earlier, illustrates the winner-loser asymmetry for
test period CERs.
In order to assess the statistical significance of any February effect on daily excess
returns, two separate regressions are carried out for both portfolios. This procedure is
carried out for each of the six test periods individually; using pooled data could be
problematic for statistical testing, as previously mentioned. Regression 6-1 investigates
the differences between daily excess returns if February and daily excess returns in other
months. The results are presented in Table 6-2.
The results in the table provide some evidence of a February effect in the daily excess
returns of Malaysian stocks. For both winners and losers, the results are similar. The
slope coefficient for the February dummy variable (Y) is positive for five of the six test
periods; only period 4 for losers and period 1 for winners generate a negative coefficient,
and this is not significant at any reasonable probability level. For winners, the coefficient
is positive and significant for three periods (p = 3, 5, 6), and a similar result is found for
losers (p = 1, 5, 6). This pattern is also evident from the results of regression 6-2, which
investigates daily excess returns in each non-February month, compared to February.
These results are presented in Table 6-3. The Durbin-Watson statistics are also reported
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for all regression results. Generally, they confirm that there is no serial correlation in the
residuals of the regressions.
Since overreaction effects tend to be asymmetric in nature, it is perhaps not surprising
that the February impact is more • noticeable for the loser portfolio than for the winner
portfolio. However, in both cases, slope coefficients are almost always negative for non-
February dummy variables, although the number of significant results varies between test
periods.
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Table 6-2: Test of equal mean dail y returns in February and in the other 11 months of the year
Period	 '1-'2(losers)	 P2(winners)
0 . 0037*	
-0.0001
	
(1.70)	 (-0.21)
2	 0.0025	 0.0012
	
(1.62)	 (1.31)
3	 0.0022	 0.0016*
	
(1.38)	 (1.77)
4	 -0.0029	 0.0000
	
(-1.22)	 (0.03)
5	 0.0072*	 0.0039*
	
(3.05)	 (3.58)
6	 0.0022*	 0.0030*
	
(2.34)	 (1.91)
Notes:
Results are based on the regression;
ER,=	 + FEB,+e,
where ER, = the mean daily returns across all 17 firms in the loser and winner portfolios;
FEB, = the dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for observations in February and 0 otherwise;
= the intercept coefficient, which measures the mean returns for the eleven
months excluding February;
= the coefficient for FEB, which measures the difference between the mean
returns in February and the other eleven months in the year;
e, = the random error term which follows the usual OLS.
t-values are in parentheses;
* indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that f' = 0, at the 0.05 level using a one-tail test (Hj: P> 0)
The critical value is ± 1.65.
177
Chapter 6
Table 6-3: Test of equality between daily excess returns in February and daily excess returns
in each of the other months
a. Loser Portfolio
Period
Month	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
	
Jan	 0.0031	 -0.0001	 -0.0030	 0.0057*	 -0.0110	 0.0030*
	
(P2	 (1.09)	 (-0.03)	 (-1.40)	 (-1.81)	 (-3.44)	 (-2.40)
	
Mar	 0.0055*	 0.0045*	 0.0040*	 0.005l*	 0.0098*	 0.0037*
	
(1)3	 (-1.91)	 (-2.21)	 (-1.87)	 (-1.65)	 (-3.16)	 (-2.99)
	
Apr	 0.0049*	 0.0038*	
-0.0025	
-0.0005	 0.0066*	 -0.0018
	
(P4	 (-1.67)	 (-1.85)	 (-1.19)	 (-0.15)	 (-2.06)	 (-1.42)
	
May	 -0.0045	 0.0037*	
-0.0007	
-0.0007	 0.0075*	 0.0032*
	
(P5	 (-1.59)	 (-1.82)	 (-0.34)	 (-0.22)	 (-2.37)	 (-2.65)
	
Jun	 0.0056*	
-0.0033	 0.0044*	 0.0054*	
-0.0110	 -0.0013
	
(P6	 (-1.91)	 (-1.63)	 (-2.07)	 (-1.73)	 (-3.36)	 (-1.07)
	
Jul	 -0.0017	 -0.0019	
-0.0029	
-0.0018	 -0.0050	 -0.0011
	
(P	 (-0.61)	 (-0.92)	 (-1.38)	 (-0.56)	 (-1.57)	 (-0.86)
	Aug	 0.0055*	 0.0054*	
-0.0030	
-0.0007	 -0.0041	 -0.0016
	
(P8	 (-1.93)	 (-2.66)	 (-1.43)	 (-0.22)	 (-1.31)	 (-1.32)
	
Sep	 -0.0032	 -0.0001	
-0.0013	 0.0006	 -0.0040	 -0.0012
(P	 (-1.08)	 (-0.06)	 (-0.59)	 (0.20)	 (-1.22)	 (-0.98)
	
Oct	 0.0059*	
-0.0027	
-0.0009	
-0.0025	 0.0088*	 0.0037*
	
(Pio	 (-2.04)	 (-1.32)	 (-0.41)	 (-0.78)	 (-2.78)	 (-3.01)
	Nov	 -0.0033	 -0.0014	 -0.0007	 0.0004	 0.0061*	 -0.0016
	
(P1!	 (-1.14)	 (-0.69)	 (-0.33)	 (0.13)	 (-1.93)	 (-1.33)
	
Dec	 -0.0042	 0.0051*	
-0.0032	 -0.0007	 0.0065*	 -0.0014
	
(P12	 (-1.43)	 (-2.51)	 (-1.51)	 (-0.23)	 (-2.08)	 (-1.12)
	DW	 1.96	 2.02	 1.79	 2.02	 2.04	 1.99
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B. Winner Portfolio
Period
Month	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6
	
Jan	 -0.0003	 -0.0015	 -0.0014	 0.0036*	 -0.0051k	 0.0040*
	
4)2	 (-0.38)	 (-1.25)	 (-1.15)	 (-2.77)	 (-3.54)	 (-1.91)
	Mar	 0.0038	 -0.0007	 0.0020*	 0.0043*	 ØØØ49*	 -0.0032
	
4)3	 (0.42)	 (-0.56)	 (-1.66)	 (-3.37)	 (-3.45)	 (-1.50)
	
Apr	 0.0003	 -0.0008	 0.001	 0.0025*	 0.0040*	 -0.0025
	
4)4	 (0.35)	 (-0.67)	 (-1.26)	 (-1.97)	 (-2.78)	 (-1.18)
	
May	 -0.0004	 -0.0016	 0.0018	 0.0023*	 0.0024*	 0.0057*
	
4)5	 (-0.48)	 (-1.25)	
(_1.45)	 (-1.76)	 (-1.67)	 (-2.70)
	
Jun	 0.0006	 -0.0017	 O.O02*	 0.0035*	 0.0040*	 -0.0026
	
4)6	 (0.63)	 (-1.33)	 (1.9l)	 (-2.74)	 (-2.80)	 (-1.22)
	
Jul	 -0.0001	 -0.0014	 O.0024*	 0.0O27*	 -0.0020	 -0.0016
	
4).,	 (-0.13)	 (-1.14)	
(-2.00)	 (-2.08)	 (-1.39)	 (-0.74)
	
Aug	 0.0001	 0.0026*	 .002€*	 -0.0019	 0.0028*	 -0.0002
	
4)8	 (0.11)	 (-2.13)	 (_21)	 (-1.46)	 (-1.95)	 (-0.10)
	
Sep	 0.0009	 0.0002	 v.000?	 -0.0009	 0.0037*	 -0.0025
	
4)9	 (1.02)	 (0.16)	 (0.61)	 (-0.67)	 (-2.59)	 (-1.17)
	
Oct	 0.0003	 0.0002	 -0.0011	 0.0033*	 0.0051*	 0.0046*
	
4)io	 (0.34)	 (0.13)	 (-0.93)	 (-2.54)	 (-3.51)	 (-2.18)
	
Nov	 0.0003	 -0.0016	 -0.0018	 0.0032*	 0.0046*	 -0.0031
(0.27)	 (-1.30)	 (-1.46)	 (-2.45)	 (-3.22)	 (-1.44)
	
Dec	 -0.0003	 -0.0019	 0.0025*	 0.0038*	 0.0040*	 -0.0035
	
4)12	 (-0.31)	 (-1.57)	 (-2.03)	 (-3.00)	 (-2.77)	 (-1.59)
	DW	 2.14	 2.00	 1.97	 1.89	 2.04	 1.89
Results are based on the regression;
ER,=Ø1 +Ø2,JAN+Ø3MAR+ ...........+Ø12DEC+e,
where, ER = the mean daily excess returns across all 17 firms which make up the winner or
loser portfolios;
JAN = a dummy variable, which equals 1 for January observation, and 0 elsewhere;
MAR = a dummy variable, which equals 1 for March observation, and 0 elsewhere, and so on
through December observations;
Øj = the intercept term, which indicates the expected value for February;
øq = model parameters (q = I, ...., 12);
the error term, which follows the usual OLS assumption;
i-values are in parentheses; * indicates rejection of the null-hypothesis that Ø = 0, at the 0.05 level using a
one-tailed test (Hj : Ø < 0 where q = 2, 3....., 12). The critical value is ± 1.65.
DW is Durb in-Watson statistics which test the serial correlation in the residuals of the regressions.
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The results for the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis and z-value tests on monthly CER
values, shown in Table 6-4, also display an apparent February effect, especially for the
loser portfolio. Looking at the results for losers first, it can be seen that there are a
number of months which, for specific periods, generate excess returns significantly
greater than the norm for the whole sample. However, only February generates positive
median CER values and z-values which are significant at the 0.05 level, for all six test
periods. This pattern is less noticeable for winner stocks, but February still generates
significantly positive CERs for four out of the six test periods. The Kruskal-Wallis
statistics at the bottom of each table also indicate that for losers, the hypothesis of
identical CERs distributions across all 12 months is rejected at the 0.05 level for all
periods. For winners, only period 1 indicates that the CERs distribution is identical across
all 12 months.
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Table 6-4: Monthly CERs of the loser and winner portfolios. usin g the Kruskal-WalIis test
Test Period 1(1989-91)
Winner	 Loser
Month	 Median	 z-value	 Median	 z-value
	
Jan	 -0.010	 -1.43	 0.100	 7.16
	
Feb	 -0.002	 -0.41	 0.040	 3.66
	
Mar	 -0.004	 0.50	 -0.050	 -1.97
	
Apr	 0.012	 0.46	 -0.050	 -1.39
	
May	 -0.020	 -1.99	 -0.030	 -1.23
	
Jun	 0.020	 1.21	 -0.050	 -2.76
	
Jul	 -0.010	 -0.28	 0.010	 2.38
	
Aug	 -0.003	 0.07	 -0.050	 -3.35
	Sep	 0.016	 1.95	 -0.010	 0.26
	
Oct	 -0.001	 0.35	 -0.060	 -2.58
	Nov	 0.008	 0.72	 0.000	 0.53
	
Dec	 -0.020	 -1.16	 -0.040	 -0.72
KWwinner = 12.78 (pO.3 10)	 KWioser = 95.27 (pO.000)
Test Period 2 (1990-92)
Winner	 Loser
Month	 Median	 z-value	 Median	 z-value
	
Jan	 -0.010	 -0.26	 0.050	 3.94
	
Feb	 0.0 10	 1.85	 0.020	 2.42
	
Mar	 -0.010	 0.97	 -0.040	 -2.44
	
Apr	 -0.020	 0.70	 -0.050	 -2.00
May	 -0.040	 -1.65	 -0.010	 -1.05
	Jun	 -0.020	 -0.82	 -0.030	 -1.08
	
Jul	 -0.010	 0.34	 0.020	 1.91
	
Aug	 -0.040	 -2.50	 0.050	 -3.79
	
Sep	 0.020	 2.71	 0.040	 3.96
	
Oct	 -0.010	 2.11	 0.020	 0.92
	
Nov	 -0.030	 -1.30	 0.000	 1.21
	
Dec	 -0.030	 -2.14	 -0.060	 -4.01
KWwinner = 30.01 (j'O.002)	 KWioser = 78.52 (pO.000)
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Test Period 3 (199 1-93)
Winner	 Loser
Month	 Median	 z-value	 Median	 z-value
	
Jan	 0.020	 0.90	 0.000	 -0.29
	
Feb	 0.020	 2.71	 0.040	 2.49
	
Mar	 -0.010	 -0.55	 0.000	 -1.75
	
Apr	 -0.010	 -0.46	 -0.010	 -0.53
	
May	 -0.020	 -0.86	 0.000	 0.52
	
Jun	 0.000	 -0.78	 -0.020	 -1.78
	
Jul	 -0.030	 -1.31	 -0.010	 -0.47
	
Aug	 -0.010	 -1.67	 -0.010	 -0.75
	
Sep	 0.020	 2.72	 0.020	 1.64
	
Oct	 0.010	 1.40	 0.020	 2.57
	
Nov	 -0.010	 -0.19	 0.000	 0.67
	
Dec	 -0.020	 -1.90	 -0.040	 -2.33
KWwinner = 25.28 (pO.009)	 KWioser = 26.67 (pO.O06)
Test Period 4 (1992-94)
Winner	 Loser
Month	 Median	 z-value	 Median	 z-value
	
Jan	 -0.010	 -0.86	 -0.060	 -4.62
	
Feb	 0.040	 4.05	 0.030	 2.24
	
Mar	 -0.020	 -2.78	 -0.060	 -4.39
	
Apr	 -0.010	 -0.69	 0.010	 1.83
	
May	 0.010	 0.97	 0.000	 0.19
	
Jun	 -0.010	 -0.96	 -0.040	 -3.33
	
Jul	 0.010	 0.46	 0.010	 1.50
	
Aug	 0.010	 0.76	 0.010	 1.25
	
Sep	 0.030	 1.99	 0.050	 3.45
	
Oct	 0.000	 -0.65	 -0.010	 -0.70
	
Nov	 -0.010	 -0.59	 0.010	 1.94
	
Dec	 0.000	 -1.70	 -0.010	 0.63
KWwinner = 32.69 (p0.001)	 KWioser = 73.69 (pO.000)
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Test Period 5 (1993-95)
Winner	 Loser
Month	 Median	 z-value	 Median	 z-value
	
Jan	 -0.020	 -1.82	 -0.080	 -4.23
	
Feb	 0.070	 5.15	 0.130	 7.31
	
Mar	 -0.030	 -2.11	 -0.060	 -4.22
	
Apr	 -0.030	 -1.56	 -0.020	 -0.58
	
May	 0.040	 1.75	 -0.050	 -1.75
	Jun	 -0.010	 -0.64	 -0.030	 3.29
	
Jul	 0.030	 2.70	 0.040	 3.39
	
Aug	 0.010	 1.66	 0.010	 2.26
	
Sep	 0.000	 -0.51	 0.040	 2.55
	Oct	 -0.030	 -2.51	 -0.060	 -2.82
	
Nov	 -0.020	 -1.74	 0.020	 1.24
	
Dec	 -0.010	 -0.37	 0.000	 0.14
KWwinner = 54.94 (33O.000)	 KWioser = 124.66 (pO.000)
Test Period 6 (1994-96)
Winner	 Loser
Month	 Median	 z-value	 Median	 z-value
	
Jan	 -0.030	 -0.84	 -0.040	 -2.28
	
Feb	 0.050	 3.28	 0.050	 3.86
	
Mar	 -0.050	 -2.13	 -0.030	 -3.63
	
Apr	 -0.010	 0.09	 0.020	 0.63
	
May	 -0.060	 -3.80	 -0.020	 -2.76
	
Jun	 -0.010	 0.72	 0.020	 1.57
	
Jul	 0.000	 2.67	 0.030	 2.72
	
Aug	 0.000	 2.87	 0.000	 0.03
	
Sep	 -0.010	 1.18	 0.010	 1.35
	
Oct	 -0.060	 -3.18	 -0.040	 -3.49
	
Nov	 -0.030	 -0.36	 0.010	 0.84
	
Dec	 -0.020	 -0.51	 0.020	 1.16
KWwinner = 53.34 (pO.000) 	 KWioser = 61.65 (pO.000)
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Notes (for Table 6-4):
Figures are obtained from monthly observations in the three year test periods from all 17 companies which
make up each of the Winner and Loser portfolios.
KW =	 Kruskal-Wallis statistic testing the null hypothesis of identical CER distributions
across 12 months;
z-value = statistic for comparing each month with the rest of the sample;
critical value: ± 1.96 for a two-tailed test;
p-values are in parentheses.
6.4: Size-February Effect in Excess Returns
Table 6-5 below summarises the results of equation 6-5, where the relationship between
the February effect and the size effect is examined. Similar to the results reported for the
January effect in US studies, the table reveals that seasonality is more pronounced for
small firms than for large firms. Out of the six periods, the daily excess returns in
February are higher than the mean daily excess returns in the other months in five periods,
as indicated by the positive slope coefficient (A.2) of the dummy variable FEB. In periods
2, 5 and 6, the higher returns in February are significant at the 0.05 level (t = 2.46, t =
2.51 and t = 1.89 respectively) for the small firms portfolio. Though not significant at the
0.05 level, the t-value of 1.41 in period 1 is also high. Only in period 4 are February
returns lower than the average for the other months, but this is not significant.
For the large firm portfolio, there are two periods, i.e., periods 5 (t = 2.42) and 6 (t =
2.46) where February yields significantly superior returns than the other months.
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Table 6-5: Test of e qual mean daily excess returns in February and in the other 11 months
for small and large firms portfolios
Period	 22 (small)	 22 (large)
	
0.0028	 -0.0009
	
(1.41)	 (-1.57)
2	 0.0036	 -0.0006
	
(2.46)*	 (-1.08)
3	 0.0017	 -0.0001
	
(1.10)	 (-0.03)
4	 -0.0023	 0.0003
	
(-1.10)	 (0.35)
5	 0.0060	 0.0020
	
(2 . 51)*	 (2.42)*
6	 0.0037	 0.0023
	
(l . 89)*	 (2.46)*
Notes:
Results are based on the regression;
ER, = 2 + 22FEB, + e,
where ER, = the mean daily excess returns across all 17 firms in the small and large
firms portfolios;
FEB, = the dummy variable, which is equal to I for observations in February arid 0 otherwise;
= the intercept coefficient, which measures the mean returns for the eleven
months excluding February;
22 = the coefficient for FEB, which measures the difference between the mean
returns in February and in the other eleven months in the year;
= the random error term which follows the usual OLS regression assumptions.
t-values are in parentheses;
* indicates rejection of the null hypothesis that 22 = 0, at the 0.05 level using a one- tailed test (Hj: 22 > 0).
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However, February does not consistently outperform the other months in producing
superior returns for this portfolio in the six periods tested. In fact, in periods 1, 2 and 3,
the returns in February are actually lower than the mean daily returns in the other months,
as indicated by the negative slope coefficient (A 2). Thus, it appears that the February
effect in the KLSE is more pronounced for the small firms. This may be due to higher
level of local individual investors participation in smaller firms. Any 'local factor' effect,
such as the Chinese New Year in February may thus cause a significant movement in
prices of stocks. As for larger firms, it is presumed that they attract more foreigners. Such
effect, therefore, would not leave significant impact on the prices of these companies.
6.5: Summary and Conclusion
The chapter seeks to detect the presence of seasonality in the context of mean reversion in
KLSE stocks. Both parametric and non-parametric tests are employed. The results of the
analyses suggest that mean reversions in the cumulative excess returns (CERs) profile of
the KLSE stocks contain a seasonal pattern. Specifically, it is found that CER values are
significantly higher in the month of February than in the other months. This is true for
both the wiimer and loser portfolios, though the evidence is more pronounced for the
later. This so-called February effect could be related to the Chinese New Year effect in
the general level of market returns identified in Chapter 3 arid other studies. Though
seasonality is detected, the finding in this chapter is not consistent with those in the US
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and UK studies in the sense that it does not document a January effect in the abnormal
returns of winners and losers, but a February effect.
A further analysis reveals that the February effect above is influenced by firm size.
Though it can be observed for both large and small firms, the February effect is more
pronounced for small firms than for large firms.
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CHAPTER 7
THE ASIAN ECONOMIC
TURMOIL OF 1997 AND ITS EFFECTS ON
THE KLSE: A POST-SCRIPT
7.1: Introduction
The analyses so far in this thesis have been based on the data from January 1986 to
December 1996 period. Especially true for the KLSE, this period can be characterised by
a tremendous growth in the number of companies listed, market value of listed
companies, and volume traded. This growth is in line with the good overall performance
of the Malaysian economy (see Table 7-1 and Figure 7-1). However, since summer 1997,
an unexpected and dramatic economic turmoil has hit many Asian countries, including
Malaysia. Within a few months, prices plunged to their lowest level in almost a decade
(see stock indices in Figure 7-2). Trading started to slow down, high premiums for initial
public offerings disappeared, foreign investors pulled out funds from these countries, and
people started to talk about recession.
The objective of this chapter is to continue to investigate whether the overreaction effect
still remains in the KLSE when the bearish year of 1997 is included in the test period. As
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mentioned above, most stocks record a substantial decline in their prices. If the
overreaction effect, as documented in the previous chapters, is valid, it can be expected
that winners in the formation period 1992-94 to suffer yet an even worse performance in
the test period 1995-97. A more interesting question, however, is; can losers reverse their
fortune in this turbulent test period?
7.2: The Chronicle of and Reasons Behind the Asian Economic Turmoil
There are a number of possible reasons which are argued to cause the turmoil. The most
popular argument advanced by many analysts and economists is the deterioration of Asian
economic fundamentals and competitiveness. High and prolonged current account
deficits, slower export growth, imprudent supervision in the banking and financial
industry, inefficient and unproductive use of capital, shortage of technical skills, and a
failure to upgrade technology which leads to export decline are among some of the
suggested causes. Another popular suggestion is the conduct of greedy, foreign currency
speculators. This argument is mostly advanced by the government of the countries
affected. All these arguments and suggestions have been widely published in news
magazines, such as the Far Eastern Economic Review, Asiaweek and Newsweek.
Despite the argument by various parties over what really causes the crisis or who is to
blame for it, the fact is the Asian economic turmoil was triggered by the devaluation of
the Thailand's baht in summer 1997. The genesis of the Thai crisis lay in the way the
country opened its door to foreign capital. Thailand liberalised by allowing domestic
investors access to cheap funds through the Bangkok International Banking facility,
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Table 7-1: Economic growth rates in Malaysia (1982-1996)
	
Year	 Real GDP growth rates
___________	
(%)
	
1982	 5.9
	1983	 6.3
	
1984	 7.8
	
1985	 -1.1
	
1986	 1.2
	
1987	 5.4
	1988	 8.9
	
1989	 9.2
	
1990	 9.7
	
1991	 8.7
	
1992	 7.8
	
1993	 8.3
	
1994	 9.2
	
1995	 9.5
	1996F	 8.7
Source: Ministry of Finance and Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (reproduced
in Investing in the Stock Market in Malaysia, June 1996, p. A3)
Figure 7-1: Malaysia: Recession, recovery and growth (1982-1996)
Source: Ministry of Finance and Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (reproduced
in Investing in the Stock Market in Malaysia, June 1996, p. A3)
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launched in 1992. Being flooded by huge amounts of cheap, largely short-term foreign
capital, the surfeit of cash led to ill-advised investment in unproductive sectors, such as
luxurious property, producing an asset bubble that inevitably burst, leaving banks with
massive bad loans. These funds were also invested in industries that provide meagre
returns, such as the capacity-glutted steel and petrochemical industries. Faced with the
choice of deflating the economy or devaluing the currency, which was previously pegged
to a basket of currencies dominated by the American dollar, the government chose the
first course, keeping interest rates high and effectively imposing currency controls by
limiting access to baht by currency traders.
However, with the balance-of-payment deficits running at US$600-700 million, that
strategy risked depleting reserves, which already shrank from the previous year.
Moreover, at that time, the government had spent about US$2 billion defending the baht,
a currency thought to be overvalued by speculators. The subsequent massive selling of
baht by speculators therefore was inevitable. The net outflow of capital and declining
returns on equity at Thai companies also exacerbated the perception that the economy was
unhealthy, and that in turn added pressure to devalue the currency. Faced with these
market pressures, the government finally decided to float the currency on July 2, 1997.
The effect of baht devaluation was later felt by other neighbouring countries, even though
they did not face a similar financial crisis to Thailand. However, many analysts already
believed there would be regional spillover, since countries like the Philippines, Indonesia
and Malaysia were all facing similar prolonged current-account deficits, which could be
vulnerable to currency speculators. On average, the current account deficit was about 5%
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of the GDP for Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, and about 4% for Indonesia in
1997. As a matter of fact, statistics revealed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
show that these countries have suffered from current account deficits since 1990 (IMF
Financial Statistics, Feb. 1988). Speculators have long believed the governments of these
countries have valued their currencies higher than the market would justify.
Consequently, like in Thailand, speculators in the foreign exchange market started
attacking these weak currencies with a wave of selling, starting with the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Singapore and South Korea. The
subsequent effect of currency devaluation in these countries led to the economic crisis.
For Thailand, the baht devaluation did not revive their economy but led to recessionary
effect as more expensive imports dampen domestic consumption. Thai companies also
suffer since a lot of their borrowings are dollar-denominated, which are mostly unhedged.
For Malaysia, most analysts and economists initially doubted that the country would face
the Thai-like financial crisis. Comparatively, Malaysia has a more stable political climate
and a sturdier banking system with reasonably efficient regulation. The country's banking
and financial institutions boast the highest capital-adequacy ratio in South-East Asia
outside of Singapore. It has a continuing high inflow of long-term capital as opposed to
Thailand's short-term capital flows, and a more flexible floating currency instead of a
fixed one like Thailand. However, in addition to some effects of direct spillovers from
Thailand and the Philippines, Malaysia's financial crisis and economic downturn are also
the results of pre-emptive measures taken by the authorities to avoid similar problems.
When the Thai baht was first under heavy speculative attack in May 1997, the Malaysian
ringgit also experienced heavy selling pressure. To protect the currency, the central bank,
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Bank Negara Malaysia, sold close to $US1.5 billion in the foreign exchange market. The
success of the strategy, however, resulted in Bank Negara soaking up an estimated 3.5
billion ringgit in liquidity. This has, in effect, pushed interest rates up. The one-month
interbank rates, for instance, increased to about 9% from the usual rate of 7.25%. Besides
the direct consequence of Bank Negara's intervention to protect the ringgit, higher
interest rates were actually desired by the central bank to curb escalating property prices
and excessive stock market speculation and avoid an asset-inflation bubble and a Thai-
like financial crisis. Among others, lending for stock and property investments were
restricted to 15% and 20% respectively. The stock market, consequently, has been in the
doldrums ever since. Meanwhile, Bank Negara also gave up protecting the ringgit on July
14, and let market forces determine its value. The currency plunged dramatically
thereafter; from about 2.5 17 ringgit to a dollar in June, 1997, the ringgit dropped to 2.744
in August and plunged further to 3.769 in December (IMF Financial Statistics, February
1998).
From what began in the foreign exchange market, the turmoil spread very quickly to the
stock market in each of the countries affected. The effect on stock markets was first seen
in Thailand, followed by Malaysia and later Hong Kong and Singapore (see Figure 7-2).
In Malaysia, confidence in the economy started to erode as the value of ringgit
deteriorated at a very fast rate. The situation has resulted in an exodus of foreign funds to
more lucrative countries, and this, coupled with less retail interest following the curb, has
dampened market sentiment. The KLSE Composite Index fell sharply from its 1997 high
of 1270 points at the end of February, to just over 1000 points in mid-July, and between
550 to 580 points by the end of December 1997 (see Figure 7-2). In several desperate
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attempts to reverse the situation, the government made controversial ad hoc policies and
statements, which not only failed to change the direction of the market, but also further
dampened investors' confidence. Among these, the government ordered state-run
agencies to start buying shares and aimounced plans to create a multibillion dollar fund to
shore up the stock market. It also threatened to ban currency trading, and accused certain
currency speculators of sabotaging the economy. Rules to dissuade stocks selling were
also introduced, such as requiring sellers to deliver physical scrip to brokers before
selling. However, the most damaging measure taken by the authorities was the drastic
decision to ban short-selling of 100 blue-chip stocks that make up the Composite Index.
This has trapped and angered many American and European fund managers, and further
eroded their confidence in the KLSE. Although the government subsequently abandoned
the ban on short-selling, and introduced other positive measures to restore confidence,
such as scaling back the stock-price-support plan and postponing giant infrastructure
projects to reduce imports and deficits, they did not bring back foreign capital and
investors' confidence as soon as expected. In the end, the KLSE lost more than half of its
value within several months of the crisis.
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Figure 7-2: Effect of Asian economic turmoil on countries' indices
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Movement of SET Price Index (Jan 1997 - Apr 1998)
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7.3: Does Overreaction Effect Still Remain when the 1997 Data is Used?
The evidence of an overreaction effect for the period 1986-1996 has already been
documented in the previous chapters. Losers are found to perform better than the market
in the test period, while the opposite is generally true for winners, though not as dramatic.
It is also observed that time-varying risk and size do not explain the phenomenon. In this
post-script chapter, an investigation will be carried out to determine if the overreaction
effect still remains when returns for the bearish year of 1997 are included in the sample.
7.3.1: Data, methodolo gy and the test
As in Chapter 4, two extreme portfolios are formed, i.e., the winner and the loser
portfolios. These are the 17 firms which outperform the market (winners) in the 3-year
formation period 1992-94, and the 17 firms which underperform the market (losers) in the
same formation period. Their market-adjusted cumulative excess return (CERs),
calculated using equations 4-2 and 4-3, are then computed for the test period 1995-1997.
Two separate tests are then employed to determine if mean reversions in CERS, and hence
overreaction effect exists. First, I test whether there are any differences in the
performance of both portfolios in the formation period (FP) and test period (TP). In
addition, I also check for any changes in beta or firm size during the same periods for
each portfolio. The appropriate hypotheses are as follow;
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For winners, the null hypotheses are,
H0 : CERFP = CERTP
BETA FP = BETA ip
SIZE F? = SIZE TP	 against the alternative hypotheses,
H i : CERp >:TP
BETA F? > BETArp
SIZE F? <SIZE	 respectively.
For losers, the following null hypotheses are tested,
H0 CERFP=CERTP
BETA FP BETA
SIZE FP SIZE Ti' against the alternative hypotheses,
H 1 : CERFP <CERTP
BETAFP <BETATP
SIZE FP > SIZE Ti' respectively.
Secondly, the CERs, beta and size of winners and losers in the test period are compared.
If the overreaction hypothesis is true, the CERs of losers are expected to be higher than
that of winners in the period. Furthermore, for the critiques of the hypothesis to be true,
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losers should have higher beta and smaller size than winners in the test period. The
appropriate null hypotheses are that, in the test period;
Ho : CER Loser = cER Winner
Loser =	 Winner
SIZE Loser = SIZE Winner , while the alternative hypotheses are that, in the test period,
HA: CER Loser > CER winner
Loser >	 Winner
SIZE Loser <SIZE Winner, respectively.
7.3.2: Results and Discussion
The results of the first test is given in Table 7-2 below. Panel A summarises the results of
the t-test relating to the equality of mean CERs, beta and size in the formation period (FP)
and test period (TP) for winners, while panel B summarises the results for losers. As
expected, the CER value for winners decreases significantly in the test period by 240%
(t=1O.36). On the other hand, though still suffering a negative overall CER value, losers
manage to record an improvement in performance by 8.67%. However, this is not
statistically significant. The overall performance of the market in the turbulence year of
1997 may have taken a costly toll for most of the companies in the KLSE; losers in the
period 1992-94 are no exceptions. However, despite the bearish sentiment, losers still
manage to improve.
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With regard to beta, there is no significant difference observed in both periods for
winners. Quite surprisingly, the beta slightly increases in the test period by 0.01, but this
evidence is insufficient to reject the null hypothesis of equal beta in the formation and test
periods. The conjecture that winners underperform the market in the test period because
they are less risky can therefore be rejected. In fact, their beta value increases in the test
period 1995-97. More surprisingly, losers' beta has decreased in the test period when it
would be expected to increase to compensate for their higher returns in the period. The
losers' beta drops from 0.96 to 0.79; a statistically significant decrease of 0.17 (t -3.03).
Last but not least, I also check if the reversal in fortunes for winner and loser portfolios is
due to the changes in their size. Critiques of the overreaction hypothesis argue that due to
the decline in their price, winners' size (as measured by market value) shrinks. The
opposite is argued for losers. As a consequence, winners' (losers') returns would be lower
(higher) in the following period. At first glance, Table 7-2 reveals that this argument
seems to be true. There is an increase in winner' size, and a decrease in losers' size;
however, both are not significant at any reasonable probability level. Therefore, the
reverse in CER value from the formation period to the test period for winner and loser
portfolios cannot be completely attributed to the changes which take place in size for both
portfolios in the periods.
The results of the second test, i.e., testing for differences in losers' and winners' CERs,
beta and size in the test period which includes the bearish year of 1997, are given in Table
7-3. As can be seen, losers significantly outperform winners by 54.5%. However, it
should be noted that this is in absolute value terms. Applying an arbitrage strategy of
200
Chapter 7
Table 7-2: Differences between formation period (FP) and test period (TP) CERs, Beta and Size of
loser and winner portfolios (1992-1997)
A. Winner
	
FP	 TP	 Differencea	 t-value
CERS	 1.5896	 -0.8145	 2.4041	 10.36*
Beta	 1.09	 1.10	 -0.01	 -0.12
Size (in RM million)
	 1165	 1618	 -453	 -1.10
B. Loser
CERs	 -0.3567	 -0.2700	 0.0867	 0.42
Beta	 0.96	 0.79	 -0.17	 3Ø3X
Size (in RM million)	 1377	 1308	 -69	 -0.42
Notes:
a. For winner portfolio, the difference is obtained by subtracting the figure in TP colunm from FP column,
while for loser portfolio, the difference is obtained by subtracting the figure in FP column from TP colunm.
t-value = t-statistic for paired t-test of differences in sample means.
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level.
X indicates that this test statistic is the 'wrong sign' in relation to the one-tail test. Using a two-tailed test,
this t-value is highly significant.
buying losers and selling winners short will not yield any profit in this period. An
arbitrageur can only reduce his losses to 54.5% by applying the strategy. A higher CER
value for losers, however, is not accompanied by a higher beta. In the test period, losers'
beta is smaller by 0.31, and this is significant at the 0.05 level (t = 3.31). In terms of size,
losers are smaller in the test period than winners. This corresponds with the higher CERs
for losers, and is consistent with the size effect. However, at the 0.05 level, it is not
significant. From both tests, it appears that even in the bearish year of 1997, some degree
of mean reversions remains. However, a further graphical analysis below actually reveals
that this is only true prior to the period of economic turmoil.
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Figure 7-3 illustrates how the monthly cumulative CER values of both winner and loser
portfolios move 36-months into the test period. It clearly shows how the effect of
economic turmoil which began in the second half of 1997 in the KLSE, affects the
performance of both portfolios. For losers, the CERs start to fall in October, and
underperform the market beginning in November. Winners, as expected, never
outperform the market in the 1995-97 period. Their CERs plunge very substantially
beginning in September 1997. The figure also reveals that the movements of CER value
of winners and losers are not symmetrical in the period 1995-97. The effect of economic
turmoil is stronger for the previous winners. Another point about Figure 7-3 is that, there
is no pronounced seasonality in the CERs of both portfolios, although some degree of
February effect can be observed for winners in the first and third years of the test period.
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Table 7-3: CERs, Beta and Size differentials between loser and winner portfolios in
the test period (1995-1997)
Loser	 Winner	 Difference	 t-value
CERs	 -0.2700	 -0.8145	 0.5445	 1.82*
Beta	 0.79	 1.10	 -0.31	 -3.31"
Size (in RM million)	 1308	 1618	 -310	 -0.59
Notes:
t-value = t-statistic for t-test of differences in sample means for two independent samples,
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level,
X indicates that this test statistic is the 'wrong sign' in relation to the one-tailed test. Using a two-tailed test,
this t-value is highly significant.
Figure 7-3: CERs of winners and losers 36 months into the test period (1995-97)
Cl) Z -) z -)	 'Cl)
0.2
0
-0.2
Ui-.
C.)
-0.6
-0.8
—s--Winner
—a— Loser
Month
203
Chapter 7
7.4: Summary and Conclusion
Asia was hit by a sudden economic crisis in the summer of 1997. Deteriorating economic
fundamentals and competitiveness, and speculative selling pressure by currency
speculators are cited as the explanations. This Asian economic turmoil, as it is most
popularly referred to, was triggered by the devaluation of Thailand's baht in early July,
and spread quickly across most countries in the region, and in turn affected their economy
as a whole, including the performance of the stock markets. As for Malaysia, the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange lost more than half of its value by the end of the year. Trading
also slackened ever since, as investors lost confidence in the economy in general, and the
stock market in particular.
An investigation is carried out to determine if the overreaction hypothesis is still valid in
the KLSE when the bearish year of 1997 is included in the test period. Winner and loser
portfolios are formed based on their 1992-94 market adjusted cumulative excess returns
(CERs), and their performance in the test period 1995-97 is examined. Results from the
analysis show that for losers, the reversion in CER value from the previous period can be
observed up to September 1997; thereafter, their CERs started to decrease. As for
winners, they never outperform the market. Comparing the performance of both portfolios
in the test period 1995-97, the losers' average CERs is higher than the winners'; however
an arbitrage trading strategy of buying losers and selling winners short only works up to
October 1997. Size and time-varying risk do not appear to be relevant with the results
above. It can therefore be concluded that when the bearish year 1997 is included in the
test period, there is still some degree of mean reversion (and hence overreaction) in the
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KLSE, but this is only observed up to October 1997 when the economic crisis just started;
further into the crisis, this anomaly is not worth exploiting.
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
8.1: Summary
This study has been concerned with documenting stock market anomalies in the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), Malaysia, with some comparisons with three other
Far-Eastern markets, namely the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), the Stock
Exchange of Thailand (SET) and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). The main
anomaly investigated was long-run overreaction effect as documented in DeBondt and
Thaler (1985). Seasonality and firm size effects, which are usually associated with the
overreaction effect, were also examined individually, and in the context of the
overreaction effect. In addition, the impact of time-varying risk was also investigated.
The search for stock market anomalies is very popular among academics. This area of
research has produced a great deal of evidence which is used by sceptics to attack the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Questions have been raised on the validity of the
hypothesis which claims that share returns are unpredictable. To the practitioners, the
evidence of stock market anomalies provides huge potential for making profits in the
market place. The predictability of returns encourages the use of an active investment
style in order to take advantage of the deviation of actual prices from equilibrium prices.
This deviation of price from the fundamental value is perceived to be greater in a
206
Chapter 8
relatively small, thin and volatile market, such as that in Malaysia. It is due to these
reasons that this study is undertaken.
The study started with an investigation of stock market seasonality in four Far-Eastern
markets - KLSE, SES, SET and SEHK. The countries' main stock indices were used to
determine whether absolute returns were different across different months of the year. Of
particular interest was whether the well-known January effect, widely documented in the
US studies, applied in these markets. In addition the cultural influence on returns was also
investigated. With the exception of Thailand, all three markets are dominated by the
Chinese investors. An investigation was carried out to determine whether the Chinese
New Year celebrations affect stock prices in these markets.
A detailed examination of the overreaction effect in the KLSE was then undertaken in the
next three chapters. Two portfolios of 'extreme' stocks were formed based on their past
performance. The initial results appeared to be consistent with market overreaction;
portfolios of stocks which performed very well (wiimers) relative to the market in a
period were observed to underperform the market in the next period. The opposite was
true for those which underperformed the market (losers). A further analysis was then done
to determine whether these results were due to time-varying risk and risk differentials
between winner and loser portfolios. Next, the firm size effect in the KLSE was
investigated, and the impact of firm size on the overreaction effect was analysed. The
profile of overreaction was then examined for any seasonal patterns. Before I concluded
the study, a post-script chapter was included whereby the effect of the recent Asian
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economic turmoil on the markets, particularly on overreaction in the KLSE, was looked
at.
8.2: Main Findin gs of the Study
(1) The January effect is not present in Malaysia and Thailand. The effect, however, is
detected in Hong Kong and Singapore. In Malaysia, returns are highest in the months
of December and February. Both are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level.
In Thailand, December has the highest returns, but overall, no months are
significantly different from the others. December also is the month which yields the
highest returns in Singapore. January and May are the other two months with returns
significantly different from zero. In Hong Kong, the January effect is most
pronounced. It is the month which yields the highest returns there, followed by
December and April.
(2) The Chinese New Year effect is detected in the countries whose dominant investors
are from the ethnic Chinese community, i.e., Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong. In
Malaysia, the effect is especially significant five days after the market reopens
following the holidays. Daily returns 40 days preceding the celebration are also high.
The Chinese New Year effect, however, is more pronounced in Singapore and Hong
Kong prior to the festive season. In these markets, the rally starts as early as 40 days
before the first day of the celebration. Once the markets are open, the returns are still
high, but the effect is no longer significant. As expected, the effect does not exist in
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Thailand, treated as the control market in the investigation. This is most probably due
to the fact that the Chinese are not dominant there.
(3) There is evidence of an overreaction effect in the KLSE. Patterns of returns,
consistent with mean reversions are observed in both the winner and loser portfolios.
Stocks which underperform the market (losers) in a three-year period (formation
period) are found to outperform the market in the following three-year period (test
period). The reverse is true for stocks which outperform the market (winners) in the
formation period. Assuming no transaction costs, a contrarian investment strategy of
buying losers and short-selling winners will earn an arbitrageur significant returns in
three out of the six periods under study. Even when transaction costs are taken into
account, the arbitrageur can still earn significant profit in two periods. Pooling all six
periods under study together, on average, losers earn a positive gross return of 3 9.2%,
while winners earn a negative return of 0.6%, so that the strategy will earn the
arbitrageur a profit of 39.8%, assuming no transaction costs.
(4) The risk factor (beta) cannot fully explain overreaction in the KLSE. The evidence of
overreaction here does not seem to be influenced significantly by changes in
systematic risk over time, nor appear to be caused by risk differentials between winner
and loser portfolios. For winners, though the beta is greater in the formation period
than in the test period in five out of six periods under study, this observation is
significant only in one period. In fact, in period 6, the winners' beta is significantly
greater in the test period. For losers, the beta is significantly greater in 4 test periods.
However, the change in risk for two non-significant periods is unlikely to explain the
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significant overreaction patterns for losers identified earlier in these two periods. With
regards to beta differentials between winners and losers in the test period, an analysis
reveals that losers' beta is greater than winners' beta in five periods. However, in
period 6, the opposite is true; the losers' beta is actually significantly smaller than
winners' beta. In this period, amazingly, losers significantly outperform winners.
More interestingly, significant beta differentials between these portfolios in three test
periods (p = 1,4,5) nicely correspond to the insignificant performance differentials of
the portfolios in those periods.
(5) A firm size effect is present in the KLSE. Portfolios constructed based on the market
value of firms are observed to yields different excess returns. The smallest firms
portfolio outperforms the largest firms portfolio in all six test periods. In three
periods, this superior performance of small firms is statistically significant.
(6) The size effect does not appear to explain the overreaction effect. This is concluded
from the following observations. First, there are few interactions between losers and
small firms , and between winners and large firms, implying that losers are not always
the smallest firms, and winners are not always the largest firms. Secondly, it is found
that losers are always smaller than winners in both formation and test periods.
Moreover, when prior period (formation period) returns are controlled for, test period
returns do not appear to be explained by size. However, when firm size is held
constant, it is found that prior period returns do have explanatory power on test period
returns. Therefore, the overreaction effect in the KLSE appears to be independent of
the size effect.
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(7) There is a strong seasonal pattern in the cumulative excess returns (CERs) profile of
winner and loser portfolios. CER values are found to be higher in the month of
February for both portfolios than the other months. In absolute terms, losers' CERs in
February are higher than those of the winners. For the loser portfolio, CERs in
February contribute more than half of its total CERs in the test period. Excluding
February CERs, however, still leaves losers with substantial positive returns. In the
case of winners, despite having an overall negative CER value in the test periods, the
CER values in February actually contribute substantial positive CERs for the
portfolio. I believe that this phenomenon is related to the Chinese New Year effect
since the festival occurs mostly in the month of February.
(8) Further investigation of the relation between the February effect and firm size reveals
that higher February returns are more pronounced for small firms than for large firms.
For small firms, there are three periods where there is evidence of a significant
February effect. For large firms, there are only two periods where a significant
February effect is observed. Higher proportions of local individual investors in small
firms may likely explain this finding, as their trading behaviour may be influenced by
local factors, such as the Chinese New Year celebration. Outside investors would
most likely invest in well-researched and well-known companies, which tend to be
large corporations.
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8.3: Conclusion
This study provides strong evidence of the existence of several anomalies in the KLSE,
and therefore concludes that KLSE share prices are predictable to some extent. The
overreaction effect, which is observable in both US and the UK stock returns is also
present in the stock returns of the KLSE. Stocks which underperform the market over a
three-year period (losers) can be used to construct portfolios which yield significantly
improved performance, relative to the market, over the following three years. For stocks
which outperform the market over the initial three-year period (winners), there is a
tendency for this superior performance to be reversed over the following three years,
though not as dramatically as for losers. Although there is evidence of time variation in
systematic risk levels, and evidence of risk differentials between winners and losers, the
evidence here suggests that these factors cannot fully explain the apparent mean reverting
behaviour of prices. There is also evidence of potential profits from arbitrage trading
based on short selling winners and buying losers, although it is doubtful that these will
always be large enough to outweigh any transaction costs.
Besides the overreaction effect, there also exists a firm size effect in KLSE stocks.
Portfolios of smaller firms are found to outperform those of larger firms. However, this
effect does not explain the overreaction effect. A seasonal pattern is also documented in
the KLSE. The general level of returns is observed to be higher in December and
February, and also around the Chinese New Year which occurs mostly in the first half of
February for the period under study. Furthermore, this so-called February effect is more
pronounced in the excess returns of small firms than large firms. Interestingly, higher
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February excess returns also play a significant part in the seasonal pattern observed in the
overreaction profile of KLSE stocks; excess returns are highest in February for both
winners and losers. Because of the non-existence of capital gain tax on securities trading
in Malaysia during the period studied here, an institutional or cultural explanation for this
seasonal pattern in overreaction appears the most likely.
8.4: Implications of the Study
The findings of this study have several implications, both for academics and practitioners.
To the practitioners in the KLSE, the results in this study provide another opportunity for
them to beat the market. Devising a strategy of buying the previous 3-year loser shares
and selling short the previous 3-year winner shares could earn them substantial profits in
the next three years. Applying a strategy based on the market value of firms, and correct
timing in buying and selling shares may also yield some profits.
At a more theoretical level, the successful trading strategy of buying losers and short
selling winners could constitute a major stumbling block to the Efficient Market
Hypothesis. To be more specific, since the strategy uses past returns as the information
set to make future predictions, the ability of the strategy to make profit consistently has
potentially violated the weakest form of the EMH. Historical information which is
available publicly does actually have predictive value. Results from studies invoking
market efficiency as an assumption are therefore, questionable. However, a degree of
caution is in order. This study does not explicitly test the validity of the equilibrium asset
pricing model. A test of market efficiency, as always acknowledged, is a joint-test of an
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asset pricing model. There might be some possibility that the asset pricing model is
misspecified. Therefore, it cannot be concluded definitely form the results in this study
that the KLSE is weak-form inefficient.
8.5: Suggestions for Future Research
One of the most puzzling observations in this study is the way in which February returns
contribute to high positive excess returns for both winners and losers. I have not made
any analytical attempt to investigate this phenomenon in this study. However, I believe
that such a phenomenon may have some relationship with the Chinese New Year (CNY)
effect, since the festival occurs mostly in February. For example, February or CNY might
constitute a focal point for the 'mental accounting' of Malaysian investors. In the absence
of capital gain tax in Malaysia, cultural or behavioural-based explanations could possibly
provide a more acceptable explanation for abnormally high February returns. Future
research should therefore look into this possibility.
Another possible extension to this study might look at the factor(s) or variable(s) that
drive overreaction in the KLSE. As DeBondt and Thaler argue, investors overreact to
news events, such as earnings announcements, and subsequently correct themselves.
Would this be true in the KLSE? Is there any tendency for firms in Malaysia to release
price-sensitive information in certain periods, such as around the Chinese New Year?
Again, this would be interesting because an alternative explanation based on cultural and
perhaps behavioural approaches could be offered to explain such a phenomenon.
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APPENDICES
ppendix 1: List of sample companies
1. Ajinomoto
2. Amalgamated Industrial Steel
3. AMDB
4. Amsteel
5. Anson Perdana
6. Antah
7. Aokam
8.AP Land
9. Asia Pacific Holdings
10. Asiatic Development
11. Austral Amalgamated Tin
12. Austral Enterprise
13. Ayer Hitam Tin
14. Bandaraya
15. Batu Kawan
16. Berjaya Group
17. Berjayalnd.
18. Berjaya Sports
19. Berjuntai Tin
20. Best World Land
21. Boustead
22. Carlsberg Brew.
23. CASH
24. Chemical Co.
25. Choc. Product
26. CIMA
27. Cold Storage
28. Cycle & Carriage
29. Dato Keramat
30. DCB Holdings
31. DMIB
32. DNPP Holdings
33. DRB
34. Dutch Baby Milk
35. Eastern & Oriental
36. Esso Malaysia
37. Faber
38. FCW Holdings
39. Federal Flour
40. Fima Corp.
41. Gadek
42. General Corp.
43. Genting
44. George Kent
45. Glenealy Plantation
46. Gold Coin
47. Golden Hope
48. Golden Plus
49. Gopeng
50. Guiness
51. Guthrie Ropel
52. Hexza Corp.
53. Hicom
54. Highland & Lowland
55. Hong Leong Credit
56. Hong Leong Industries
57. Hong Leong Properties
58. Hume
59. Idris Hydraulic
60. Inchape Timuran
61. limovest
62.1GB Corp.
63. IJM Corp
64. 101
65. 101 Properties
66. Island & Peninsular
67. Jaya Tiasa
68. Johan Holdings
69. John Hancock
70. Keck Seng
71. Kelanamas
72. Kemayan
73. Kian Joo
74. Killinghall
75. KL Industrial Holdings
76. KL Kepong
77. Kong Guan
78. Kuala Sidim
79. Kulim
80. Kumpulan Emas
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81. Land & Generals
82. Landmarks
83. Larut Consolidated
84. Lien Hoe Corp.
85. Lingui Development
86. Lion Corp.
87. Magnum
88. Malakoff
89. Malayan Cement
90. Malayan Flour
91. Malaysia Pacific Industries
92. Malaysian Aica
93. Malaysian Air
94. Malaysian Assurance
95. Malaysian General Investment
96. Malaysian Mining
97. Malaysian Mosaics
98. Malaysian Oxygen
99. Malaysian Plantation
100. Malaysian Resources
101. Malaysian Tobacco
102. Malaysian Utd md.
103. Malex Industries
104. Maruichi
105. Matsushita
106. MayBank
107. MBF Capital
108. MBF Holdings
109. Mechmar Corp.
110. Menang Corp.
111. Metroplex
112. Muda
113. MUI Properties
114. Mulpha International
115. Multipurpose Holdings
116. MWE Holdings
117. Mycom
118. NBT
119. NSTP
120. OYL md.
121. Pacific Chemicals
122. Palmco Holdings
123. Panglobal
124. Pan Malaysia Cement
125. Paramount
126. Pelangi
127. Penis Plantation
128. Petaling Garden
129. Pilecon Engineering
130. PJ Development
131. Promet
132. Public Bank
133. Rahman Hydraulic
134. Renong
135. Rothmans
136. Samanda Holdings
137. Sanyo
138. Sateras
139. SCB Development
140. SEA Development
141. SEAL
142. Setron
143. Sime Darby
144. Sime UEP
145. Sin Heng Chan
146. Selangor Dredging
147. Selangor Property
148. Shell
149. Sitt Tatt
150. Sg Way
151. South Malaysia Industries
152. SPK Sentosa
153. Sri Hartamas
154. Tan Chong
155. TDM
156. Technology Resource Induntries
157. Time Engineering.
158. Tongkah Holdings
159. Tractors Malaysia
160. Tronoh
161. UAC
162. UMW Holdings
163. Uniphone
164. Westmont Land
165. Yeoh Hiap Seng
166. YTL Corp.
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Appendix 2: Winners and Losers in each subperiods
Period1: Winners __________________	 _______________
	
Formation Period	 Test Period
Company	 CER8688 Beta8688	 CER89-91	 Beta8991
Tractors Malaysia	 1.150 15 0.40	 0.58655 0.48
UMWHldngs	 0.93510 1.05	 0.89085 1.29
M'sian Mining
	
0.83708	 1.37	 -0.30182	 1.18
DNPP Hldgs.	 0.75673 0.95	 -0.72477 1.17
Amsteel	 0.68612	 1.25	 0.08056	 1.15
M'sian Air	 0.62193	 0.84	 -0.33378 0.89
JayaTiasa	 0.61864 0.58	 -0.71872 0.91
Guiness	 0.55072 0.85	 -0.10372 0.69
SimeDarby	 0.53800	 1.08	 0.01804	 1.13
Federal Flour	 0.53022 0.73	 0.07511	 0.27
Muda	 0.52943	 1.20	 0.36315	 1.11
YeohlliapSeng	 0.51021 0.68	 -0.06011 0.62
M'sia Pacific md.	 0.49527 1.10	 0.42573	 0.78
Penis Plant.	 0.48632 0.77	 0.09454 0.40
KLKepong	 0.45417 0.91	 -0.53884 0.74
Rothmans	 0.42522 0.23	 0.81638 0.44
Killinghall	 0.39345 0.44	 -0.71032 0.62
AVERAGE	 0.61875 0.85	 -0.00830 0.82
Period1: Losers _______________	 _________________
	
Formation Period	 Test Period
Company	 CER8688	 Beta8688
 CER89-91 Beta8991
Hong Leong Prop.	 -1.37823 1.23	 0.49882	 1.53
M'sian Resources	 -1.39564 1.23	 -0.89809	 1.43
KLInd.Hldg.	 -1.40257 1.37	
-1.01160	 1.59
Panglobal	 -1.44269 0.81	
-0.04008	 1.00
Renong	 -1.50431 1.12	 1.53864	 1.57
AP Land	 -1.56885 0.97
	 0.25925	 1.43
TechRes.Ind.	 -1.58112 1.29
	 0.11195	 1.60
CASH	 -1.74911 1.46	 0.31358	 1.74
TongkahHldgs.	 -1.81849 1.05	
-0.02391	 1.63
M'sian Assurance	 -1.83070 0.85
	 0.02466	 1.61
MBFH1dgs.	 -1.84723 1.11	 0.54069	 1.83
LienHoeCorp.	 -2.01531 1.04	
-0.09482	 1.40
Landmarks	 -2.04948 0.87	
-0.12803	 1.37
South M'sia Inds.	 -2.07070 0.86	 0.34462	 1.80
Anson Perdana	 -2.19989 0.95	 -0.00328	 1.47
DRB	 -2.33052 1.31	 -0.01492	 1.78
Sri Hartamas	 -2.40625 0.91	 -0.14610	 1.60
AVERAGE	 -1.79948 1.08	 0.07479	 1.55
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Period2: Winners ___________________	 ________________
	
Formation Period
	
Test Period
Company	 CER8789	 Beta87.89 CER90-92 Beta9092
UMWHldngs	 1.97172 0.92	 0.08316 1.26
Muda	 1.65846 1.24	 -0.92213	 1.21
Msia Pacific md.	 1.25839 1.12
	
-0.03244 0.69
Tan Chong	 1.19957 1.44	 -0.21055	 1.51
GoldenPius	 1.18974 1.54	 -0.11367	 1.54
Land&Gen	 1.18505 1.54
	 -0.53278	 1.11
CIMA	 1.17490 1.06
	
-0.15138 0.90
Time Eng.	 1.16932 1.09
	 -1.13558	 1.45
1GB Corp.	 1.03074 1.41
	 -0.39643	 1.22
Pan M'sia Cement	 0.97944 1.11
	 -0.67325	 1.01
Amaig. md. Steel 	 0.87432 1.31
	 -0.63352	 1.34
Cycle& Carriage	 0.85559 1.05	 -0.14010	 1.38
Tractors Malaysia 	 0.84991 0.35
	
-0.17210 0.44
Maruichi	 0.84816 1.03
	 -0.23464 0.69
Malayan Cement	 0.84688 1.13
	 0.16867 0.84
Amsteel	 0.83143 1.20
	 -0.81360	 1.23
Setron	 0.83116 1.12
	 -0.83446	 1.55
AVERAGE	 1.10322 1.16	 -0.39675 1.14
Period2: Losers ___________________	 _______________
	
Formation Period	 Test Period
Company	 CER8789	 Beta8789
 CER9O-92 Beta9092
TechRes.Ind.	 -0.67483 1.27	 0.32112	 1.63
Lien Hoe Corp.	 -0.71648 1.16	 -0.53462	 1.23
Tongkah Hldgs.
	
-0.72904 1.21	 -0.3259 1	 1.69
MBFH1dgs.	 -0.78025 1.14	 0.16459	 1.78
Pacific Chemicals 	 -0.78648 0.28	 1.39502 0.58
Best World Land	 -0.85583 0.03	 -0.00580 0.25
Sin Heng Chan
	
-0.85741 0.38	 -0.10226 0.38
Msian Resources	 -0.87252 1.15	 0.10675	 1.43
John Hancock	 -0.88142 0.91	 -0.37636 0.64
Dutch Baby Milk	 -0.9 1271 0.62	 -0.0593 8 0.25
AyerllitamTin	 -1.01159 0.14	 -0.02564	 1.50
SouthM'sialnds.	 -1.02213	 1.19	 -0.02104	 1.71
AnsonPerdana	 -1.06525 1.06	 -0.16230	 1.49
Sri Hartamas	 -1.13005 1.05	 -0.62966	 1.59
Panglobal	 -1.24805 1.05	 -0.18180	 0.83
M'sianAssurance	 -1.89276 1.08	 -0.11694	 1.61
Aokam	 -1.92508 0.53
	 1.69183	 1.78
AVERAGE	 -1.02129 0.84	 0.06692 1.20
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Period3: Winners	 ___________________
Formation Period
	 Test Period
Company	 CER8890	 Beta3890
 CER9I-93 Beta9193
UMWHldngs	 1.81269 1.50	 -0.71192 1.07
CIMA	 1.72053 1.03	 -0.29125 0.91
Renong	 1.47547 1.56	 0.16927	 1.25
Genting	 1.13384 0.99	 0.70707	 1.14
M'siaPacificlnd.	 1.13196 0.86	 -0.15218	 0.74
Tractors Malaysia	 1.04063 0.44	 -0.60545 0.87
Malayan Cement
	
1.03585 1.10	 -0.02738 0.81
Tan Chong	 1.00905 1.54	 -0.54890	 1.30
Golden Plus	 0.95569 1.67	 1.47106	 1.19
Carlsberg Brew.	 0.92637 0.50	 -0.33684 0.30
Rothmans	 0.90389 0.48	 -0.15977 0.55
SgWay	 0.88834 1.35	 0.43127 0.90
Pan M'sia Cement	 0.86446 1.13	 -0.17058	 1.03
Mycom	 0.85400 1.20	 0.27999 0.89
Pilecon Eng.	 0.8 1246 1.60	 0.40370	 1.08
Palmco Hldgs.	 0.788 14 1.27	 -0.19569 0.51
OYL md.
	
0.76794 0.60
	
0.96269 0.50
AVERAGE	 1.06596 1.11	 0.07206 0.88
Period3: Losers _____________________
	
Formation Period
	 Test Period
Company	 CER8890	 Beta8890 CER9i-93
	
Beta9193
M'sian Assurance	 -0.65370 1.49
	 0.55197 1.21
Cold Storage	 -0.65923 0.72	 0.2 1358 0.99
Berjuntai Tin	 -0.660 16 0.72
	 1.46353 0.77
Berjaya Group	 -0.66805 1.27
	 0.38549 0.92
Dato Keramat	 -0.67822 0.24
	 2.70778 1.06
KL md. Hldg.	 -0.68488 1.64
	 -0.13524 1.25
M'sian Plantation	 -0.708 12 1.05
	 0.69691 1.34
John Hancock	 -0.72555 0.75	 0.60372 0.58
SEA Development 	 -0.75311 0.88
	 0.2233 8 0.59
Best World Land	 -0.77983 0.03
	 0.34 127 0.62
Pacific Chemicals	 -0.79034 0.27
	 2.35649 0.51
Kuala Sidim	 -0.80790 0.62
	 0.9 1446 0.72
Kelanamas	 -0.82442 0.74
	 0.65675 1.17
SinHengChan	 -0.83611 0.48
	 1.55565 0.42
M'sian Resources 	 -0.98204 1.52
	
0.9 1303 1.20
Innovest	 -1.08099 1.36
	 0.09047 1.12
Aokam	 -1.42237 1.56
	
2.13709 0.98
AVERAGE	 -0.80677 0.90	 0.92214 0.91
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Period4: Winners _________________ ______________
	
Formation Period
	
Test Period
Company	 CER8991	 Beta8991 CER92-94
	
Beta92.94
OYLInd.	 1.68763 0.57	 0.44715 0.86
CIMA	 1.64026 1.03	 0.17519 0.80
Renong	 1.53864 1.57	 0.45327 1.27
Sanyo	 1.42224 0.93	 -0.20779 0.61
Magnum	 1.29970 0.99	 0.57862 1.14
Golden Plus	 1.25508 1.66	 1.29069 1.42
Gentirig	 1.23286 1.03	 0.55333 1.02
KianJoo	 1.22584 0.83	 0.21385 0.80
Matsushita	 0.95978 0.44	 -0.41237 0.57
Mycoui	 0.92893 1.25	 0.56909 0.99
FCWH1dgs.	 0.91759 0.11	 1.43266 0.58
UMWHldngs	 0.89085 1.29	 0.05684 1.01
George Kent	 0.87174 1.43	 0.76116 0.56
SgWay	 0.85769 1.29	 1.16180 0.79
Shell	 0.85698 0.84	 -0.30179 0.46
Rothmans	 0.81638 0.44	 -0.15265 0.52
Palmco Hldgs.	 0.79580 0.85	 -0.23366 1.29
AVERAGE	 1.12929 0.97	 0.37561 0.86
Period4: Losers ____________________ ________________
I	 Formation Period	 Test Period
Company	 CER8991	 Betas99 i
 CER92-94	 Beta9294
Best WorldLand	 -0.58901 0.11	 0.21264 1.39
Sin Heng Chan	 -0 .59967 0.48	 1.77799 1.05
Asiatic Dev.
	
-0.60743 0.86	 0.68444 1.53
Golden Hope	 -0.62807 0.82	 0.20087 1.43
Malayan Flour	 -0.6323 1 0.74	 0.0504 1 1.37
Kuala Sidim	 -0.67329 0.54	 0.72975 1.43
Killinghall	 -0.71032 0.62	 0.28827 1.40
Innovest	 -0.71152 1.27	 -0.20374 1.39
JayaTiasa	 -0.71872 0.91	 1.27989 1.01
DNPP Hldgs.	 -0.72477 1.17	 0.38003 1.57
Rahman Hydraulic 	 -0.73936 0.43	 0.87901 1.74
Cold Storage	 -0.75836 0.88	 0.29024 1.25
Berjuntai Tin	 -0.7660 1 0.75	 1.32424 1.68
M'sianResources	 -0.89809 1.43	 1.02811 1.35
MsianPlantation	 -0.93191	 1.07	 0.38326 1.79
KLInd.Hldg.	 -1.01160 1.59	 0.51842 1.46
Kelanamas	 -1.30188 0.98	 0.49591 1.35
AVERAGE	 -0.764841 0.86	 0.60704 1.42
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Period 5: Winners _________________ ______________
	
Formation Period	 Test Period
Company	 CER90.92	 Beta9o-2 CER93-95 	 Beta93-95
Magnum	 2.04474 1.05	 -0.07141 1.20
FCWH1dgs.	 1.69955 0.11	 0.62229 0.71
Aokam	 1.69183 1.78	 -0.74495 0.93
Pacific Chemicals 	 1.39502 0.58	 0.3 1487 0.89
OYL md.
	
1.35 143 0.44	 0.49616 0.76
Sanyo	 1.23846 1.09	 -0.21104 0.70
Mycom	 1.08086 1.31
	
0.24279 1.01
George Kent	 1.02555 1.34
	 -0.19864 0.53
Genting	 1.00061	 1.04	 0.41435 1.02
Hong Leong Credit	 0.96057 1.18
	 0.55687 0.74
Berjaya Sports	 0.93527 1.67
	 0.85878 1.04
Matsushita	 0.9 1784 0.45
	 -0.49293 0.54
Dato Keramat	 0.83668 0.67
	 1.34900 1.56
KianJoo	 0.69718 0.71	 0.21933 0.76
YTL Corp.	 0.61973 1.02	 1.51813 0.83
MBF Capital	 0.59767 1.55	 0.36708 1.37
Renong	 0.59455 1.41	 0.80755 1.41
AVERAGE	 1.09927 1.02	 0.35578 0.94
Period 5: Losers ___________________ ___________________
I	 Formation Period	 Test Period
Company	 CER9092	 Beta9o2 CER9395	 Beta5
Cold Storage	 -0.67852 1.09	 0.27454 1.33
Berjayalnd.	 -0.69450 1.19	 0.07775 1.36
JayaTiasa	 -0.71074 0.87	 1.49081	 1.15
Menang Corp.	 -0.7 1546 1.71	 0.2028 1 1.85
TDM	 -0.72749 1.78	 0.52586 1.65
M'sian Air	 -0.76238 0.91	 0.03925 0.75
Rahman Hydraulic 	 -0.7680 1 0.48	 0.75999 1.88
SEAL	 -0.77263 0.97	 0.95 182 1.56
Amsteel	 -0.81360 1.23	 0.07631 1.34
Setron	 -0.83446 1.55	 0.56198 1.49
Innovest	 -0.90883	 1.16	 0.31949 1.44
Muda	 -0.92213 1.21	 0.38116 1.48
KL md. Hldg.	 -0.93297 1.52	 0.15664 1.62
Larut Consolidated	 -0.98293 1.70	 0.79872 1.46
BerjuntaiTin	 -1.01111 0.66	 1.04140 1.79
Time Eng.	 -1.13558 1.45	 0.34975 1.28
DRB	 -2.08429 1.69	 1.16450 1.36
AVERAGE	 -0.90915 1.25	 0.53958 1.46
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Period 6: Winners ___________________	 _______________
	
IFormation Period	 Test Period
Company	 CER9193	 Beta9193 CER94-96 	 Beta94..96
DatoKeramat	 2.70778 1.06	 -0.81930 1.50
Pacific Chemicals	 2.35649 0.51	 -0.3 1441 1.06
Aokam	 2.13709 0.98	 -1.87924 1.07
Lingui Dev.
	
2.11646 1.24	 -0.65089 1.37
Berjaya Sports	 1.91223 1.33	 0.72163 0.96
Hicom	 1.82234 0.67	 -1.13935 1.28
KongGuan	 1.69476 0.56	 0.03011 1.14
Idris Hydraulic	 1.66992 1.41	 -0.93902 1.59
Sin Heng Chan	 1.55565 0.42	 0.24204 1.12
Magnum	 1.50623 0.88	 -0.02060 1.27
Muipha Int'l.	 1.50062 1.40	 -0.70656 1.72
Golden Plus	 1.47106 1.19	 -1.00814 1.65
Berjuntai Tin	 1.46353 0.77	 -0.70842 1.89
Hong Leong Credit	 1.38389 0.90	 0.02168 0.79
TechRes.Ind.	 1.36664 1.18	 -0.84615 1.16
Gopeng	 1.36524 0.88	 -0.16770 1.67
YTL Corp.	 1.32169 0.82	 0.96896 0.81
AVERAGE	 1.72657 0.95	 -0.42443 130
Period 6: Losers ____________________ ____________________
	
Formation Period	 Test Period
Company	 CER9193	 Beta913 CER9496	 Beta9496
CIMA	 -0.29 125 0.91	 -0.08979 0.76
Esso M'sia	 -0.293 57 0.57	 0.06969 0.55
Lion Corp.	 -0.31269 0.97	 0.25389 0.87
Amsteel	 -0.32709 1.33	 -0.20377 1.34
Carlsberg Brew.	 -0.33684 0.30	 0.83031 0.20
M'sian Tobacco	 -0.34108 0.55	 -0.08813 0.53
Antah	 -0.34676 1.23	 0.46107 1.50
UAC	 -0.35474 0.79	 -0.3 1407 0.99
KLKepong	 -0.36493 0.89	 0.53139 0.95
Petaling Garden	 -0.41484 1.13	 0.05707 1.45
Penis Plant.	 -0.42729 0.37	 -0.02655 0.62
M'sian Air	 -0.45085 0.84	 -0.18517 0.73
Tan Chong	 -0.54890 1.30	 0.14270 1.33
Tractors Malaysia	 -0.60545 0.87	 0.29745 0.70
UMWHldngs	 -0.71192 1.07	 0.43369 0.96
Guiness	 -0.73414 0.72	 0.40115 0.78
DRB	 -0.77042 1.03	 0.02366 1.36
AVERAGE	 -0.44899 0.87	 0.15262 0.92
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